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Abstract 
The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Information Systems Security 
(INFOSEC) Studies and Research (NPS CISR) has developed an instructional 
program in computer security. Its objective is to insure that students not only 
understand practical aspects of computer security associated with current 
technology, but also learn the fundamental principles that can be applied to the 
development of systems for which high confidence in policy enforcement can be 
achieved. Introduction to Computer Security, the cornerstone course for our 
program, is described here. 
1 Introduction 
Twenty-five years ago, computers were still largely monolithic mainframes, physically isolated 
from cyber-predators and closely tended by dedicated staffs of technical and administrative 
personnel. Even then, when computers were the domain of scientists and engineers, the need for 
computer security was recognized [22] and programs to achieve it pursued, e.g. [23]. 
Now society’s relationship with the computer has changed dramatically. Computers are 
everywhere: in our tools and appliances, in our homes, schools and offices. They are used to 
manage our money and all phases of commercial enterprise. The evolution of techniques with 
which to download executable content either for work or entertainment from remote systems 
provides powerful mechanisms that tie together the far corners of the world as never before. Now 
computer security is no longer an esoteric subject discussed by a small group of academics and 
system administrators, but a topic that must be appreciated by all citizens of the information age. 
The education of computer security professionals is critical to the support of personal, corporate, 
and government information systems security objectives. 
Over the past six years, at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), we have developed a program in 
INFOSEC education. This effort is under the umbrella of the Naval Postgraduate School Center 
for Information Systems Security Studies and Research and Research (NPS CISR). A cornerstone 
of the educational program offered by NPS CISR is the introductory course in computer security 
that we have developed. This report is intended to provide background regarding the rationale for 
the course’s content and a detailed description of the course itself. 
1 
2 Background 
2.1 Computer Science at NPS 
- The INFOSEC education program at NPS is part of the Computer Science Curriculum. In the 
two-year, eight-quarter Masters degree program, students are required to demonstrate competence 
in a core curriculum of traditional computer science courses. Many entering students have no 
prior education in computer science. They must cover the fundamentals of computer science 
which include the theory of formal languages, computer systems principles, object-oriented 
programming, data structures, artificial intelligence, operating systems, software methodology, 
database systems, computer communications and networks, computer graphics or interactive 
computation, computer security, and the design and analysis of algorithms. 
To allow for specialization in a variety of areas, the core curriculum is enhanced with tracks in the 
following areas: software engineering; artificial intelligence and robotics; database and data 
engineering; computer graphics and visual simulation; computer systems and architecture; and 
computer security. 
Each student’s course of study is capped by a written thesis, most often based on research directed 
by a faculty member in the student’s chosen specialization track. This work must be conducted 
during the sixth through eighth quarters in conjunction with classes. Thesis research allows 
students to be involved in work addressing an unsolved problem, usually within the framework of 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or U.S. Government; it enhances both their oral and 
written presentation skills, and it hones their critical thinking abilities. In many cases students 
start thesis research prior to the sixth quarter. 
2.2 NPS CISR 
The computer security track was established in 1991 to address the growing need for INFOSEC 
education of U.S. military officers. First, a two-course sequence in INFOSEC was offered: an 
introductory course and an advanced topics course. In 1994 the track was expanded and new 
INFOSEC courses were added to the Computer Science Curriculum. 
With the encouragement of sponsors, the Naval Postgraduate School Center for INFOSEC 
Studies and Research was officially established in October 1996. Today, N P S  CISR involves the 
research of eight faculty and staff members, nine thesis students, and approximately 150 students 
participating in classes and laboratory work annually. Students in Computer Science, Information 
Technology Management, and Information Warfare curricula all take courses in computer 
security. 
NPS CISR serves the INFOSEC research and education needs of DoD/DoN in the following 
primary areas. 
Curriculum development ensures that a coherent and comprehensive program in INFOSEC 
foundations and technology is presented at the university and postgraduate levels. 
Development of the INFOSEC and Trusted Systems Laboratory supports the INFOSEC teach- 
ing and research programs at NPS. 
Faculty development fosters the insertion of INFOSEC concepts at appropriate points in gen- 
eral computer science courses and involves interested faculty members in leading-edge 
INFOSEC research problems. 
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A Visiting Professor program which brings INFOSEC experts to N P S  to offer courses and 
engage in research with faculty and students. 
An Invited Lecture series injects commercial and military relevance into the NPS CISR activi- 
ties. 
An academic outreach program permits other non-CISR academic institutions to benefit from 
the INFOSEC education and research developments at NPS. 
An effort to insure that NPS CISR graduates are identified so that their expertise can be applied 
to the wide variety of INFOSEC challenges in DoD and U.S. Government. 
Research, focusing on INFOSEC problems, with emphasis on those of DON, DoD, and U.S. 
Government. 
2.3 INFOSEC Curriculum 
The curriculum for the INFOSEC track has been designed to meet the following general 
objectives: 
To provide courses for both beginning and advanced students, 
To provide courses accessible by students who are not in the Computer Science curriculum, 
To insure that Computer Science students have a strong foundation upon which to base 
advanced course work in computer science and INFOSEC, 
To involve students in ongoing research and technology development efforts associated with 
computer security and INFOSEC, and 
To enhance students’ laboratory experience through the hands-on use of secure systems, 
To heighten awareness of security issues with non-computer science majors, such as those 
studying management or procurement. 
2.3.1 NPS CISR Curriculum Philosophy 
To teach computer security, an accurate definition of the subject is needed. At the most general 
level, security pertains to access either to computational resources or to information in a computer 
system. Access to computational resources can be denied to legitimate users through the 
disruption of service, theft, or merely too little processing power or bandwidth for the amount of 
computation required. In contrast, information is vulnerable to unauthorized modification or 
disclosure. Access to information is controlled to prevent unauthorized modification and 
disclosure. Thus we have a triad of INFOSEC objectives: 
Availability: to ensure that information and/or resources are not being withheld in an unautho- 
rized manner. 
Confidentiality: to ensure that information is not disclosed in an unauthorized manner. 
Integrity: to ensure that information is not modified in an unauthorized manner. 
It is important to clearly separate problems in availability from those associated with 
confidentiality and integrity. For availability, we wish to ensure access to a resource, whereas, for 
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the other two, we wish to permit only authorized parties access to information. Students learn that 
availability is subjective, what is sufficient access to resources for one individual may be 
inadequate for another. Thus it is difficult to express an availability policy. In contrast 
confidentiality and integrity can be precisely defined and it is possible to know when a system has 
provided the necessary and sufficient mechanism to support either a confidentiality or an integrity 
policy, or both. 
In terms of content, we believe that it is essential that students understand the fundamental 
concepts behind risk avoidance as articulated in the Reference Monitor Concept [4]. This 
encompasses a notion of completeness that is absent from more intuitive and/or ad hoc 
approaches to computer security. The idea that a policy enforcement mechanism is always 
invoked, cannot be modified by unauthorized individuals, and is inspectable so that one can 
assess whether or not it works correctly is applicable over a broad range of security policies and 
mechanisms. This requires systematic presentation of the principles of computer security and a 
corresponding engineering discipline. The feasibility of designing systems which are less 
susceptible to recurrent cycles of penetrations and patches [17] can be described and 
demonstrated. 
In addition, our students must know how to function in the real world, where risk management 
techniques are employed [ 11. The practical nature of these approaches make them attractive in 
situations where more complete systems are not in place. (Note that we are making a distinction 
between the study of these protection functions and system maintenance.) Issues associated with 
the incremental achievement of security objectives must be addressed. 
Topics have been identified which we believe should be covered in an INFOSEC education 
program. Our position as a DoD university is reflected in some of these subjects, however, most 
are universal. They include, in no particular order: Risk Analysis, Disaster Recovery, Access 
Controls and Authentication, System Maintenance, Cryptography, Emanations Security, Audit 
Management, Protocols, Key Management, Configuration Management and Backups, Privacy 
Issues, User Monitoring, Personnel Issues, Physical Security. Additional topics are covered as 
needed. Coverage in the introductory survey courses, by necessity, must be broad rather than 
deep, but the survey must provide sufficient technical depth to serve as a springboard for 
progressing to advanced studies. 
2.4 Lab Requirements 
The ultimate objective of all INFOSEC studies is to improve security in real systems. Thus, 
practical laboratory experience is crucial for an effective INFOSEC program. Laboratory 
exercises in the form of tutorials and projects help to reinforce and extend concepts conveyed in 
lectures as well as help prepare students for effective thesis research. 
Most NPS CISR courses include a lab component. As existing courses are refined and new ones 
developed, corresponding lab exercises are prepared or updated. An objective of the N P S  CISR 
program is to allow students to understand the kinds of technologies that are available to solve 
current computer security problems and to consider potential future technologies. Students are 
given first-hand experience in using a variety of trusted systems and explore topics in security 
policy enforcement, security technology for database systems, monolithic and networked trusted 
computing techniques, and tools to support the development of trusted systems. 
4 
3 INFOSEC Curriculum 
The INFOSEC courses for computer science students is integrated as a specialization track within 
the core computer science curriculum. The course matrix for the track is shown in Table 1. 
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3.0.1 Introduction to Computer Security 
Two courses, Introduction to Computer Security and Management of Secure Systems, provide an 
overview of INFOSEC principles and techniques described in section 2.3 . The two courses 
review both the conceptually complete and more intuitive approaches to INFOSEC. These 
provide the students with an appreciation of both foundational concepts and current practice in 
computer security. 
Introduction to Computer Security was the first course offered at N P S .  Over time, we have made 
significant changes to the NPS CISR flagship course, Introduction to Computer Security. When 
initially offered, it was an upper level graduate course and had daunting prerequisites: data 
structures, software system design, networks, databases, and software methodology. It included 
many of the topics now covered by the two current courses, Introduction to Computer Security 
and Management of Secure Systems. The original course skimmed many topics, but there was 
still insufficient time to survey all areas of computer security deemed important. Therefore, we 
decided to create two courses: one on the principles and underlying mechanisms for system 
security and the other on practical aspects of structuring and maintaining secure systems. In 1995, 
Introduction to Computer Security was modified to be an intermediate rather than an upper-level 
graduate course. Several benefits accrue from this change. With fewer prerequisites, the course is 
accessible by a much larger population of N P S  students. This results in an increased number of 
DoD personnel having taken a graduate-level INFOSEC course. In addition, it may be taken 
much earlier in each students’ course of study. Thus students are “sensitized” to INFOSEC issues 
early. For computer science students, this means that they will have a better appreciation of how 
various areas of computer science such as operating systems, software engineering, and many of 
the more formal courses contribute to system security. For students in other curricula, this early 
overview of INFOSEC concepts permits them to understand how these ideas are applicable 
within their own discipline and affords them the opportunity to take more advanced INFOSEC 
courses as electives. 
The second major change to Introduction to Computer Security was the inclusion of extensive 
laboratory materials to accompany lectures. Although there were occasional demonstrations in 
class, the course was originally presented with no laboratory component. Now we have developed 
a set of laboratory exercises and tutorials which complement lecture material. Topics include: 
passwords, discretionary access controls, mandatory access controls, and use of Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP). Student feedback has been very positive as these exercises help to reinforce 
concepts discussed in lectures and give concrete examples of security implementations. In 
addition, students become familiar with a range of trusted products and security enhancements to 
untrusted systems. These include Sun’s Trusted Solaris and Wang Federal’s XTS 300 system. 
The course has been organized into eleven one-week units designed as a logical progression in 
INFOSEC principles. The prerequisites are: an introductory course on computer organization. It 
consists of three hours of lecture and two hours of laboratory work per week. We usually give 
three exams of equal weight during the course and collect approximately six homework and 
laboratory assignments. The catalog description is quoted here: 
This course is concerned with fundamental principles of computer and communications 
security for modern monolithic and distributed systems. It  covers privacy concerns, data 
secrecy and integrity issues, as well as DoD security policy. Security mechanisms introduced 
will include access mediation, cryptography, authentication protocols, and multilevel secure 
systems. Students will be introduced to a broad range of security concerns including both 
r 
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environmental as well as computational security. Laboratory facilities will be used to 
introduce students to a variety of security-related technologies including, discretionary 
access controls in Class C2 systems, mandatory access controls in both low and high 
assurance systems, identification and authentication protocols, the use of cryptography in 
distributed systems, and database technology in trusted systems. 
With few books to choose from as texts, we elected to use a book that would give an overview of 
the field [15] and to provide an extensive set of other materials for assigned readings. Because the 
book had no homework problems, we had to devise all homework sets ourselves. Below is a brief 
outline of the topics covered in the N P S  CISR version of Introduction to Computer Security. The 
references are to the supplementary reading assigned for each topic. One of the articles [7] is 
assigned over several weeks, because it covers a number of topics. 
Introduction to Computer Security- Definition, laws, historical perspective. 
Access Control I - Policies, Identification and Authentication, Discretionary Access Control 
Access Control 11 - Mandatory Access Control and Supporting Policies [7] 
Building Secure Systems I - Design and Implementation concepts that support assurance [3] 
Malicious Software and Intrusion Detection - Trojan Horses, viruses, worms, detecting attacks. 
Certification and Accreditation, Disaster Planning and Recovery, and Risk Analysis - certifica- 
tion and 
accreditation issues [2] 
Cryptography basics - private key, public key, and hashing schemes 
Cryptographic protocols - key management, voting, digital cash, secret sharing, one time pass- 
word 
generation, Digital Signature Standard and Clipper. [lo] [19] [21] 
Network Security - special considerations, combining access control and cryptography. [7] 
Network Security in Today’s Environment - TCP/IP, Internet and firewalls [5] [8] [20] 
Building Secure Systems 11 - System evaluation issues [ 181 [ 131 
171 
191 
Like the subject it surveys, Introduction to Computer Security is dynamic. Each quarter we 
review the topics covered as well as the readings to ensure that they remain current and pertinent. 
We hope that this description of our course will encourage the interested reader to review the 
course notes which have been included as an appendix and to read some of the articles that we 
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Who Should be Concerned? 
As a Member of DoD 
You are required to safeguard classified material. 
You are required to safeguard sensitive but unclassified material 
such as privacy act data. 
As a Private Citizen 
Questions you should be asking about information stored about you: 
Who hasit? 
Who is selling it? 
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Legislation Addressing Computer Security Issues 
Three types of laws address computer security 
Laws about classified and sensitive but unclassified 
(SBU) data. 
Computer crime laws. 
Laws regarding privacy issues. 
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Protection of Classified or Sensitive Information 
National Security Decision Directive 145 
(NSDD 145) - 1984 
Mandated protection of both classified and unclassified sensitive 
information. 
- Productivity statistics 
- Census Bureau statistics 
- Air traffic control information 
- Health and financial records 
Gave NSA jurisdiction to encourage, advise and assist in the pri- 
vate sector (controversial to say the least). 
Created the System Security Steering Group 
- 
- Attorney General 
- Director of OMB 
- Director of CIA 
Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury 
Revised and reissued in 1990 as NSDD 42 
- Scope narrowed to primarily defense related information. 
National Telecommunications and Information 
Systems Security Publication 2 
(NTISSP 2) - 1986 
"National Policy on Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Informa- 
tion in Federal Government Telecommunications and Automated 
S y s tems" 
Sensitive, but unclassified information is infomation the disclo- 
sure, loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction of which could 
adversely affect national security or other federal government inter- 
ests. National security interests are those unclassified matters that 
relate to the national defense or the foreign relations of the U.S. 
government. Other government interests are those related, but not 
limited to the wide range of government or government derived 
economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technology, 
and law enforcement information, as well as the privacy or confi- 
dentiality of personal or commercial proprietary information pro- 
vided to the U.S. government by its citizens. 
Applies to all government agencies and contractors. 
Rescinded in March 1987 due to privacy concerns. 
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Protection of Classified or Sensitive Information 
Computer Security Act 
Public Law 100-235 (1987) 
Requires every U.S. government computer system that processes 
sensitive information to have a customized security plan. 
Requires all users of these systems (federal employees or contrac- 
tors) to receive computer security training. 
Further defines sensitive information as: 
"...information whose loss, misuse, unauthorized access to, or mod- 
ification of could adversely affect the national interest, or the con- 
duct of federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are 
entitled to under ... the Privacy Act" 
Gave the Institute of Computer Sciences and Technology (branch 
of NIST) responsibility for assessing the vulnerability of federal 
computer systems, for developing standards, and for providing 
technical assistance as well as developing guidelines for the train- 
ing of personnel 
DoD Directive 5200.28 
Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems 
Provides mandatory, minimum AIS security requirements. 
Promotes the use of cost-effective, computer-based security for 
AIS s. 
Applies to classified information, sensitive unclassified informa- 
tion and unclassified information. 
Applies to all AISs (stand-alone systems, communications sys- 
tems, computer network systems, peripheral devices, embedded 
computer systems, personal computers, word processors, office 
automation systems, application and operating systems software 
and firmware). 
Requires all DoD systems to be accredited. 
- Outlines the accrediation process. 
- Specifies accrediation responsibilities, DAA, ISSO, etc. 
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Computer Crime 
18 US. Code 1005 (I 948) 
Prohibits making false entries in bank records. 
18 U.S. Code 1006 (1948) 
Prohibits making false entries in credit institution records. 
18 U.S. Code 1362 (I 948) 
0 Prohibits malicious mischief to government property. 
18 U.S. Code 2071 (1 948) 
Prohibits concealment, removal, or mutilation of public records. 
1 8 U.S. Code 1343 (I 952) 
Prohibits wire fraud using any interstate communications system. 
18 U.S. Code 1029 (1984) 
Prohibits fraudulent use of credit cards, passwords, and telephone 
access codes. 
18 U.S. Code 2701 (I 986) 
Prohibits unauthorized access to information that’s stored elec- 
tronically. 
18 U.S. Code 2778 (I 989) 
Prohibits illegal export of software or data controlled by the DoD 
18 U.S. Code 251 0 (I 989) 
Prohibits the illegal export of software or data controlled by the 
Dept. of Commerce. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 1 Page A 1 - 1 1 
Computer Crime 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Public Law 99-474 (1986) 
0 Prohibits unauthorized or fraudulent access to government com- 
puters. 
0 Prohibits access with intent to defraud. 
Prohibits intentional trespassing. 





Fine of $5000 or twice the value of anything obtained. 
Up to five (5) years in jail. 
Robert T. Moms (first person convicted - 1990) 
3 yrs probation, $10,000 fine, 400 hrs community service 
Supreme Court refused to hear his case 
Must show intent to use information to injure U.S. or to pro- 
vide advantage to foreign nation. 
No distinction between those who use computers for hacking, 
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Privacy 
US. Constitution, Bill of Rights 
(179 1) 
Fourth Amendment guarantees protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
(Note: The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee an indi- 
viduals right to privacy!) 
Privacy Act 
Public Law 93-579 (1974) 
Requires U.S. government to: 
- safeguard personal data processed by federal agency com- 
puter systems. 
provide ways for individuals to find out what information is 
being recorded on them and a means to correct inaccuracies. 
- 
Right of Financial Privacy Act 
(1978) 
Establishes that a depositor's bank accounts are private 
Can be accessed only by court oFder and proper notification 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act 
(1979) 
Protects the privacy of transmission of fundsousing electronic 
funds transfer (EFT') 
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Privacy 
Electronic Communications Act 
(1986) 
Prohibits unauthorized interception of communications regardless 






Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act 
U.S. Code 552a (1988) 
Protects against privacy violations due to information matching 
policies of the federal government. 
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Early Computer Security Efforts 
1950's 
0 Stand alone systems using physical security for systems and termi- 
nals. 
0 Development of first TEMPEST standard. 
0 Establishment of U.S. Communications Security (COMSEC) 
Board. 
1960's 
Beginning of the age of Computer Security. 
0 Timesharing systems (multiple users at the same time) and remote 
terminals created new problems. 
DoD launched f is t  study of threats to DoD computers (1967). 
- Assembled task force under Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA). 
- Published findings in 1970 Security Controls for Computer 
Systems 
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Early Computer Security Efforts 
1970’s 
“Classified material contained in an ADP system shall be 
safeguarded by the continuous employment of protective features 
in the system’s hardware and software design and configuration.” 
Tiger Teams were used to test vendor claims of computer security 
features by attempting to break into the vendor’s system. 
The Tiger Teams showed overwhelming success at breaking 
in. 
Patching techniques were used to shore up a system’s weak- 
nesses. 
After patching, systems were still penetratable. 
The patch and penetrate scheme shown to be inherently 
flawed. The concept of a Reference Monitor (Security Ker- 
nel) is spawned. 






IBM spends $40 Million to address computer security issues. 
First mathematical model of a multi-level security policy. 
Developed by David Bell and Leonard LaPadula. 
Central to development of computer security standards. 
Laid groundwork for later models. 




Development of first security kernel. 
- 
Other kernels under development. 
- Mitre’s DEC PDP- 11/45 
- UCLA’s Data Secure UNIX PDP-11/70 
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Early NBS and NSA (NCSC) Involvement 
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology - NIST) 
1968 - NBS performed an initial study to evaluate the govern- 
ment’s computer security needs. 
1972 - NBS sponsored a conference on computer security in 
collaboration with ACM. 
1973 - NBS initiated program aimed at researching development 
standards for computer security. 
1977 - NBS began a series of Invitational Workshops dedicated 
to the Audit and Evaluation of Computer Systems. 
point is that internal control mechanisms of current oper- 
ating systems have too low integrity for them to... effectively iso- 
late a user on the system from data that is at a ‘higher’ security 
level than he is trusted ... to deal with.” 
I 





Director of NSA assigned responsibility for trusted infor- 
mation security products. 
Response to NBS workshop and public seminars on the 
DoD Computer Security Initiative. 
DoD Computer Security Center (CSC) was established 
CSC becomes NCSC and assumes scope of responsibility 
broadens. 
Communications and computer security merge under 
Deputy Directorate for Information Security Systems 
(INFOSEC). 
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Tasking of the NCSC 
Encourage the widespread availability of trusted computer sys- 
tems. 
Evaluate the technical protection capabilities of industry and gov- 
ernment developed systems 
Provide technical support of government and industry groups 
engaged in computer security research and development. 
0 Develop technical criteria for the evaluation of computer systems. 
Evaluate commercial systems. 
Conduct and sponsor research in computer and network security 
technology. 
0 Develop and provide access to verification and analysis tools used 
to develop and test secure computer systems. 
Conduct training in the areas of computer security. 
0 Disseminate computer security information to other branches of 
the federal government and to industry. 
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Why Is Computer Security Difficult? 
Some Factors 
0 Most managers are unaware of the value of their own computing 
resources. 
Fear of damage to public image. 
0 Legal definitions are often vague or non-existent. 
Legal prosecution is difficult: 
- Criminal must be traced. 
- No 'hard' evidence. 
- Hard to pin a value to data. 
- "No fingerprints" mentality. 
- Criminals viewed as just curious intellectuals. 
Computer Criminals do not fit a stereotype. 
The Law and Ethics are often unclear. 
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Computer Security Problems and Crimes 
Computer Security Problems 
Most loss or damage is not malicious 
- Ignorance of existing policies. 
- Ignorance of the system on which they work. 
Anyone can make a mistake! 
Accidents 
- 
Computer Security Crimes 
Amateurs 
Temptation is there if access is available. 
- You wouldn't ask a stranger to hold your wallet while you 
went around the corner to move your car. 
Oh Yeah! I'll show you! 
Disgruntled employees 
- 
Crackers and Hackers 
Often the challenge or Curiosity 
- 
- 
West German group (Cliff Stoll) 






West German group (Cliff Stoll) 
Desert Shield / Desert S t o m  
Terrorists 
No major incidents have occurred yet! 
- 
- Potential Economic disaster. 
This is a potential nightmare waiting to happen. 
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Categories of Corn puter Misuse 
Human Error 
Hard to control 
Abuse of Authority 
White collar crime 
Direct Probing 
Rattling doorknobs 
Probing With Malicious Software 
Trojan Horses 
Direct Penetration 
Exploiting system bugs 
Subversion of Mechanism 
Trapdoors 
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Is There A Threat? 
Bank Theft (1984) 
Branch manager netted $25 million! 
HBO Attack (1986) 
Captain Midnight overpowered HBO uplink. 
Part-time uplink operator. 
0 Displayed brief message to viewers. 
Chaos Club 
West German Computer Club. 
In 1987 announced that it had successfully penetrated a United 
States Government Computer (NASA's). 
Able to store and manipulate information on SDI. 
NASA was unaware of penetration until messages started appear- 
ing on the system. 
NASA initially reported no damage. 
Virus later found on system which may have originated during the 
initial break-in. 
Cliff Stoll and the KGB 
West German crackers tried to break in to over 450 computers 
(1987). 
30 successful attempts. 
Looking for NBC related information to sell to KGB. 
0 First prosecution for Computer espionage. 
Airline Computers (1988) 
0 A major airlines discovered its reservation and ticketing system 
had been penetrated. 
0 Bogus reservations had been made. 
Illegal tickets issued. 
Internet Worm (1988) 
Affected Sun and VAX systems. 
2100-2600 systems affected. 
0 Culprit: Robert T. Morris, a Cornell graduate student. 
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Is There A Threat? 
Friday 13th Virus (1988) 
Threatened to erase the hard disks of financial, research and adminis- 
trative computers. 
Originated at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. 
Virus Flambe (1988) 
0 Infected a computer consulting firm. 
Altered scan rate of IBM monitors. 
Monitor burst into flames. 
Satellite Positioning System (1989) 
14 year old boy using Apple computer: 
- Cracked Air Force SPS. 
- 
- 
Dialed unauthorized long-distance access codes. 
Browsed through file of 200 businesses. 
Desert Storm/Desert Shield (1990) 
40 known attempts (6 confirmed successful)! 
How many unknown attempts/successes 
Airline traffic control system (Arorua IL) (1995) 
Air traffic delayed for several hours! 
Word Macro Virus (1995) 
Currently the most prevalent virus. 
ActiveX Trojan Horse (1997) 
Transfers funds from your bank account to the hacker’s account. 
Erotic Photograph Trojan Horse (1997) 
Reconnects your system through a phone number in Moldova. 
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Economic Damage from the Internet Worm 
Lost Machine Time 
2,076,880 Machine hours unable to access network 
Lost Access 
User hours unable to access network 





Programmer Time I Admin. Time 
Reinfection, removal from network, shut- 
down analysis, monitor 
Create patch, debug, install, test, check- 
out, monitor and implement 
Analyze worm, disassemble, document (at 
each of 1200 networks) 






Initial problem analysis 12,400 machines 
Identify, isolate, remove, clean, return to 
operation (6,200) 
49,600 I 1 1,000 
2,000 
74y400 I 
Install fix on all UNIX systems, test, 
checkout and monitor 1057000 I 6,000 
Residual checkup, tech communications 
conferencing and ripple events 1879000 I 264,000 
TOTAL HOURS I 796,050 I 336,000 
Hourly Rate $22 $42.50 
COST $17,513,100 $14,280,000 
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Information Warfare 
Overview 
Practically all of today's vehicles, ships and aircraft use control 
devices, communications systems and weapons systems that use com- 
puter systems, in one form or another. These systems, as in all infor- 
mation systems, rely upon the integrity of programs and the data 
which they input and output. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
any attack on the data and programs may render these systems useless. 
Hard kill, Soft kill or Imperceptible Degradation 
We frequently think in terms of complete system kills, either from a 
direct missile hit to the platform (hard kill) or to supporting sensor 
systems (soft kill) which the platform relies upon for its navigation, 
communication or targeting. The benefit of course, is that we can 
achieve total destruction of the system or render it completely useless; 
however, the major disadvantage is that our adversary is aware of the 
loss of their system and may engage alternate systems. 
Less obvious is the advantage that can be achieved through impercep- 
tible degradation of the targeted information system. If we can reduce 
the measure of effectiveness of the system, often referred to as proba- 
bility of kill (PK), in such a fashion that our adversary is unaware and 
places his faith in the system then we can effectively increase our 
force multiplier. 
There are a number of tradition battlefield models which have proven 
reasonably accurate in measuring overall force effectiveness on actual 
battlefields. Modification of these models to reflect system degrada- 
tion to the enemy's control, communication and weapons systems 
have shown that viruses and worms can have a significant effect on 
battlefield results. 
I nse r t ion Tech n iq ues 
Insertion of viral code may take place during the manufacturing or 
distribution process. However, it is possible that the code could be 
inserted by field operatives during a time of crisis. 
* The code could be triggered remotely or by use of logic bombs that 
render the system completely ineffective or slightly degrade system 
performance. The code obviously needs be hardwarehoftware spe- 
cific; that is, the code must be written to target a specific communica- 
tions or weapons system. 
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Information Warfare 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
Battle damage assessment for complete systems kill is challenging 
enough and frequently relies upon sophisticated surveillance systems 
to provide the battlefield commander with accurate information. Battle 
damage assessment for systems which have their PK perturbed 
slightly cannot be immediately assessed and requires analysis of bat- 
tlefield results over prolonged periods. 
This factor makes it difficult for commanders to assess the overall 
effectiveness of such warfare techniques during the fog of war and as a 
result they may actually be unaware that it has achieved an advantage 
in their favor. 
IW Difficulties 
What constitutes an act of war? 
What is the correct response? 
The civilian sector is not prepared to deal with attacks. 
IW issues: 
0 IW attacks can be perpetrated with very little resources. 
0 Presents a different attack paradigm. 
Traditional Paradigm 
US Society 0 
New Paradigm 
-- - - -  - - - - - - - -  * I - - -  
US Society 
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Section 2 
Access Control I 
Identijication and Authentication and 
Discretionary Access Control Policies 
Section 2 Page A 1-29 NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security 
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Access Control Policies 
Security Policy: 
Generally speaking, a security policy describes how people may 
access documents or other information. 
A computer’s version of a security policy consists of a precise set 
of rules for determining authorization as a basis for making access 
control decisions. 
This section and the following section present several security pol- 
icies that are commonly implemented in computer systems. 
Policies presented include: 
- Access to systems based upon user identification. 
- Access to objects (such as files, directories, etc.) based upon 
user identification, where owners of objects can, at their dis- 
cretion, grant access to other users. 
Access to objects (such as files, directories, etc.) based upon 
the clearance level of the user. 
- 
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System Access Control 
Controlling Access to the System Physically 
Guards 
- need at least 4 for 24 hour coverage 
- must recognize someone, or token 
- no record of access 
Locks 
- cheaper than a guard 
- no record of access 
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Identification and Authentication ( I  and A) 
Controlling Access to the System Using 
Identification and Authentication 
Two Step Process 
Identification 
- Telling the system who you are. 
Authentication 
- Proving to the system that you are who you say you are. 
Three classic ways of establishing proof. 
- Something you know. 
- Something you have. 
- Something you are. 
I and A Benefits 
- Can provide a complete log of access and attempted accesses. 
- Access privileges grantedremoved quickly 
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. . . . . .. ~- 
I and A 
Passwords 
Something you know. 





Attacks on Passwords 
Brute force attack. 
- Try allwords. 
Probable password attack. 
- Try short words. 
- Try common words. 
Probable user password attack. 
- Familynames. 
- Birth dates. 
Password File 
Conventional encryption. 
- Enter password. 
- Decrypt stored password from table. 
- Compare passwords. 
- Enter password. 
- Encrypt password. 
- Compare to encrypted password. 
One way cipher. 
Attacks Using Password File 
Readable password file. 
Backup tapes. 
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Guessing Passwords 
L 26L 52L 
. 4  4.57 lo5 7.31 x lo6 
8 2.09 x 10" 1013 
10 1.41 1014 1.44 1017 
6 3.09 x 10' 1.98 x lo1' 
Password Space: 
The password space is the set of all passwords. 
The size of a password space is determined by: 
The length of passwords, denoted by L. 
The size of the password alphabet, denoted by A .  
- If passwords only consist of lower case letters, A = 26. 
- If passwords consist of lower and upper case letters and dig- 
its, A = 62. 





5.68 x 10" 
Exhaustively trying all passwords: 
On the average, you will need to try half of them. 
If an intruder (using a computer) tries 1 password each second, 
they can try 60 passwords a minute, or 86,400 passwords a day. 
If passwords are of length 6 and consist of lower case letters, it 
will take 60 months, on the average. 
If an English word is used as a password, the problem is greatly 
simplified. There are only 5000 8-letter English words. The 
intruder can guess one of these in 42 minutes, on average. 
If the intruder steals an encrypted password file and the encryption 
software, it takes only seconds to check whether an encrypted 
string is one of the encrypted passwords. 
Thus, potential passwords can be tested 1,000,000 times faster. 
A 6-letter password can be guessed in 155 seconds, on average. 
Internet Worm Password Guesses: 
The following list shows passwords that the Internet worm tried.. 
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Passwords Tried by the Internet Worm 
water will Wisconsin 
weenie William wizard 
whatnot Williams burg wombat 
whiting Will ie  woodwind 
whitney winston wormwood 
yacov 
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Password Issues 
Password Issues 
Use more than just A-Z. 
Use a password of at least 6-characters 
Avoid actual names or words. 
Choose an unlikely password. 
Change your password regularly. 
Don't write it down. 
Don't tell it to someone else. 
Avoid shoulder-hangers. 
Implementation Issues: 
System may actually give away information. 
- Which part of login is incorrect. 
- Which system is being accessed. 
Limit access attempts. 
Enforce password time limits. 
Employ terminal restrictions 
Employ password checking programs. 
- Proactive checkers are best. 
- Ensures adequate password length. 
- Ensures adequate password alphabet (forces the inclusion of 
capital letters, punctuation, or numbers). 
- Avoids the use of English words. 
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Authentication Devices 
Tokens and Smart cards 
Something you have. 
A token is an object which authenticates its possessor. 
Must be unforgeable and unique. 
Not foolproof since it may be lost or stolen. 
Smart card may compute the response to challenge. 
Smart card may perform encryption. 
Personal Characteristic Recognition (B iome t ric 
Devices) 
Something you are. 
Retinal scanners. 
Paldfingerprin ts. 
Voice pattern recognition. 
Difficult for imposter to duplicate. 
Challenge and Response Systems 
c Something you have and something you know. 
Passwords are in the clear from time of entry until accepted by 
host. 
Normal passwords are static. 
Challenge and reply systems create a pseudo one time password 
system. 
Passwords become dynamic. 
To ensure security: 
- Encryption keys should be changed regularly. 
- Algorithms should be changed occasionally. 
Challenge and reply systems are most appropriate for host-to-host 
communications because of the computing power available. 
This method affords authentication and identification as well as 
eliminates the replay problem. 
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Modem Issues 
Auto mat i c Cal I- Back 
Internal table must be well protected. 





- System breaks communication. 
- System consults internal table. 
- System calls back at predetermined telephone number. 
- If number specified by user not one of those listed in the com- 
puter's directory then a warning is issued to security officer. 
User dials a computer system. 
User identifies himselfherself to system. 
Silent Modem 
Carrier tone is suppressed until caller sends the first tone. 
Does not reveal that the telephone line is a modem line. 
No real protection, only forces intruder to take a second step. 
Prevents a computer from dialing randomly in search of another 
computer. 
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Login Spoofing 
Problem: 
A password grabbing program is malicious software that is left 
running on a terminal that mimics the normal login prompt. 
After a user enters a login name and password, the program 
records the name and password and displays the normal incorrect 
password message and exits. 
The correct system login prompt is displayed and the user logs in 
again, this time without further problems. 
However, the person that left the spoofing program running can 
retrieve the login name and password and login under an assumed 
identity. 
This type of program is a type of Trojan Horse program. Specifi- 
cally, it is a "spoofing" Trojan Horse program. It is also called a 
"password grabber". 
Solution: 
The Trusted Path 
An unforgeable link between the terminal and the system. 
When the trusted path is invoked, all user processes to a terminal 
are killed and the system trusted path screen or menu is displayed. 
It provides a means where the user can be sure that they are com- 
municating with the REAL system. 
Before logging in, users ALWAYS invoke the trusted path. 
All password management functions, like changing passwords, 
should use the trusted path. 
As we will see in other sections, other trusted functions should use 
the trusted path too. 
Note: 
Passwords and biometric devices are ONLY good for authenticat- 
ing the user to the system. 
A trusted path is required to authenticate the system to the user. 
I and A consists of both identifying and authenticating the user to 
the system and identifying and authenticating the system to the 
user. 
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Data Access Control 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a data 
access control policy that allows users to grant or 





Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
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DAC 
Permission Bits 
Used by Unix, VMS and other systems. 
A user is specified as the owner of each file or directory. 
Each file or directory is associated with a group. 
At any specific time each user is associated with a group. 
Example 
r w e  r w e  r w e  bits specifying Read, Write 
or Execute permission 
filel r w - r w - - - - Alice (file owner) 
file2 r -  e r -  e r -  e Bob(f3eowner) 
.file3 r -  - r -  - r - - Alice (file owner) 
TT- Others (all users) 
Group (members of the group 
Owner (owner of the file) 
associated with the file) 
Drawbacks 
Insufficient granularity (how does Alice give ONLY Bob read 
access to filel?). 
Deny access to a single user? No. 




Passwords for file / directory access 






Loss - forgotten. 
Disclosure - loose lips; requires reprotecting the file. 
Revocation - password must be changed and all legitimate users 
must be notified. 
System Administration nightmare, too many passwords. 





Every object has a unique owner. 
Owner possesses major access rights. 
Owner may declare who has access. 
Owner may revoke access. 
One capability list per user. 
Names all objects user is allowed access to. 
Lists maintained by 0s. 
Users cannot access lists directly. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security 
- 
Section 2 Page 46 
Capability Lists 
Example Capability Lists: 
Alice 's list of capabilities 
file1 (Owner, Read, Write) 
file2 (Read) 
file3 (Execute) 
Bob's list of capabilities 
file2 (Owner, Read, Write) 
file5 (Execute) 
Trent's list of capabilities 
file3 (Owner, Execute) 
file6 (Read) 
Difficulties with Capability Lists Schema: 
Management of large/many lists. 
Revocation of access - must search all user lists to determine if 
object is on that user's list. 
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Access Control Lists 
General Schema: 
One list for each object. 
Shows all users who have access. 
Shows what access each user has. 
Generally, specifies access based on users and groups. 
Generally, wildcard values are supported to simplify administra- 
tion. 
Entries are generally listed in order from most specific to least spe- 
cific and are interpreted in a manner that supports a desired policy. 
One such policy might be use specific rights over wildcard rights. 
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Smith.druid I r  
In this example: 
User Jones in group crypto has rew access to file Alpha. 
User Green does not have access to file Alpha. 
All users in group crypto (with the exception of Green) have re 
access to file Alpha. 
All users, other than Green, have r access to Alpha. 
User Smith in group druid has r access to file Beta. 
No other users have any access to file Beta. 
- 
Drawbacks 
Requires a more complicated implementation than permission 
bits. 
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DAC Weakness 
Suppose you have a system that: 
correctly enforces an I and A policy, 
correctly enforces a DAC policy, 
stores both Unclassified and Secret information, and 
has both Unclassified and Secret users. 
Also suppose that all Secret users act in accordance with proce- 
dures for handling classified information (i.e., they do not set 
access permissions on files containing Secret information such 
that Unclassified users can view them). 
Question: What can go wrong? 
Answer: Malicious software. 
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DAC Weakness 
Consider the following scenario: 
An unclassified user, Ivan, brings a great Star Trek game into 
work. The game becomes very popular. Unbeknownst to users the 
program surreptitiously copies user’s files into Ivan’s directories 
with permissions such that Ivan can read them. This type of pro- 
gram is called a Trojan Horse program. It performs a useful func- 
tion so that users will use it, but it secretly performs other actions. 
How does the program do this? When Alice, a Secret user, runs 
programs, those programs (text editors, etc.) are able to access all 
files accessible by Alice, because those programs are running on 
behalf of Alice. 
When Alice runs the Star Trek program, it too runs on her behalf 
and can access all files accessible by Alice. Thus, the game pro- 
gram can read all files readable by Alice and make a copies of 
them into Ivan’s directory with permissions on the files set such 
that they are readable by Ivan. 
The gist is, when Alice runs the game program (or 
any malicious software) it can do any thing that 
Alice can do. 
Conclusion: 
DAC mechanisms have an inherent weakness. 
They are vulnerable to Trojan Horse attacks. 
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DAC Weakness 
How great is the threat of malicious software? 
Consider the following points: 
How much software on your own system did you write? 
How much software on your system can you absolutely vouch for? 
More and more software is written overseas these days. 
It only takes one bad engineer in a group of a thousand good engi- 
neers to embed a Trojan Horse in a product. 
If you store information that is worth stealing, the Trojan Horse 
attack is very attractive 
Are you running a browser that downloads and executes Java 
applets? 
Note: 
The users act in accordance with the security 
policy, it is software that is malicious. 
Want to know more? 
A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in 
Trusted Systems, NCSC-TG-003 
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Section 3 
Access Control II 
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Mandatory Access Control Policies (MAC) 
Why Do We Need a MAC Policy? 
From Section 2, we know that DAC policies inherently cannot pre- 
vent a malicious software (Trojan Horse) attack. 
We need a policy that does address the malicious software prob- 
lem. 
A MAC Policy is such a policy. 
A Mandatory Access Control policy is a policy in which 
people do not have control over the authorization of 
people to information. 
Note how this policy differs from a DAC policy. 
Within some universe of discourse Mandatory Policies 
are: 
Global - sensitivity of information does not change relative to its 
"location" in the system 
Persistent- sensitivity of information does not change from time to 
time 
- does not state that information is TS on MWF but only C the 
remaining days of the week 
Example MAC Policy 
Military Security Policy 
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Mandatory Access Control Policies (MAC) 
Mandatory Access Control Policy Definitions 
Access Class 
User - Clearance 
Information - Sensitivity 
Clearance and Sensitivity can be mapped to system attributes call 
Access Classes. 
Object 
Any passive entity that contains information. 
For the time being, think of this as a file. 
Subject 
Active entities operating on behalf of users. 
For the time being, think of this as being associated with a process. 
In an implementation of a MAC policy 
Each subject has a label (or access class). 
Each object has a label (or access class). 
The ability of a subject to access an object is based upon a com- 
parison of the subject's label and the object's label. 
Two labels are compared using the "dominance" operator 'I 2 'I. 
As an example, consider the set of military classification levels 
{Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Unclassified}. Where: 
- I.e., if label A dominates label B, we write A 2 B . 
- Top Secret 2 Secret 
- Top Secret 2 Confidential 
- Top Secret 2 Unclassified 
- Secret 2 Confidential 
- etc. 
Technically Top Secret 2 Top Secret , Secret 2 Secret , etc. 
Note 
Object labels and subject labels are a requirement of MAC policy 
implementations. 
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Bell and LaPadula Model (BLP) 
Bell and LaPadula Model Facts 
The Bell and LaPadula Model is a mathematical description of the 
DoD Security Policy (a later section discusses the need to have a 
mathematical description). 
The Bell and LaPadula Model specifies read and write access 
between a subject and an object based upon the dominance rela- 
tionship between the subject’s label (or access class) and the 
objects’s label (or access class). 
The Bell and LaPadula Model is the most common model for 
MAC policies. 
Applies only to secrecy (not integrity) of information. 
It includes both discretionary and mandatory access rules 
- Both checks are made upon request for access. 
- We will only look at the MAC aspects of the model since we 
are using the model to demonstrate a MAC policy. 
BLP Mandatory access control 
Lets S be the set of all subjects in a system and 0 be the set of all 
objects in a system. 
For each subjects in S there exists a label or access class for s 
called C(s). 
For each subject o in 0 there exists a label or access class for o 
called C(o). 
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Bell and LaPadula Model 
Simple Security Property 
A subject s may have read access to an object o only if 
C(s) 2 C(0) 
(You shall only view objects which are classified at the same level or lower than 
the level for which you are cleared) 
* - Property 
Also called Confinement Property 
A subject s may have write access to an object o only if 
C(s) 5 C(0) 
(You shall not talk to anyone who is cleared at a level below you) 
The first property (The Simple Security Property) 
is: 
.The normal "no read up" policy where 
- Secret users can read Secret, Confidential and Unclassified 
information (read down allowed) 
- but Secret users cannot read Top Secret (no read up) 
The second property (the *-Property, pronounced 
'Star Property') is required to prevent malicious 
software from writing down. 
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Bell and LaPadula Model 
Why the *-Property is needed 
Recall the Star Trek game that contained a Trojan Horse program. 
If a Secret user uses the program on a system that does not 
enforce the *-Property, the Trojan Horse could read Secret files 
and write them to Unclassified files, where Ivan (the person who 
wrote the Star Trek game) (who is an Unclassified user) can read 
them. 
If, however, a system enforces the *-Property, a Trojan horse can- 
not write down. 
Thus: 
In a computer system, a mandatory policy can protect information 
in objects from unauthorized access 
even in the face of malicious software. 
Restatement of the BLP rules: 
Noreadup. 
Nowritedown. 
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Bell and LaPadula Model 
The BLP Model is often described in terms of secure 
information flows. The Figure below shows such a flow 
diagram. This is another way of saying that there is "no 
read up" and "no write down." 
Secure Flow of hformation (B-LP) 
Subject Object 
As indicated by the diagram, a subject can only both read 
and write an object if the object has the same access class 
value as the subject. 
BLP Example 
Consider the following objects and subjects: 
Filel has an access class value of Secret. 
File2 has an access class value of Confidential. 
File3 has an access class value of Top Secret. 
Subjectl has an access class value of Top Secret. 
Subject2 has an access class value of Confidential. 
Under the BLP Model the following accesses are- 
allowed : 
Subjectl can read Filel, File2 and File3. 
Subjectl can write only File3. 
Subject2 can read File2. 
Subject2 can write Filel, File2 and File3. 
Can an Unclassified user blindly write to Secret? 
Yes. The model allows it, but most implementations prohibit arbi- 
trary blind write ups. 
~~ 
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MAC Issues 
Question: 
How does Alice, a Secret user, write information to an Unclassi- 
fied file? 
Answer: 
Systems that support MAC policies, must also support the notion 
of a session level. 
When a user logs on they request a session level, which can be any 
level up to their clearance level. 
If Alice logs on and requests a session level of Secret, a Secret 
level subject is created on her behalf.This subject can read files at 
or below Secret and can write files at or above Secret. 
While Alice is logged in, she can re-negotiate a new session level 
to any other level that she is allowed to operate at. This means if 
she needs to write and Unclassified file, she must negotiate an 
Unclassified session. 
Session negotiation should use the trusted path. 
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Question: 
Who puts the access class label values on objects (files)? 
Answer: 
When an object (a file) is created (e.g., with a text editor), its 
access class value is specified as part of the creation process. 
When files are imported into a system (off a floppy disk, from the 
network, etc.), they are labelled appropriately. 
- If a file is downloaded from an Unclassified network, it is 
labelled as Unclassified. 
- If a file is downloaded from a Secret network, it is labelled 
Secret. 
- If a file is imported off an Unclassified Floppy Disk, it is 
labelled as Unclassified. 
- If a floppy disk contains multilevel data (files at different 
access class values), then the files on the disk are labelled 
accordingly and when they are imported into a system the 
system label value is made the same as the label value of the 
. file on the disk. 
Observation: 
Need a consistent set of machinable labels for heterogeneous sys- 
tems. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 3 Page A 7-63 
Com part men ts 
Use of compartments 
MAC policies often use Compartments in conjunction with access 
class levels. 
The term category is sometimes used in place of the word com- 
partment. 
Access class levels generally refer to values that are hierarchically 
ordered with respect to a dominance operator. 
E.g., Top Secret 2 Secret, Secret 2 Confidential, 
Confidential 2 Unclassfied 
Compartments are not hierarchically ordered values. 
Compartments are set elements where dominance is determined 
by whether or not a set of compartments is a subset of another set 
of compartments. 
Example: 
Consider a situation where compartment names are fruits. 
- If A = {apples, peaches, apricots} and 
- B = {peaches, apricots} then 
- A 2 B because B is a subset of A. 
It is possible to have two sets of compartments C and 0, 
such that C does not dominate D and D does not dominate 
C. 
Example: 
Non-comparable sets of compartments: 
- C = {oranges, apples, peaches} and 
- D = {oranges, peaches, bananas}. 
Beware: 
Often DoD usage of the term "need-to-know" to refers to the use 
of compartments and non-DoD literature often uses the term 
''need-to-know" to refer to DAC. 
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Compartments and Levels 
Examples : 
Levels = Top Secret, Secret, Confidential 
Compartments = Crypto, Nuclear, Biological, Red, Green 
- Alice is logged in at a session level of "Secret-Nuclear, Red" 
- Tim is logged in at a session level of "Confidential-Crypto, 
Nuclear, Biological" 
Anne is logged in at a session level of "Top Secret-Green" - 
- File1 has class "Secret-Green" 
- File2 has class "Secret-Red, Green" 
- File3 has class "Confidential-Red" 
- File4 has class "Top Secret-Green" 
- File5 has class "Secret-Nuclear, Red, Green" 
Assuming the BLP model of read and write access (where 
write up is allowed), who has read access to which files 
and write access to which files? 
~~ 
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Integrity 
Note: 
The term integrity is used in two ways in the context of computer 
security. 
Program or execution integrity refers to a system's ability to pro- 
vide protected domains of execution. 
Data integrity refers to keeping data free from unauthorized modi- 
fication. 
Secrecy versus Integrity 
Recall from the "Golden Triangle" slide that secrecy and data 
integrity concerns are distinct. 
Secrecy concerns the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of 
data or information. 
To re-enforce the orthogonal nature of these concepts, provide 
examples of the four types of data labeled in the table below: 
Question: 
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Biba Integrity Model 
Biba Model 
In addition to enforcing a policy for secrecy, we would like sys- 
tems to enforce a mandatory policy for data integrity too. 
The Biba Integrity Model addresses the unauthorized modification 
problem by restricting read and write accesses. 
Uses integrity levels and integrity compartments much like sensi- 
tivity levels and sensitivity compartments. 
For each subject s in S and each object o in 0: 
- Fixed integrity classes I(s) and I(o) 
A high integrity fde is one whose contents are created by high- 
integrity processes. 
- The properties guarantee that the high-integrity file cannot be 
contaminated by information from low-integrity processes. 
- The high-integrity process that writes the file cannot be sub- 
verted by low integrity processes or data. 
- The integrity class label on a file guarantees that the contents 
came only from sources of at least that degree of integrity. 
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Biba Integrity Model 
Simple Integrity Properw 
A subject s can modify (have write access to) object 0, only if 
(An low integrity subject will not write or modify high integrity data.) 
I(s) 2 I(0). 
* - Property 
If a subject s can have read access to object 0, only if 
I(0) 2 I(s). 
(The high integrity subject will not read low integrity data.) 
Restatement of the Biba rules: 
Nowriteup. 
No read down. 
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Biba Example 
Consider the following objects, subjects and 
integrity levels: 
File1 has an access class value of Administrator. 
File2 has an access class value of User. 
File3 has an access class value of Security Administrator. 
Subjectl has an access class value of Security Administrator. 
Subject2 has an access class value of User. 
Where 
"Security Administrator" dominates "Administrator" 
"Administrator dominates User" 
Under the Biba Model the following accesses are 
allowed: 
Subjectl can read File3. 
Subjectl can write Filel, File2 and File3. 
Subject2 can read Filel, File2 and File3. 
Subject2 can write File2. 
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The Biba Model is often described in terms of secure information 
flows. The Figure below shows such a flow diagram. This is another 
way of saying that there is '!no write up" and '!no read down." 
Integrity Flow (Biba) 
Write Ef Subject Object 00 
As indicated by the diagram, a subject can only both read 
and write an object if the object has the same access class 
value as the subject. 
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Combined BLP and Biba Example 
This example demonstrates how read and write 
accesses are restricted in systems that support 
the Bell and LaPadula secrecy model and the Biba 
integrity model. 
Each subject and each object has both a sensitivity label and an 
integrity label. 
Consider the following sensitivity levels TS, S, C. 
Consider the following integrity levels SecAdmin, Admin, User. 
- File1 TS-User 
- File2 TS-SecAdmin 
- File3 S-Admin 
- File4 C-SecAdmin 
- Subjectl S-User 
- Subject2 S-SecAdmin 
- Subject3 TS-SecAdmin 
- Subject4 TS-User 
Subjectl can read File3 and File4 
Subjectl can write File1 
Subject2, etc. 
The class TS-User is called system-high, because a subject at this 
class can read every object in the system. An object of this class 
can be written by every subject in the system. 
The class C-SecAdmin is called system-low, because it can be 
read by every subject in the system. A subject of this class can 
write every object in the system. 
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MAC Conclusions 
Concluding statements about MAC. 
A MAC policy can prevent malicious software (e.g., Trojan 
Horses) from directly leaking information from high to low. 
Recall that we trust users to not give the store away, but we gener- 
ally can’t say the same thing for software. 
So we build systems that enforce a MAC policy on applications 
and we don’t have to worry about the application software. 
- For example, a subject running at Secret cannot write any 
information at a level below Secret. 
Note that a Trojan Horse can write information 
between objects at the same security level. 
For example a Trojan horse can read one Secret file and copy it to 
another Secret file. 
Is this a problem? 
No. Here’s why. 
This scenario would require a bad guy (e.g., Ivan) to have a Secret 
clearance. (So you need personnel security too.) 
He brings in his killer Star Trek game (with an embedded Trojan 
Horse). 
Sue, a Secret user, plays the Star Trek game and the Trojan Horse 
copies her Secret files into Ivan’s directory. But Ivan is already 
cleared for Secret information so the Trojan Horse does not get 
him any information he is not already cleared to see. 
In general, systems that support a MAC policy also support a DAC 
policy to provide a convenient separation of user’s data. 
There is still a potential problem with MAC systems. 
Covert Channels can still leak information from high to low in 
spite of a MAC policy. 
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Covert Channels 
Covert channels are flows of information between 
access class levels counter to a MAC policy but 
which are allowed by an implementation. 
Covert channels are a means of leaking information from high to 
low, one bit at a time. 
If the rate of transmitting bits across the channel (the channel baud 
rate) is great, this threat is significant. 
Covert channels involve two programs, of which one must be a 
Trojan Horse. Covert channels are a little complicated to imple- 
ment. 
However, if information being stored is very valuable, the covert 
channel threat is real. 
Covert channels come in two varieties. Storage channels and tim- 
ing channels. 
- Covert storage channels exploit a resource common to both a 
high subject and a low subject. 
- Automated flow analysis tools can identify every storage 
channel in a formal specification of a system’s interface. 
- Covert timing channels exploit a mechanism where a high 
subject can affect the timing of low subject. 
- No automatic means exist for identifying every existing tim- 
ing channel at a system’s interface. 
- Timing channels are identified by a examination of the inter- 
face. 
~ 
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Covert Storage Channel Example 
The classic example of a covert storage channel is the 
disk exhaustion channel. 
Ivan, (a low user) introduces a Trojan Horse program (e.g., Star 
Trek game) into the system and somehow gets a high user to exe- 
cute it. 
When the high user plays the Star Trek game a sub-program is 
spawned and goes to sleep. The sub-program contains the Trojan 
Horse and wakes up and starts running at a time when activity on 
the system is low (e.g., at 0100). 
Ivan starts another program (a low program) that will wake up at 
0105, (5 minutes later than the high program). This allows the 
high program time to initialize the channel. 
The high program finds a high file to copy (fileA). 
The high program initializes the channel by repeatedly creating 
files until the "disk full" exception is returned. 
The two programs will synchronize with each other by reading a 
system clock. The high program will signal bits on every even mil- 
lisecond and the low program will receive bits on every odd milli- 
second. 
The high program starts reading the bits out of FileA. The follow- 
ing steps are repeatedly performed until the high program is 
through reading the file. 
The high program does: (on even milliseconds) 
- If a bit is a 0, the high program deletes one file. (Creating 
room on the disk for a file to be created.) 
- If a bit is a 1, the high program does not delete a file. (So 
there is no room on the disk to create a file). 
The low program does: (on odd milliseconds) 
- The low program always tries to create a file. If there is room 
on the disk, the create file call is successful. If the call is suc- 
cessful, the low program writes a 0 into a destination file. 
- If there is no room on the disk, the create file call will fail, 
with the "disk full" exception. If the call is unsuccessful, the 
low program writes a 1 into the destination file. 
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Covert Channels 
Storage Channel Example Conclusions: 
The channel baud rate of the previous example is 1 bit every 2 mil- 
liseconds. 
This is 500 bits per second, which is 30,000 bits per minute. 
The timing scheme used in the example is very conservative. 
Much higher baud rates are generally attainable. 
One way to close the disk exhaustion channel is to partition the 
disk into volumes and allocate each volume to a different security 
level. For example, volume 0 is for TS files, volume 1 is for S files 
and volume 2 is for C files. 
Under this partitioning scheme, a C subject cannot tell if the TS 
volume is full or not. Recall that in the covert channel scenario, the 
C subject determined if the disk was full by attempting to create a 
file. Under the partitioning scheme C subjects create files on a sep- 
arate volume than the TS subjects. 
Covert Timing Channels 
Covert timing channels exploit a mechanism where a high subject 
can affect the timing of a low subject. 
A potential timing channel, which exists on single processor sys- 
tems, uses the fact that both the high subject and the low subject 
use the same physical processor. 
To signal a 1, the high subject performs a lengthy operation (e.g., 
disk YO) and signals a 0 by performing a short operation. 
When the high subject finishes its operation, the low subject is 
scheduled to run. 
When the low subject gets scheduled, it reads the system clock and 
determines how long the high subject operation took. 
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Multilevel Subjects 
Multilevel subjects versus Single-Level subjects 
Up until this point, all subjects in the MAC discussions were sin- 
gle level subjects. 
That is, a subject could both read and write at only one level. 
For example, a Secret subject could only both read and write 
Secret level objects. (This is required to prevent malicious soft- 
ware from writing high data to low objects.) 
Situations exist (e.g., information downgrading) where a subject 
needs to be able to both read and write over a range. 
For example, downgrading information from Secret to Confiden- 
tial would require a subject to read information in Secret objects 
and write it to Confidential objects. 
Thus, MAC implementations must provide some 
means for multilevel subjects. 
Note that the vast majority of subjects will still be single-level sub- 
jects, because multilevel subjects are subject to the Trojan Horse 
problem. 
Thus, any code that is used in a multilevel subject MUST BE 
TRUSTED. 
That is, it must be examined to determine that it does not contain a 
Trojan Horse. 
Often multilevel subjects are call trusted subjects. 
Besides downgrading, there are other selected applications that 
require a multilevel subject. 
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Atmlications of Multilevel Subjects 
Down grading information 
Need human review -judgement 
Automated sanitization cannot assure that all sensitive information 
has been removed 
Login to a Multilevel System 
users need to set session level 
user has HIGH and LOW range of security levels 
must set read and write class for session 
Guards 
GUARD 
Mu It i leve I Input 
L 
I 
Guard might consist of four processes: 
- one multilevel process, P1 (multilevel), 
- three single level processes P2 (S), P3 (C), P3 (U) 
P1 receives labeled information from multilevel input 
P1 inspects label and puts information into a labeled object 
P2, P3, or P4 send information from objects at its level to output 
system 
Guard is trusted to insure that labeled information is sent to the 
correct end system. 
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Support in g Po I ic ies 
Supplement both mandatory and discretionary security policies 
No matter how complex a policy may appear, if sufficient analysis is 
applied, it will be mandatory, discretionary, or supporting 
Identification and Authentication 
associate subjects with users 
authenticate user to system and system to user (trusted path) 
Audit - Accountability 
Data Consistency Policy 
protects against damage resulting from user or software error 
protects against unauthorized modification or destruction of infor- 
mation 
E.g., Ages are non-negative, department credit card purchases 
must not be greater than $200.00. 
A ccoun ta bility Policy 
authentication of individuals, thus permitting them to be account- 
able for the actions 
auditing of individual accesses and access attempts 
- deterrent to misuse 
- detection of security violations 
Labeling Policy 
assignment of access labels to information entering and leaving 
the system 
assignment of access class authorizations to users 
Aggregation Policy 
labeling of aggregates more sensitive than individual elements 
Sanitization Policy 
* release of derived information which is at a lower class than that 
from which it was derived. 
release of information from aggregates where the individual ele- 
ments are at a lower class that the aggregate 
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Supporting Po I icies (continued) 
Supporting Policy Mandatory Discretionary 
identification and X X 
authentication 
Reclassification Policy 














consistency I I x I classification independent 
X classification dependent 
X classification dependent 
accountability 
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TCBs, Reference Monitors, Protection 
Domains, Subjects and Objects. 
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Assurance Versus Policy 
Security Policy 
The previous two sections discussed several security policies and 
supporting policies for computer systems. 
These policies state rules that are enforced by a system’s security 
features. 
Assurance 
Assurance, within the context of computer security, is a measure 
of trust or confidence that a system’s security policies are correctly 
enforced. 
Note: 
Security Policies and Assurance are orthogonal. The number and 
type of policies enforced by a system says nothing about how well 
the policies are implemented. Assurance addresses the issue of 
how well a policy is implemented (with respect to correctness of 
the policy being enforced). 
The amount of effort required to analyze a system’s ability to 
properly enforce its security policies, is dependent on the amount 
of software, firmware and hardware responsible for implementing 
the security features of the system. 
- A small amount of software can be analyzed with a reason- 
able amount of effort. 
- A large amount of software (e.g., an entire Unix operating 
system) cannot be fully understood and analyzed with any 
amount of effort. Large systems are beyond the scope of cur- 
rent analyzing tools and techniques. 
If we want to be able to analyze and fully understand the security 
features of a system, we either: 
- Build only small systems. 
- Build systems such that the security relevant code is small 
and separable from the non-security relevant code. Thus, only 
the small amount of security relevant code needs to be ana- 
lyzed. 
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Trusted Computing Bases 
Trusted Computing Base Issues 
A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the totality of protection 
mechanisms within a computer system, including hardware, firm- 
ware and software. That is, the TCB contains the security relevant 
software, firmware and hardware. 
An imaginary boundary around the TCB is call the security perim- 
eter. 
The TCB contains mechanisms for implementing the various secu- 
rity policies enforced by a system, (MAC, DAC, I & A, Audit, 
etc.). 
Of these policies the most crucial is MAC (recall that DAC is 
inherently flawed due to its susceptibility to malicious software). 
Special design and implementation requirements are needed for 
the portion of the TCB that implements MAC. 
These special design and implementation requirements lead to the 
Reference Monitor Concept. 
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Reference Monitor Concept 
General Schema: 
The Reference Monitor is an abstraction that allows subjects to 
access objects. 
The Reference Monitor is interposed between all subjects and 
objects. 
The Reference Monitor makes reference to an authorization data- 
base. 
At an abstract level, the Reference Monitor supports two classes of 
functions: 
- Reference functions - for accessing information 










The Reference Monitor must be invoked on every reference of a 
subject to an object. 
Isolation 
The Reference Monitor and its database must be protected from 
unauthorized alteration. 
Verifiability 
The Reference Monitor must be small, well-structured, simple and 
understandable so that it can be completely analyzed, tested and 
verified to perform its function properly. 
Su p po rt Fu nct io ns 
Reference Monitors often utilize supporting policies. 
lden ti fica tion and Authentication 
identify users to the system - who you are 
authenticate users to system - what you have, know, or are 
reliably identify trusted part of system to users 
Audit 
record security relevant operations 
introduction of new objects into a domain 
deletion of objects 
create an audit trail composed of audit records 
- reference monitor may be source of only some of the audit 
trail information 
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Security Kernel 
Security Kernel Facts 
A Security Kernel is an implementation of the reference monitor 
concept. 






A system that is built upon a Security Kernel: 
- Lends it self to a tractable analysis to determine how well the 
system enforces specific security policies. 
Addressing Computer Misuse 
Don’t need the power of a Security Kernel to address 
- user errors: best countered by user education 
- abuse of authority: countered by audit 
- direct probing: countered by sound management and audit 
Security Kernel particularly suited for addressing several catego- 
ries of computer misuse: 
- probing with malicious software: countered by MAC policy 
- penetration: countered by high assurance systems 
- subversion: countered by high assurance systems 
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Security Kernel from an Existing Operating System? 
NO! 
Security Kernel Design using Existing Operating System 
Security functions may be diffused throughout system. 
Massive redesign required to 
- isolate security relevant functionality 
- insure modularity 
- insure use of hardware features in support of security kernel 
objectives 
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Determining Assurance 
Aspects of Assurance 
Section 11 (Building Secures Systems 1I) covers several aspects of 
determining the level of assurance of a particular system. 
The remainder of this section covers: 
-- The use of Security Models to help establish 
assurance. 
-- System architecture as it relates to assurance. 
Security Model issues: 
A Security Model is a precise and unambiguous statement of a 
systems security policy. 
A Security Model is an obvious representation of the security pol- 
icy. 
A Security Model is simple and abstract, and therefore is easy to 
comprehend. 
An Informal Security Model may be written in formal mathemati- 
cal notation or in a natural-language. 
A Formal Security Model is written in formal mathematical nota- 
tion. 
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Security Models 
Two ways a system may be insecure 
flaws in policy 
flaws in implementation 
Reasons for using a Security Model 
Security Models can address both issues mentioned above. 
Both Informal and Formal Security Models can be used to estab- 
lish that a Security Policy is not flawed. 
- We do not want to implement a system that enforces a flawed 
policy. 
- In the case of Formal Security Models, this proof is made by 
mathematically showing that the Model is consistent with its 
axioms. 
Both Informal and Formal Security Models can be used to estab- 
lish that an implementation faithfully reflects the security policy. 
- An Informal Security Model can be mapped to an implemen- 
tation or an Informal Specification which can help establish 
that an implementation faithfully reflects the enforcement of 
a security policy. 
A Formal Security Model can be mapped mathematically to a 
Formal Specification which can help establish that an imple- 
mentation faithfully reflects the enforcement of a security 
policy. 
- 
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Formal Work Improves Verification 
Objective: 
Demonstrate that the implementation is faithful to the 
policy 












Testing Test i ng Arguments 
, 1 , ,  1 II , Implementation Implementation Implementation 
b 
Increasing assurance that implementation is necessary and sufficient 
to enforce policy 
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General Characteristics of Security Models 
Model constrains design to meet security requirements 
Doesn’t constrain how that design might be implemented. 
Guides security relevant behavior of the mechanism. 
Mechanism expressed in a functional specification. 
No 
Add-ons to an existing system are 
an example of weak security fixes 
where modeling would be useless. 
Three Major Types of Models 
State Machine Models 
State variables represent (security) state of machine. 
Transition functions describe changes to the variables. 
Access Matrix Models are state machine models. 
- Access matrix model shows how matrix changes using transi- 
tion functions. 
Attribute model shows how security attributes of subjects and 
objects are compared. 
Information Flow Models 
Control flow of information from one object to another. 
Useful for covert channel analysis. 
N o n-l n t e rf e ren ce Models 
Subjects operate in different domains and are prevented from 
affecting each other in ways that would violate the security policy. 
Still active research topic. 
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State Machine Modeling Steps 
Preliminary Steps 
Define relevant security state variables. 
Define what it means to be in a secure state. 
- (e.g., all Unclassified subjects don’t have read access to any 
Confidential objects.) 
- This is called the invarianf. 
Define the state transition functions. 
Select an initial state for the system. 
Proof Steps That Establish the Model is 
Consistent With its Axioms 
Prove that the initial state is secure. 
Prove that each individual function maintains a secure state (i.e., 
that they take a secure state to another secure state). 
Induction is the basis of the proof. 
Since the initial state is secure and 
since all state transition functions maintain a secure state (take a 
secure state to another secure state) 
all combinations of transition functions can only result in a secure 
state. 
Conclusion: 
If a system starts in a secure state and all transition 
functions take a secure state to another secure state, the 
system will always be in a secure state. 
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Example Access Control Matrix 
SysMGR 
User-Svcs 
Abstract Representation of an Authorization Database: 
A table in which: 
- Each row represents a single user (subject). 
- Each column represents an object. 
Access matrix can be represented as a list of triplets to avoid 
sparse matrix. <subject, object, rights> 
~~ 
- - - RW X X RW - 
X X R W - - - - 
I User-B 
I User-T 
Access Control Matrix 
In the example above the rights are 
R - read 
W - write 
X - execute 
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A person may read a document only if the person’s 




Policy to Model Translation 
Property I :  A subject may read an object only if the access 
class of the subject is greater than or equal to the access 
class of the object. 
Property 2: A subject may write to an object only if the 
access class of the object is greater than or equal to the 
access class of the subject. 
Note that Property 1 is the Bell and LaPadula simple security 
property and Property 2 is the BLP *-property. 
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SSM: Define State Variables 
Notation; 
0 null set 
( } setnotation 
u union 
V for all 
E is anelement of 
'x the value of x in the state after a transition (i.e., in the next 
state) 
S = set of current subjects 
0 = set of current objects 
. sclass(s) = access class of subject s 
oclass(o) = access class of object o 
A(s,o) = set of access modes equal to one of: 
{r} subject s can read object o 
{ w} subject s can write object o 
{ rw} subject s can read and write object o 
0 neither read nor write access 
contents(0) = contents of object o 
subj = active subject 
state of system at any time is 
( S ,  0, sclass, oclass, A, contents, subj} 
Define Secure State 
Invariant: the system is secure if and only if, V s E S, o E 0, 
if r E A(s,o), then sclass(s) 2 oclass(o), 
if w E A(s,o), then oclass(0) 2 sclass(s), 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 4 Page A 1-96 
SSM: Define Transition Functions 
~ ~ 
set-access (s, 0, modes) 
write-object (0, d) 
set access modes for subject s to object o 
write data d into contents of o 
I create-object (0, c) I create object o at class c I 
~~ ~ 
Icreate/change-object(o,c) I set class of o to c and create 
I copy-object(from, to) I copy contents (from) to contents (to) I 
F d - d a t a ( o ,  d) I add data d to contents of o 
Functions are defined mathematically and are atomic 
operations. 
create-object (0, c) 
ifoe 0 
then '0 = 0 v (0) and 
'ocluss(o) = c and 
V s E S, 'A(s, 0)  = 0 
set - access(s, 0, modes) 
i f s e  SandoE 0 
and if { [ r E modes and sclass(s) 2 oclass(o)] or r e modes) 
{ [ w E modes and oclass(0) 2 sclass(s)] or w e modes} 
and 
then 'A(s, 0) = modes 
Notes 
= means mathematical equality not programming assignment. 
+ The order of statements not important. 
+ Transition functions must be atomic. 
If something isn't described in the function then nothing happens 
to it, everything that changes in the state must be described in the 
function. 
~ ~~ ~ 
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SSM: Proof of Consistency 
Prove Each Transition Function 
Invariant and Function imply 'Invariant 
Example: create-o b ject proof 
V s E S, o E 0, if r E A(s,o), then sclass(s) 2 oclass(o), 
if w E A(s,o), then oclass(0) 2 sclass(s), 
and 
i f o e  0 
then '0  = 0 u (0) and 'oclass(0) = c and V s E S, 'A(s, 0) = 0 
implies 
'd s E 'S, o E '0, if r E 'A(s,o), then 'sclass(s) 2 'oclass(o), 
if w E 'A(s,o), then 'oclass(0) 2 'sclass(s), 
Note how the create-object function needs to force nulls in the col- 
umn of the access matrix for the new object. Needed for the function 
to be secure. 
Define and Prove Secure Initial State 
{So, 0 0 ,  sclasso, oclasso, Ao, contentso, subjo} 
Simple Initial State 
So = 0 and 0 0  = 0 
Another Initial State 
V s E SO, o E 00 sclasso (s) = co oclasso (0) = co 
A&, 0 )  = {r, w) 
Conclusion 
After each transition function is proved secure (i.e., each 
transition function takes a secure state to a secure state) 
and an initial state is proved secure, the model proof is 
complete. This means that the model is consistent with its 
axioms and that the security policy is not flawed. 
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SSM: Constraints 
Must insure that transitions from state to state are secure 
Add constraints - these address values in two consecutive states 
- maintain secure relationship between "oldt and "new" values 
- restrict subjects from invoking certain operations under cer- 
tain conditions 
- control transitions that modify information 
Example 
changeheate-object (0, c) 
'oclass(0) = c; and 
if o e 0 then '0 = 0 u (0); and 
V s E S, 'A(s, 0) = 0 
Problem: this function permits the access class of an object to be 
changed. Information could be downgraded. 
Solution: add a new property 
Property 3: the access class of an object cannot decrease 
We are dealing with a particular type of transition, so add a constraint 
constraint: V o E 0, 'oclass(o) 2 oclass(o) 
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Important Models 
Computer Security literature often makes 
reference to the following Security Models: 
Lattice Model 
- A lattice model is a generalized model where the elements 
form a mathematical structure called a lattice. 
- The figure on the following page shows a lattice representa- 
tion of the legal information flows within the context of mili- 
tary style labels. 
- Many other models satisfy lattice model properties. 
- Models that exhibit lattice properties lend themselves to 
mathematical analysis. 
- It can be expressed in terms of a lattice model. 
- It is a confidentiality model. 
- It was the first mathematical model of a multilevel secure 
computer system, 
- It can be expressed in terms of a lattice model. 
- It is an integrity model. 
- It is the dual of the BLP model. 




- An information flow model. 
- An information flow model. 
- A theoretically important model, which facilitates proofs 
regarding the decidablitiy of subjects gaining rights to 
objects. 
Clark-Wilson Model 
- It is a commercial model that is transaction oriented. 
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Example Lattice 
Example lattice showing legal information flows in 
a system that has: 
Secrecy levels of "TS", "S" and "C" 
The compartments "Nuclear" and "Red" 
t 
Notice how information flows from label "A" to label "B" only if 
label "B" dominates label "A". 
Least Upper Bound (LUB) 
- The LUB of a set of lattice elements (or levels and compart- 
ments) is defmed to be the "least dominant" element that 
dominates all elements of the set. 
- The GLB of a set of lattice elements (or levels and compart- 
ments) is defined to be the "greatest dominant" element that is 
dominated by each element of the set. 
Examples: 
- The LUB of "S : R e d  and "C : Nuclear, Red" is "S : Nuclear, 
Red" 
- The GLB of "TS : Nuclear, Red" and "S : Red" is " S  : Red" 
Greatest Lower Bound (GLB) 
System-High is the upper bound of all security classes in a system. 
System-Low is the lower bound of all security classes in a system. 
~~ 
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System architecture issues: 
System architecture considerations directly 
address the isolation requirement of Security 
Kernels. Important specific issues are: 
The use of hardware to support domains of execution. 
The use of hardware to support distinct storage objects. 
The use of Layering, Modularity and Data-Hiding. 
- Layering is the structuring of software into distinct loop-free 
layers (i.e., layers only call down). 
- This allows software to be analyzed in smaller chunks (one 
layer at a time) since the correctness of a lower layer is not 
affected by an upper layer. 
- Modularity is the structuring of software into small under- 
standable single purpose chunks. 
Data-Hiding is the structuring of data such that it can only be 
manipulated through a simple high-level well defined module 
interface. 
- 
The use of the principle of "Least Privilege". 
A subject should have access to the fewest objects needed 
for the subject to work successfully. 
(Information is limited by a need-to-know!) 
Example: 
The system backup program may be allowed to bypass read 
restrictions on files, but it need not have the ability to mod- 
ify files. The restore program might be allowed to write files 
but not read them. 
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0s Protection of Memory 
An 0 s  may offer protection of memory (system 
objects) at any of several levels: 
No protection (unrestricted sharing between processes and sub- 
jects) 
Isolation (no sharing between processes subjects) 
Restricted sharing between processes and subjects 
- Share via access limitation 
- Share by capabilities 
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A method to confine users to one side of a boundary. 
Predefined memory address (fixed). 
Operating system on one side. 
User program on the other side. 
Relocation: 
The process of taking a program written as if it began at address 0 
and changing all addresses to reflect the actual address at which 
the program is located in memory. 
Fence register: 
Contains address of end of 0s. 
Provides means of code relocation. 
Only protects operating system. 
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Process / Subject Distinction 
The difference between a Process and a Subject: 
A Process is a thread of execution. 
A Subject is a Process executing in a domain. 
- A domain is an address space (i.e., the totality of memory 
locations addressable by a process). 
- The 0s domain (memory location 0 to 999,999) and 
- the User Program domain (500,000 to 999,999), 
In the situation shown below there are two domains for a process: 
When process PROCl is executing a User Program, it is restricted 
to the memory range 500,000 to 999,999. When the User Program 
needs an 0s service (e.g., writing to a device), PROCl makes an 
0 s  call and PROCl starts executing in the 0s. While PROCl is 
executing in the OS, it is restricted to the memory range 0 to 
999,999. When PROCl finishes the requested 0s service, PROCl 
returns to executing within the User Program. 
The 0s subject of PROCl is when PROCl is executing in the 0s. 









999,999 I User Program Space 
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Protection of Memory and Addressing 
Address 
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Protection of Memory and Addressing 
BaselBounds Registers 
Base register: 
All addresses are offset from the base register. 
A variable fence register generally called a base register. 
Bounds Register: 
Provides upper address limit. 
When used with a base register user program is confined. 
Provides one user's program protection from another. 
Does not protect user from himselfherself. 
Can be achieved through additional registers - 
Virtual Machine Supervisory Program: 
Generally the only process which can change the contents of these 
registers. 
Maintains a protected table of all register value pairs (one for each 
virtual processor). 
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Protection of Memory and Addressing 
Program Base 
T I -  
~ 
Program Bounds 


















User B IProgram Space 
Two Pairs of Base/Bounds Registers 
The Program registers specify the range of memory addresses 
allowed for code. 
The Data registers specify the range of memory addresses allowed 
for data references. 
A general scheme would also include a memory area for each pro- 
cess stack. 
Given that each process will require a set of three register values, 
this scheme gets a little complicated. 
A scheme that simplifies the management of many different mem- 
ory regions (code, data and stack for Process A, code, data and 
stack for Process B, etc.) is the memory segmentation scheme. 
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Seamentation of Memory 
Segmentation 
Segmentation is the notion of dividing memory into separate 
pieces, called segments. 
Each segment has a unique name. 
Individual bytes of memory are addressed as a pair <segment 
name, offset> 
The O/S maintains a table mapping the logical addresses to the 
physical addresses. 
This scheme has the same effect as an unbounded number of base/ 
bounds register pairs 
A form of information hiding: 
The 0s can move any segment to any location. 
A segment can be removed from main memory. 
Every address reference passes through the 0s. 
- A process which does not have a segment name in its table is 
denied access to that segment. 
Handled by combination of hardware and software. - 
Benefits of segmentation: 
Each segment can be assigned a different level of protection (e.g., 
access class label or value). 
Each request for a segment can be checked for appropriate access 
(perfect for Reference Monitor / Security Kernel implementa- 
tions). 
Two or more users can share access to a segment, but with differ- 
ent access rights. 
It is impossible for a user to generate an address or gain access to 
an unpermitted segment. 
Inherent problems: 
Segment names are inconvenient to encode. 
Segmentation leads to fragmentation of main memory. 
If swapping is used then additional memory management tech- 
niques must be employed (e.g. LRU). 
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Logical and Physical Representation of Segments 
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Seamentation Continued 
Use of segmentation: 
Each process has a table of segments that it can access (Intel uses 
the terminology "Descriptor Table"). 
This table specifies the address space of the process. 
Paged Segmentation 
Paged memory schemes are convenient since they automatically 
manage the task of swapping in and swapping out pages of mem- 
ory as needed by programs. 
Break each segment into equal sized pages. 
Advantages of hardware that supports the 
segmentation of memory: 
Supports the isolation of processes by providing a simple means 
for specifying process address spaces. 
Supports labelling of objects (perfect for Reference Monitor / 
Security Kernel implementations). 
The next few slides will show how segmentation can support the 
implementation of execution domains. 
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Execution Domains 
Motivation: 
The Process / Subject discussion a few pages back assumed the 
existence of two execution domains, the 0s domain and the User 
Program domain. 
In general more than two execution domains are desired to support 
the principle of least privilege. 
The figure below shows an architecture that uses four distinct 
domains of execution for each process: 
When a process is running in the "DBMS Application" domain it 
cannot directly affect any of the code or data in the lower more 
privileged domains. 
- It can indirectly affect data in the lower domains by making 
calls to that domain. 
- For example, the Application can ask the DBMS to modify a 
database table, but it cannot directly affect the table without 
using the DBMS. 
DBMS Application 
Database Management System (DBMS) 
Operating System (0s) 
Security Kernel 
I I 
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Execution Domains Continued 
Implementation Details of Execution Domains: 
Execution Domains can either be implemented in software or hard- 
ware. 
Intel x86 (8086,80286,80386,80486 and Pentium) chips support 
four hardware execution domains. 
Intel uses the terminology "Hardware Privilege Level". 
Multics hardware supported 32 domains. 
Execution domains are sometime referred to as rings. 
The term hardware rings implies hardware enforced domains and 
software rings implies software enforced domains. 
An important aspect of a ring implementation is the mechanism 
that allows outer (less privileged) subjects to call into inner (more 
privileged) subjects. 
This mechanism is called a call gate. 
Call Gate Issues: 
Call gates (or gates) limit the way the less privileged subjects 
invoke the services (procedures and functions) of the more privi- 
leged subjects. 
Gates specify exactly which entry points of a domain may be 
called from above. For example, the Security Kernel ring in the 
previous figure may contain 323 functions and procedures, but the 
Security Kernel gate only allows the upper subjects to call 27 of 
them. 
Gates prevent upper subjects from jumping into the middle of pro- 
cedures and functions in the lower domain. 
Gates can also be used to limit which subjects may call into a 
domain. For example, in the previous figure, the Security Kernel 
gate may only allow calls from the 0 s  subject. That is, the DBMS 
subject cannot call directly into the Security Kernel. 
Gates are also used to validate pointers that are passed into a pro- 
cedure of a more privileged ring. The gate ensures that all pointer 
parameters don't point to any addresses that are part of the more 
privileged domain. 
Intel x86 chips provide robust gate mechanisms for supporting the 
four privilege levels. 
Why Care about Hardware Privilege Levels? 
Boeing MLS LAN 
Gemini Trusted Network Processor 
Hardware Versus Software Implementation 
A1 80x86 Multiprocessor 
A1 80x86 PC or Multiprocessor 
Hardware is far more efficient than software. 
High Assurance Products Use Hardware Mechanisms. 
Verdix VSLAN 
Trusted Product 
B2 80x86 Custom Board 
I Target Base Architecture 1 Rating I 
~- I Wang XTS 300 I B3 180x86 I 
I TIS Trusted Xenix I B2 I80x86PC I 
Table from: Sibert et al, The Intel 80x86 Processor Architecture: Pit- 
falls for Secure Systems 
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Ring Issues 
Software Rings 
With software rings, the Security Kernel creates the ring abstrac- 
tion, (i.e., it enforces the ring policy). 
General Ring Issues 
A process may run in any one of several rings at any one time, 
moving from ring to ring during execution. 
A process running in a given ring is protected from other processes 
running in the same ring (process isolation). 
Intel Privilege Levels are denoted as PL 0 through PL 3. 
Ring mechanisms enforce a ring policy. 
A common ring policy is where a subject running in ring i can 
access all data and functions in ring j, if i 5 j. 
- This is the policy enforced by the Intel hardware Privilege 
Level mechanisms. 
- Recall, a process running in a given ring is called a subject. 
- See the figure below. 
DBMS Application (PL 3) 
Database Management System (DBMS) (PL 2) 
Operating System (0s) (PL 1) 
Security Kernel (PL 0) 
~~~~ ~ 
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Ring Brackets 
Ring Bracket Motivation 
Ring brackets are often part of ring enforcement mechanisms. 
The use of ring brackets allow for a ring policy that is more robust 
than the policy enforced by Intel hardware Privilege Levels. 
A set of ring bracket values are associated with each segment of 
memory. 
The following example demonstrates a ring bracket policy and 
encoding. 
- See the example below. 
Example 
Three ring bracket values R1, R2 and R3 are associated with each 
segment. 
0-R1 is the write bracket 
0-R2 is the read bracket 
0-R3 is the execute bracket 
I Ring Bracket values: I Rl I R2 I R3 I 
A segment with ring brackets of (4,5,7) is writable from rings 0 
through 4, readable from rings 0 through 5, and executable from 
rings 0 through 7. (it is assumed that R 1 5  R2 5 R3) 
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Example of Subjects, Processes and Gates 
.... -...- 
Code Segment 
Single Process, Multi-subject Scenario 
In the figure below, execution starts in the upper left-hand code 
segment, C1. 
Subsequent processing goes as follows: 
C1 calls a procedure (via arrows 1 and 2) in C2. It needs to go 
through gate 1. 
The procedure in C2 finishes and execution returns (via arrow 3) 
to the calling point in C1. 
C1 (via arrow 4) calls a procedure in C3. 
C3 reads and writes data (via arrow 5) from/to D 1. 
C3 (via arrows 6 and 7) calls through gate 1 to a procedure in C4. 
C4 reads and writes data (via arrow 8) f rod to  D2. 
C4 (via arrows 9 and 10) calls through gate 2 to a procedure in C5. 
The procedure in C5 finishes and execution returns (via arrow 11) 
to the calling point in C4. 
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Design of Secure Operating Systems Overview 
Qualities of Secure Systems 
1. Security policy - well defined and enforced by system. 
2. Identification - every subject must be uniquely identified. 
3. Marking - objects labeled for comparison when access requested. 
4. Accountability - must maintain complete and secure records. 
5. Assurance - must contain mechanisms which enforce security and 
6.  Continuous protection - mechanisms must be protected them- 
must be able to measure their effectiveness. 
selves. 
Basic Considerations 
Security must be considered in every aspect of the design of oper- 
ating systems. 
It is difficult to add on security features. 
P r i nci p les of Des ig n 
1. Least privilege - fewest possible privileges for user. 
2. Economy of mechanism - protection system should be small, sim- 
3. Open design - mechanism should be open to scrutiny. 
4. Complete mediation - check every access. 
5. Permission based - default permission should be denial of access. 
6.  Separation of privilege - one permission should not give away the 
7. Least common mechanism - avoid shared objects. 
8. Easy to use. 
ple and straight forward. 
entire system. 
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Malicious Software 
Greedy programs 
Background task assumes greater priority. 
May not be malicious in nature. 
Infinite loops (are you guilty?) 
- Most systems use time-outs. 
- VO time not usually checked. 
Trapdoor 
A secret, undocumented entry point into a module. 
Inserted sometime during code development. 
- Most often debugging hooks. 
- 
- Produce unwanted side effects. 
- Unacceptable input-not caught. 
May permit direct change of variables. 
Poor error checking. 
Most instances are not malicious in nature. 
- Even if not malicious others may utilize it. 
Trojan Horse 
Pe#onns a hidden function in addition to its stated function. 
Generally distributed as object code along with documentation of 
overt use. 
Micro users particularity susceptible. 
Can be introduced by binary manipulation (DEBUG). 
Instructions may be scattered with jumps. 
Instructions may be encrypted. 
New Threats 
Malicious remote executables. 
- Downloaded Java 
- Agentware 
Really variations on known problems. 
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Malicious Software 
Viruses 
Self replicating and infectious program. 
May be relatively harmless or disastrous. 
More prevalent on PCs 
- 
- Swapping of programs. 
- 
- Ignorance. 
Do not compile their own source code like mainframes. 
Easier to get infected (opportunity is there). 
Viruses can be categorized by: 
How do they infect others? 
Overwriting virus? 
Non-overwriting virus? 
- Where do they live? 
Boot infector? 
System infector? 
Application infector?(specific or generic) 
Self encrypting to avoid detection of the signature. 
Polymorphic to present a different signature every time. 
File compressing to be able to hide in files without increasing 
the size of the host file. 
- 





A program that can run independently and can propagate a fully 
working version of itself to other machines! 
Does not require the host program to be run to activate it (as is the 
case for a virus). 
Not all are malicious 
- file compression routines 
- automatic back-up routines 
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Viruses 
Historical overview 
1949 - John von Neumann publishes “Theory and Organization of 
Complicated Automata” a report which dealt with the subject of 
self reproducing code. 
1960’s - Bell Lab programmers H. Douglas McIlroy, Victor 
Vysottsky, and Robert Morris, create an after hours recreation 
game called “Core Wars” which experiments with code designed 
to reproduce and gain control of the computer’s core memory. 
“Core Wars” concept becomes a popular pass time at several other 
industrial and academic research centers but remains a closely 
guarded secret. 
1970’s -Several futuristic novels, notably: “Shockwave Rider” by 
Thomas Brunner and “The adolescence of P-1” by Thomas J. 
Ryan feature worms and intelligent, information-seeking viruses. 
1984 - Disclosure of recipe for “Core Wars” virus revealed to gen- 
eral public. 
0 1986 - University of Delaware comes under attack by both the 
Brain virus and the Scores virus. 
0 1988 - Princeton University requests assistance to combat nVir 
virus which was attacking their systems. Three hours later Stan- 
ford University reported a similar incident. One week later another 
nVir virus attack took place at Oulu University in Finland. 
March 1992 - Michelangelo virus is broadly publicized and overall 
the general public becomes more aware of the destructive potential 
of computer viruses. 
MS Word macro virus 
- Really executed 
- CERT advisory 
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Viruses 
General Virus Infection Scheme 



















How could this threat be limited or prevented? 
By isolating incoming code so that it cannot modify system code or 
imp ortan t applications. 
By using f l e  access controimechanisms P A C  or MAC). 
Antiviral software. 
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Viral Infection Rates 
I 
Viral Infection Models vs. Reality 
A number of researchers have developed models, based upon biologi- 
cal models, in an attempt to describe the infection rate of viral infec- 
tions. 
These models, which have been around since the late 1980's, suggest 
that every computer system in the world should be infected with some 
form of virus today. We know this is not true, so these models fail to 
account for other factors which reduce the overall effect of viral infec- 
tions. 
There are several reasons why these models do not accurately model 
the real world. Two obvious reasons stand out from all the rest: 
1. The models do not accurately model the effect of anti-viral pre- 
cautions. 
2. The models do not take into account the effect of wide scale virus 
detectionhemoval upon discovery of new viruses. 
I Education of the user community and rigid anti-viral efforts! I 










Disk from home 
Don't know / refuse to say 
Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) 
Sales demo disk 
Repair or service disk 
Shrink-wrapped application 
Download other than EBB 
Intercompany disk 
Came with PC 
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The Virus Threat 
Preventing a Virus Infection: 
Use only commercial software acquired from reliable, well-estab- 
lished vendors. 
Test all new software on an isolated system. 
Make backup bootable installation and recovery disks. 
- Keep disks write-protected during reboot. 
Use virus detectors. 
Can be configured to run periodically or when new files are 
imported. 
- 
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Intrusion Detection 
Def i nit io n : 
0 The ability to detect security lapses, ideally while they occur. 
Techniques: 
Intrusion detection software builds usage patterns of the normal sys- 
tem and triggers an alarm any time the usage is abnormal. 
Issues: 
0 Related to audit reduction. 
Helpful against insiders. 
The field is still young. 
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Accreditation 
Definition - Accreditation 
Formal declaration by a designated approving authority (DAA) that 
an AIS is approved to operate in a particular security mode and envi- 
ronment using a prescribed set of safeguards. 
Official Management authorization to operate a system. 
Grants approval to operate 





- computer security (COMPUSEC) 
- communications security (COMSEC) 
- personnel 
- with stated vulnerabilities, countermeasures 
Within given operational concept and environment 
Stated system interconnections 
Acceptable level of risk 
Specified Time Period 
Against a defined threat 
- accrediting authority assumes risk responsibility 
Accreditation Results 
Accreditation affixes security responsibility with DAA 
Shows that due care has ben taken for security in accordance with 
policies 
Given parameters of accreditation, system will protect against 
- compromise, modification, destruction 
Accreditation is in effect 
- upon formal acceptance 
- for specified period 
Accreditation required prior to processing live data (waiver 
required otherwise) 
- classified 
- sensitive but unclassified 
Interim approval possible 
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Accreditation Issues 
DOD Directive 5200.28 
5200.28 Requires Accreditation, March 1988 
Classes of Information 
Classified 





Network - digital, hybrid, analog 
Peripheral devices and software 
Process control computers 
Embedded computer systems 




Office automation systems 
Applications and operating system software 
Firmware 
Etc. 
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Accreditation Issues 
Safeguard I n f o r m at i o n 
Classified and Sensitive But Unclassified 
Access only by authorized individuals 
Used only for intended purpose 
















Accreditation Supported by: 
Certification Report 
Risk Analysis 
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Designated Approving Authority 
Definition - DAA 
The official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for 
operating a system at an acceptable level. 
A .K. A. : Accrediting Official 
The more sensitive the system, the more senior the DAA 
Accrediting Authority 
DAA Authorities 
evaluate overall mission requirements of system 
provide definitive direction relative to risk in system security pos- 
ture 
Sys fern Responsibilities 
One system - One DAA 
Multiple systems - One DAA 
One System - Multiple DAA 
- Careful agreements must be established 
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DAA Responsibilities 
Each DAA shall 
Review and approve security safeguards 
- issue accreditation statements 
- based on safeguard acceptability 
Ensure that safeguards are implemented and maintained 
Identify security deficiencies 
- takeaction 
- Adequate training 
- 
Name an Information System Security Officer (ISSO) 
Directive recommends that ISSO not report to operational 
elements of AIS over which security requirements of the 
5200.28 directive must be enforced 
Require AIS security education and training be in place 
Establish data ownership 
- accountability 
- access rights 
- special handling requirements 
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DAA Identification 
Factors 
type of information: 
- SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 
- SIOP-ESI Single Integrated Operational Plan-Extremely 
Sensitive 
- collateral 
office of primary responsibility (owner) of system 
interconnections with separately accredited systems 
Sometimes the owner of the data defines the accreditor 
Sometimes the accreditor is defined by the owner of the system 
DAA Maps to Security Policy 
SingleDAA 
- Agency/Service Policy 
- DoD Policy 
- Multiple Agencies 
- 
- 
- clearly define policies 
- document through MOA 
Multiple DAAs 
Cannot know details of each other’s policies 
system may be subject to requirements of all organizations 
New Network Connections? 
System DAA must consider risks 
Network DAA must consider security of system requesting connec- 
tion 
Must comply with network security requirements prior to connec- 
tion 
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Network Accreditation Issues 
Interfacing or Networking 
AISs managed by different DAAs 
MOA required and includes 
description and classification of data 
clearance levels of users 
designation of DAA who shall resolve conflicts among DAAs 
safeguards to be implemented before interfacing AISs 
Networking Responsibilities: 
Multilevel Communications Network 
- e.g. World Wide Military Command and Control System 
Intercomputer Network 
One DAA responsible for overall security - 
Safeguards agreed to, implemented and accredited prior to hook 
U P  
DAA in charge may remove non-compliant AIS from network 
May have subnets 
- use cryptography from NSA or DIA to define boundaries 
Highest accreditation division required based on security require- 
ments 
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National Security Policy 
Agency and service Security Policies 
Total of 34 Policies 
Example: AUTODlNlDMS 
Mode of System Operation 
Policy: DCAC 370-195-3 
- Multilevel 
- Defence Communications Agency (DCA), March 1987, DCS 
AUTODIN Category 111 Operational Acceptance Test, DCA 





- NSA/Office of operational security 
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Certification 
Definition 
The comprehensive analysis of the technical and nontechnical secu- 
rity features and other safeguards of a system to establish the extent 
to which a particular system meets a set of specified security require- 
ments 
Supports accreditation process 







Mission security requirements 
Operational environment 
Certification Personnel 
Technically competent to assess system 
Produce documentation provided to DAA 
Part of System Lifecycle 
Track security state of system 
- changes to system 
- changes to environment 
Environmental Factors Considered 








Test system security attributes against threats in the intended environ- 
ment 
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Factors Affecting Certification 
Mission Security Requirements 
Compare 
Fixed format, high integrity, on-time messages 
Office automation mail 
S y s tem Complexity 
Compare 
StandalonePC 
LAN with workstations, file server, WAN gateway 





Previous C&A evidence 
Previously evaluated products 
Products or subsystems that have already been accredited 
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Role Of Risk Management 
Definition 
The process concerned with the identification, measurement, control 
and minimization of security risk in information systems 
Encompasses entire system lifecycle 
Has direct impact on system certification 
Identify Areas for Safeguards 
Disclosure 
Modification 
Denial of Service (DOS) 
Unauthorized use 












System design --> 
System implementation --> 
Countermeasure specification 
verify effectiveness of countermeasures 
identify additional countermeasures 
verify effectiveness of countermeasures 
identify additional countermeasure 
Operational system --> 
Management commitment to risk management must be defined as 
early as possible in program lifecycle 
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Recertification and Reaccred itat ion 
Part of stated Policy 
DoD policy 
System shall be reaccredited every three years 
Director of Central Intelligence 
System shall be reaccredited every five years 
System Changes 
Change in criticality and/or data sensitivity 
Change in security policy 
Change in threat or system risk 
Change in security mode of operation 
Changes in operating system or software providing security fea- 
tures 
Changes in hardware providing security features 
Breach of security, integrity, or other unusual situations which 
might invalidate accreditation 
Physical changes 
Configuration changes (e.g., new connections) 
In networks, 
- changes to subscribing systems 
- addition of other accredited systems 
Results of audit or external analysis 
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Separately Accredited Networks 
AUTODINDMS 
Unclassified (but Sensitive) IP Routing Network (NIPRNET) 
Secure IP Routing Network (SIPRNET) 
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) 
Integrated Tactical Strategic Data Network (ITSDN) 
Critical Intelligence Communications (CRITCOMM) System 
Special Intelligence Communication (SPINTCOM) Network 
STU I11 (Secure Telephone Unit-111) 
Red Switch 
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Certification and Accreditation Process 
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Certification and Accreditation Process 
Step 1: 
Involves gathering and developing relevant documentation (e.g., 
policy implementation guidance, security regulations/manuals, 
previous certification reports, product evaluation reports, COTS 
manuals, design documentation, design modification, and security 
related waivers). Aspects to be considered during this step include: 
- Mission criticality 
- Functional requirements 
- System security boundary 
- Security policies 
- System components and their characteristics 
- External interfaces and connection requirements 
- Security mode of operation or overall risk index 
- System and data ownership 
- Threat information 
- Identification of the Designated Approving Authority (DAA) 
Step 2: 
Since security should have been considered with system concep- 
tion, planning for C&A is a natural extension of system security 
planning. That is, the schedule and resources required to complete 
the C&A process are identified. Aspects to be considered during 
this step include: 
- Reusability of previous evidence 
- Life-cycle phase 
- System milestones (time constraints) 
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Certification and Accreditation Process 
Step 3: 
The security aspects of the system as a whole (i.e., how well secu- 
rity is employed throughout the system) is analyzed. C&A activi- 
ties during this step include determining whether system security 
measures adequately satisfy applicable requirements. 
Step 4: 
This step involves documenting /coordinating the results and rec- 
ommendations of previous phases to prepare the certification 
package which is used as supporting documentation in the accred- 
itation package. The types of documentation generally included as 
part of the certification package include: 
- System needhission overview 
- Security policy 
- SecurityPlan 
- System architectural description and configuration 
- Reports of evaluated products from a recognized government 
evaluation. 
- Statements from other agencies indicating that personnel, 
COMSEC, or other security requirements have been met. 
- Risk analysis report 
- Test plans, Test procedures and test results from security tests 
conducted 
- Analytic results 
- Configuration Management Plan 
- Previous C&A information 
- Contingency plan 
- Memoranda of understanding (MOAs) 
Step 5: 
This step is optional and involves the DAA or hisher representa- 
tive conducting a site survey to assure that security requirements 
meet the requirements for the system. 
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Certification and Accreditation Process 
Step 6: 
DAA makes the accreditation decision based upon factors such as 
global threats, system needcriticality, certification results and rec- 
ommendations, residual risks, the availability or cost of alternative 
countermeasures and other factors that may reach beyond pure 
security considerations (e.g. political consequences). The DAA 
may decide: 
- Full accreditation 
- Accreditation for operation outside the originally intended 
environment (e.g. mission needs, crisis situation). 
- Interim accreditation with steps identified for accomplish- 
ment prior to full accreditation. 
- Disapproval. 
Step 7: 
Accreditation maintenance throughout the life-cycle by ensuring 
that the system continues to operate within the stated parameters 
of the accreditation. 
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Protection from Natural Disasters 
Natural Disasters 







- broken water pipes 
- sprinklers 
Rising Water 
- time is on our side 
- hardware is replaceable 
- real concern is data and programs 
- most centers do not label media by priority groups 
- locate computer center above ground level 
- place building on elevated ground 
- flooding on upper floors seeps down 
- sprinkler system goes off 
- large plastic bags 
- covers or bags near all terminals 
or 
Falling Water 
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Protection from Natural Disasters 
Fire 
Time is critical 
Emphasizes need for quick, orderly shut down procedures 
Smothering systems used vice water 
No windows/fire-resistant access doors 
Power Loss 





Disconnect phone line 
Heat 
Only solution is to shut down system 
Greatest problem is unreliability of performance 
Adequate ventilation/& conditioning 
Inspect air system regularly 
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Recovery Protect ion 
Types of Backup 
Complete backup takes time 
Revolving backup 
Selective (partial) faster 
Optimum is a proper combination of complete and selective 
Must be able to reconstruct from last backup to failure point 
Complete record of transactions since last backup 
- everything on the system is copied 
- each time a backup is done, the oldest is replaced 
- only those files which have changed are copied 
Off site Backup 
Must store media and paper trail 
Backups right next to machine - NEVER 
Cold Site 
A shell facility 
Own or rent 
Usually resume operations within a week 
Hot Site 
Ready to run facility 
Company may own facility or subscribe to service 
May or may not be staffed 
I Complete and Timely Backups! I 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
Components of a Disaster Recovery PLan 
EDP Disaster Recovery Plan Report 
- assumptions and considerations 
- recovery requirements 
- descriptions of all resources reviewed, highlighting the criti- 
cal resources 
- strategies considered and recommended strategies 
- detailed recovery procedures 
- emergency plan and backup plan 
- staffing and responsibilities 
- maintenance and testing procedures 
Recommendations for Actions 
- actions required to be taken by management to put the plan in 
place and test it regularly 
- detailed assignments and locations for actions to be taken at 
the time of an emergency until the backup operation is run- 
ning 
- procedures to return to the original site or another one 
selected 
appendix which may not be included with all copies of the 
EDP Disaster Recovery Procedures 
Recovery and Restoration Procedures 
Documentation and Related Information 
- 
Plan 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
Phases of Disaster Recovery Study 
1. Definition Phase 
1. Decide on disaster recovery objectives. 
2. Appoint planning coordinator and planning team. 
3. Develop initial set of assumptions. 
4. Decide on types of disasters to consider. 
5. Tentatively select a key disaster scenario. 
11. Functional Requirements Phase 
1. Assemble all organizational procedures and standards relative to 
emergencies. 
2. Assemble all documentation relative to the inventory of resources, 
including hardware, communications, software, forms, facility 
descriptions, etc. 
3. Make an evaluation of what systems are mandatory, necessary, or 
desirable. 
4. Analyze the applications and facilities against the recovery objec- 
tives. 
5. Decide on long term strategy or short term high-impact plan. 
6. assess the operational requirements of the critical resources and 
7. Agree on the assumptions and definitions. 
8. Tentatively determine what is to be included in the plan. 
9. Set priorities and acceptable time-frames for recovery. 
applications. 
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Ill. Design and Development Phase 
Decide on the requirements for the critical resources and applica- 
tions. 
Evaluate alternative recovery strategies. 
Select one or more recovery strategies. 
Perform a costbenefit analysis for the management report. 
Perform a full risk analysis. 
Decide on the organization for the Disaster Recovery Teams. 
Plan the management of resources during a disaster event. 
Identify potential vendors and price services. 
Select the final design and prepare detailed recovery procedures. 
10.Produce the plan report with recommendations. 
IIl: Implementation Phase 
1. Acquire any hardware, software, communications lines, etc. that 
2. Negotiate and sign contracts with vendors. 
are needed. 














Develop test and monitoring plans. 
Develop maintenance plan. 
Testing and Monitoring Phase 
Set up test plan with internal review/audit. 
Schedule tests for small sections of the plan at a time. 
Make arrangements to use facilities external to your organization. 
Attempt to run backup systems. 
Correct errors in the plan. 
Repeat a variety of tests periodically. 
VI. Maintenance Phase 
1. Develop a system to update names, responsibilities and telephone 
2. See that system for backup libraries is working smoothly. 
3. Standardize documentation and procedures. 
numbers. 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
Content of An MIS Contingency Plan 
1. Contingency Plan for Major Disasters 
A. Detection and Reaction 
1. Identifying the problem; notifying the authorities 
a. Emergency Services 
b. Environment 
c. Physical security 
2. Reducing your exposure 
a. Air-conditioner failure 
b. Fire alarm procedure 
c. Electrical failure procedures 
d. Flood and water damage 
3. Evacuation of the facility 
4. Advising the Emergency Management Team of the situation 
5. Creating a flow chart of the detection and response 
B. Initiation of the Backup-site 
1. Emergency Management Team notifies other teams 
2. Establish Control Center 
3. Begin Disaster Recovery Team operations and Disaster 
4. Timed events 
Recovery logs 
a. 1 to 6 hours after being notified 
b. 6 to 12 hours after being notified 
c. 12 to 24 hours after being notified 
d. 24 hours after being notified 
C. Establishment of Full Recovery at Backup Site 
backup site, and the applications tested 
ational 
1. All planned software, hardware and resources in place at 
2. Communications network and other equipment in fully oper- 
3. Disaster Recovery Team checklists 
Alternative Site 
D. Restoration of Facilities and Operations at the Original and/or 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
11. Disaster Recovery Teams 
A. MIS Organizational Chart 
B. Descriptions and Responsibilities 
1. Disaster Planning Coordinator 
2. Emergency Management Team 
3. Operations Team 
a. Computer operations 
b. Facility preparation 
c. Replacement hardware 
d. Cold-site preparation 
e. Computer support equipment 
f. supplies 
a. Data input 
b. Data control 
a. Transportation to/from backup facilities 
b. Training 
c. Administrative services 
a. Systems software 
b. Communications network 
4. Data Entry and Control Team 
5. Special Projects Team 
6.  Technical Support Team 
7. Data Administration Team: Database Restoration and Integ- 
8. Systems and Programming Team 
rity 
a. Application systems restoration and recovery 
b. Application programs 
9. Insurance Department Team: Insurance and Salvage 
10. Internal Audit Team: Verification of the Integrity of Resto- 
ration 
C. Team Preplanning and On-Going Functional Responsibility 
1. Disaster Planning Coordinator 
2. Emergency Management Team 
3. Operations Team 
4. Data Entry and Control Team 
5. Special Projects Team 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
6. Technical Support Team 
7. Database Team 
8. Systems and Programming Team 
9. Insurance Department Team 
10. Internal Audit Department Team 
Ill. Data Center Requirements 
A. Computer Room and Tape Library Layout 
B. Power Requirements, Cable Diagrams, and Plug Connectors 
C. Air-conditioning, Fire Protection, and Security 
D. Computer Equipment and Vendor Location and Serial Number 
1. Computer room 
2. Data entry 
3. Other areas: Programrning/systems/technical services/offices 
1. Line flow chart drawing 
2. Communications controller 
3. Satellite 
F. Terminal Configuration Charts 
1. Local terminal configuration 
2. Remote terminal configuration 
E. Teleprocessing: Configuration Information 
IV. Suppliers 
A. New and Used Hardware Suppliers 
B. Software Suppliers 
C. Communications Suppliers 
D. Special Equipment Suppliers 
E. Office-Support Equipment Suppliers 
F. Computer Custom-Forms Suppliers 
V. Prioritize All Applications 
A. Rate all Systems with Their Priorities 
B. Assign Responsibility for all Applications 
C. Designate Systems Requiring Detailed Recovery Plans 
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Disaster Plannina and Recovery 
VI Media Protection 
A. Protection and Retention of Vital Records 
B. Protecting the Database 
1. Database backups 
2. Updates 
3. Database definitions 
4. Software modification source code 
C. Standard Backup Procedures 
B. MIS Staff 
C. Service and Maintenance Personnel 




E. Access Control 
F. Secured Forms-Room Access 
G. Vault Access 
H. Non-office Hours 
I. Security Duties: Guards 
J. Office Security. 
X. Software Security 
A. Sign-On Passwords 
B. Maintaining Application Programs 
C. Password Maintenance 
XI. Backup Facilities 
A. Subscribing to a Backup Facility 
B. Facility Layout 




1. Initial testing 
2. Restoring your files and libraries 
3. Testing critical applications 
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Disaster Planning and Recovery 
4. Testing communications 
5. Mock Disasters 
6. Testing program compilations 
XI/. Reciprocal Agreements 
Xlll. Insurance Protection 
A. Data Processing Property Protection Coverage 
B. Insurance on Computer Hardware 
C. Insurance on Other Data Processing and Office Equipment 
D. Business-Interruption Insurance 
XIK Policing the Plan 
XK Maintaining the Contingency Plan 
A. Disaster Planning Coordinator’s Responsibility 
B. Team Captain’s Responsibility 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Securiw Section 6 Page A 1-1 62 
Risk Analysis 
Def i nit i o ns 
Vulnerability 
A weakness in system procedures, system design, implementation, 
internal controls, etc., that could be exploited to violate system secu- 
rity policy. 
Threat Agent 
A method used to exploit a vulnerability in a system, operation, or 
facility. 
Categories of Threat Agents include: 






outsiders with access 
“Mother Nature” 
The probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular vul- 
nerability of the system. 
Safeguards 
The protective measures and controls that are prescribed to meet 
the security requirements specified for a system. 
- Safeguards may include: 
- hardware and software security features 
- operating procedures 
- accountability procedures 
- access and distribution controls 
- personnel security 
- physical structures, areas and devices 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 6 Page A 1 - 163 
Risk Analysis 
Risk Analysis 
The process of identifying security risks, determining their magni- 
tude, and identifying areas needing safeguards. 
Part of risk management. 
Risk analysis is a process. 
A risk assessment is the result of the risk analysis process. 
Risk Management 
The total process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or 
minimizing uncertain events that may effect system resources. 
Risk management includes: 
- riskanalysis 
- cost benefit analysis 
- selection of mechanisms 
- implementation and testing 
- security evaluation of safeguards 
- overall security review 
DON Risk Management Process 
Conduct AIS security survey. 
- Develop Activity AIS Security Plan (AAISSP) 
- Issue Interim Authority to Operate 
- Implement minimum mandatory safeguards 
Conduct Risk Analysis 
Develop Security Test and Evaluation Plan 
- Execute tests 
Develop test Contingency Plans 
Compile Accreditation Report 
Issue Accreditation Statement 
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Risk Analysis 
Reasons to Perform Risk Analysis 
Identifies assets and controls. 
Alerts management to near-term risks. 
Pinpoints need for corrective actions. 
Provides guidance for resource expenditures. 
Relates control program to organizational mission. 
Provides criteria for designing and evaluating contingency plans. 
Improves overall awareness. 
Steps in doing Risk Analysis 
1. Identify and valuate assets. 
2. Determine vulnerabilities. 
3. Estimate likelihood of exploitation. 
4. Compute expected annual cost. 
5. Survey applicable controls. 
6. Calculate Return on Investment (ROI). 
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Risk Analysis 

























Local area networks 


















Special Interface Equipment 
Network front ends 
Database machines 
Intelligent controllers ’ 
I/O Devices 
User directed I/O devices 
Printer 
Card Reader 
Terminals - local and remote 


































































Tape and disk library 
Customer engineer room 
YO area 
Data preparation area 
Physical plant room 
Backup equipment 
Auxiliary power 
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Risk Analysis 
1 b. Valuate Assets 
Hardware 
- What is the replacement cost at current price? 
- How long will it take to replace the systemlcomponent? 
- If the work can be done manually, how many more people are 
required to do the job? How much overtime? 
- If customers contract for services, what are the lost revenues? 
- How long will it take for a programmer to find the problem? 
- How long will it take to reload and test the program? 
- If it is proprietary software, how long will it take to rewrite 
the software? 
- If the source code for proprietary software has been disclosed 
then, what is the probable associated cost? 
Software 
Data 
- Can it be replaced? 
- How much will it cost to reconstruct it? 
- Are criminal penalties involved? (police records, tax info, 
medical info, “Privacy Act” related info) 
- Is the information classified or company confidential? (sales, 
financial info, product data, weapons research, military oper- 
ations) 
- Is there a possible loss of life or injury? (life support systems) 
- How many people will have to work overtime? 
- How much will training for the new person cost? 
Personnel 
Difficult to measure 
- Psychological effect (value of customer) 
- Effect of proprietary release (projected sales loses) 
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Risk Analysis 
When valuating assets it is often convenient to create a value scale. 
0 1 or less I 
1 I up to 10 
I 2 11 - 100 I 
3 101 - 1,000 I 
I 4 1,001 - 10,000 I 
I 5 10,001 - 100,000 I 
6 100,001 - 1,000,000 I 
7 I 1,000,001 -10,000,000 I 
I 8 10,000,000 + I 
Greater resolution can be achieved by using a smaller base. 
The main disadvantage of using scales is that senior management 
personnel are often trained to think in absolute monetary terms. 
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Risk Analysis 
Ib. Estimate Impact Area Value 
Each asset may be viewed as impacting upon one of the three 




Assigning a dollar value to each of these areas gives a better pic- 
ture of the asset’s overall value 
For example, consider just a simple personnel file which holds 
personal information about 50 employees. Total loss of the file 
would require a clerk, earning $10.00 per hour, three days (24 
hours) to reconstruct the file. In addition it might require another 
clerk to work two hours overtime to process personnel information 
manually. However, because disclosure of “Privacy Act” informa- 
tion carries a $10,000 fine, the greatest area of impact is Secrecy 
I Secrecy I $10,000 
I Integrity I NIA I 
I Availability I $240 + $90 = $320 I 




(4) Denial of Service 
~~ 
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Risk Analysis 
Ic. Calculate Total Value for each Asset 
3 
Value, = C I m p a c t i  
i =  1 
Value, = Impact Area Value (in dollars) for Asset, 
Impacti = Impact Area Value (in dollars) for Asset, 




I Secrecy I $10,000 I 
I Integrity 
=Availability I $240 + $90 = $320 
Value, = 10,000 + 0 + 320 = 10,320 
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Risk Analysis 
2. Determine Vulnerabilities 
Experience, research and imagination all provide help. 
- What are the effects of natural disasters? 
- What are the effects of outsiders? 
- What are the effects of malicious insiders? 
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Risk Analysis 
3. Estimate Likelihood of Exploitation 
Data from general population. 
Observed data for specific system. 
Estimate number of occurrences in a given time. 
Estimate likelihood from table. 
Delphi Approach 
- several raters compare independent estimates 
- revise until consensus 
- geographic location 
- facility environment 
- proximity to population centers 
- data sensitivity 
- protection/detection features 
- visibility 
- proficiency level 
- security awareness 
- emergency training 
- morale 
- local economic conditions " 
- redundancies 
- written procedures 
- compliance level 
- past prosecutions 
Factors affecting threat occurrence: 
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Risk Analysis 
Once a week 52/1 
Frequency of occurrence is normalized based on annual occur- 
rence: 
52.0 
I Never I I OeO I 
I Once in 300 yrs. I 1/300 I .00333 I 
I 1/200 I .005 I 
I Once in 100 yrs I moo I .01 I 
I 1/50 I .02 1 
I 
Once in 25 yrs 1/25 .04 
Once in 5 yrs 1/5 .2 
Once in 2 yrs 1/2 .5 
Yearly 
Twice a year 
I Once a month I 12/1 I 12.0 I 
I Once a day I 365/1 I 365 I 
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Risk Analysis 
Landslide 
The following data is based upon nation statistics and is normal- 
ized to annual occurrences. 




I .005 - .2 I Alteration ofdata 
- 
.07 - 50 Employee sabotage .l- 5 





0 - .01 Theft 
.01- 10 Unauthorized use 
.01 - .5 I Alteration of software I .00225 - .0125 I 
Hurricane .05 - .5 I Bombthreat I .01- 100-1 
Snow/Ice storm I 0 -  10 I Terroristactivity I 009-.10 I 
Tornado I .00001-2 I Fraud I .09 - .5 I 
Tsunami I 0 - .125 I Riot/Civil disorder I 0 - .29 1 
.015- 1 I 
.009-5 I 
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Risk Analysis 
4a. Calculate Annual Loss Expectancy per Threat 
n 
ALE, = V , X O ,  
a = O  
ALEt = Annual Loss Expectancy for Threat, 
V, = Value of Asset, (0 to n assets) 
0, = Estimated number of occurrences of Threat, (0 to m threats) 
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Asset = Server 
Threatl = Electrical Power Surge 
Cost of incident = $10,000 
Event frequency is three (3) times per year 
ALEI,~ = $10,000 x 3 = $30,000 
Asset = Disk Drive 
Threatl = Electrical Power Surge 
Cost of incident = $1,000 
Event frequency is three (3) times per year 
Asset = Data Center 
Threat1 = Electrical Power Surge 
Cost of incident = $100,000 
Event frequency is three (3) times per year 
ALE,,] = $100,000 x 3 = $300,000 
ALE = ALEl,] + ALE2,1+ ALE3 1 
ALE =$30,000 + $3,000 + $300,000 = $333,000 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 6 Page A I - I 78 
Risk Analysis 
4b. Calculate Annual Loss Expectancy per Asset 
m 
ALE,  = V,XO,  
t = O  
ALE, = Annual Loss Expectancy for Asset, 
V, = Value of Asset, 
0, = Estimated number of occurrences of Threat, (0 to m threats) 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Assetl = Data Center 
Threat = Electrical Power Surge 
Cost of incident = $100,000 
Event frequency is three (3) times per year 
ALE1,l = $100,000 x 3 = $300,000 
Assetl = Data Center 
Threat = Earthquake 
Cost of incident = $1,5,3,000 
Event frequency is once every two years 
ALE12 = $1,500,000 x .5 = $750,000 
Assetl = Data Center 
Threat = Flood 
Cost of incident = $3,000,00( 
Event frequency is once every 10 years 
ALE13 = $3,000,000 x .10 = $300,000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ALE = ALE1,l + ALE12 + ALE13 
ALE =$300,000 + $750,000 + $300,000 = $1,350,000 





4c. Calculate Total Annual Loss Expectancy 
Assetl Asset2 ... Asset, 
(V1 x 01) + (V2 x 01) + ... +(V,XOl) AJ-41 
(Vl x 09 + (V2 x 09 + ... + (Vnx 02) ALE, 
... 
(V, x 0,) + (V, x 0,) + ... + (V, x 0,) ALE, 
L 
ALE,, ALEd ... ALE, I ALE 
Determine Total ALE by summing over Threat Categories: 
m 
A L E  = Z A L E ,  
t = O  
Determine Total ALE by summing over all Assets: 
n 
A L E  = ALE, 
a = O  
ALE = Total Annual Loss Expectancy for all assedthreat pairs. 
I Both calculations of ALE should produce the same value. I 
Threat/Asset Matrix 




PC access control software 
5. Survey New Controls 
Observe which threats produce the greatest ALEt 
Identify possible controls which may reduce vulnerability (some 
may apply to several vulnerabilities). 
- Datapro 
- Computer Security Institute Journal 
- Evaluated products listings 









off site storage 
cipher locks I accesslist 
___ 
lightning arrestors 
emergency power generator 
~ 




dedicated comm. lines 
halon system 
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Risk Analysis 
6. Project Savings and Compute Return on Investment 
For each control identified: 
1. Identify those vulnerabilities which may be reduced by 
2. Assign an effectiveness rating for each eventkontrol pair. 
3. Estimate the annual cost of implementing the control. 
4. Calculate the Return on Investment (ROI). 
implementation of the control. 
ck = Annual cost for Controfk 
rk = Effectiveness rating of Controfk 
ALE, = ALE of Threat, 
Greatest ROI 
Minimized ALE 
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ALE =$30,000 + $3,000 + $300,000 = $333,000 
Threat = Electrical Power Surge 
Control = Surge Suppressors (100) 
ck = $50 x 100 = $5,500 
rk = -70 
= 4 2  : 1  (0.70 x 333,000) - 233,100 - 
(5 ,500 )  5,500 
ROI = 
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Risk Analysis 
Q u anti t at ive vs . Q u a I it at i ve Tech n i q u es 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The method we have just described has been the general quantita- 
tive approach. 
Most appropriate for large facilities. 
Fundamental problems with the quantitative method: 
- Difficult to find good numbers for threat frequencies. 
- Difficult to estimate value the intangible value of an asset, in 
particular the “availability” of the information the system was 
designed to provide. 
Methodology is essentially incapable of discriminating 
between low-frequency high-impact threat events (fires) and 
high-frequency low impact threat events (operator error). 
- Inherent subjectivity of the numbers involved. 
- Labor intensive, time consuming and therefore costly 
- 
I A truZy quantitative method has not yet been developed! I 
Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Most appropriate for smaller facilities 
Rather than using pseudo-exact numbers, the qualitative approach 
uses even fuzzier metrics for asset values, threat frequencies, and 
control effectiveness: 
- High, Medium, Low 
- One, Two, Three (1,2,3) 
- Vital, Critical, Important, Convenient and Informational 
Advantages 
- Less labor intensive 
- Less Time consuming 
Disadvantages 
- Hard to get support for something with an associated term 
like “very important” to management 
- Numbers are even more subjective 
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Risk Analysis 
Less than $2,000 
Between $2,000 and $15,000 
Between $15,000 and $40,000 




Financial Loss Table 
Between $300,000 and $1,000,000 
Between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000 
Between $3,000,000 and $10,000,000 
Between $10,000,000 and $30,000,000 
Over 






Between $2,000 and $15,000 2 1  
Between $15,000 and $40,000 3 1  
Between $40,000 and $100,000 1 4 1  
Between $100,000 and $300,000 5 1  
Between $300,000 and $1,000,000 1 6 1  
Between $1,000,000 and $3,000,000 7 1  
Between ~ 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  and $10,000,000 8 -  
Between $10,000,000 and $30,000,000 9 1  
Over lo I 
Cost of Disruption Table 
~~ 
Between $40,000 and $100,000 4 
Between $100,000 and $300,000 5 
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Risk Analysis 
Example Value tables often used in Qualitative Analysis 
Legal Implications 
Less than $10,000 4 
Between $10,000 and $50,000 5 
Between $50,000 and $1,000,000 and/or 8 
information liable to prosecution. 
Over $1,000,000 and/or Senior Officer Liable 10 
Breach of Confidentiality 
I Less than $IOO,OOO 1 4 1  
I Between $100,000 and $10,00,000 1 5  
I Over $ IO,OO,OOO 1 7 1  
Corporate Embarrassment 
Embarrassment restricted to within the project or 
F o r i i t e .  ~ 
1 
Extent of embarrassment spread to other work I areas of Operating group or Division 2 
Extent of embarrassment spread throughout orga- I nization. 3 
I Public made aware through local press coverage I 5 
I Adverse national press 1 7  




Analyze the vulnerabilities of a department with respect to the 
people who work in the department. 
- examine each job involved 
- the skills required 
- level of access required 
- working conditions 
- assets which the job impacts 
Scenario Analysis 
Useful in visualizing what might happen when no real data is 
available. 
Highly subjective. 
Valuable in identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities. 
Application Risk Assessment 
Identify assets and threats 
Estimate the probabilities and impact of vulnerabilities 
Rare 1 3 6 
Moderate 2 5 8 
High 4 7 9 
Prioritize vulnerabilities 
- Using the chart, locate the priority value on the matrix at the 
intersection of probability and exposure. 
- Begin with the highest ranked vulnerabilities, identify poten- 
tial protective measures. 
Identify controls 
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Risk Analysis 
Arguments Against Risk Analysis 
NotPrecise 
- values used are imprecise 
- frequency of expected loss are imprecise 
- best used as a planning tool 
- management often places too much emphasis 
- should emphasize relative sizes 
- an education process 
False Sense of Precision 
No Scientific Basis 
- 
- 
not based on empirical principles 
based on probability theory/statistical analysis 
Immutability 
- filed and forgotten 
- should be updated annually (Navy says every 3 yrs.) 
- temptation to use previous figures 
Use old figures as a guide: 
- identify changes 
- assets 
- threatshhreat frequency 
- replacement costs 
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Security Plans 
Security Plan 
A document that describes how an organization will address 
its security nee&. 
Three aspects 
What should the plan contain? 
Who should Write it? 
How to acquire the support for the plan? 







Recall ==> Risk Analysis Reveals: 
Exposures of greatest potential loss. 
Exposures of greatest expected loss. 
Controls which provide the greatest effectiveness. 
Controls which provide the greatest return per dollar invested. 
* The projected savings and feasibility of recommended controls. 
Identify uncovered risks and why they are not covered. 
- control too costly 
- risk insignificant 
What recovery action should be taken. 
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Security Plans 
Responsibility for implementation 
Personal computer users. 
Database administrators. 
Information Officers. 
Personnel staff members. 
Timetable 
The order of implementation. 
Measurable milestones for progress assessment. 
Continuing Attention 
Establishment of evaluation and review dates. 
Inventory dates for assessing inventory and controls. 
Review of risk analysis. 
Members of the Security Planning Team 
Should represent the following groups: 
- Computer hardware group 
- Systems programmers 
- Application programmers 
- Data entry personnel 
- Physical security personnel 
- Representative users 
- Communications personnel 
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Security Plans 
Content of A Security Plan 
I. Policy Statement 
*Policy statement should specify 
- Organizations security goals. 
+ protect disclosure of information to unauthorized persons 
+ protect integrity of data 
+ protect against loss due to physical disaster 




- Commitment (dollars, people, etc.). 
*The more precise the policy statement, the easier it will be to 
interpret and implement. 
II. Current Security Status. 
*A List of the assets. 
*The Security Threat to those assets. 
*Controls in place to protect assets. 
- How was this data gathered? 
- What were the assumptions? 
- How were valuations made? 
111. Procedure for addressing previously unidentified or new vulnera- 
IV. Recommendations. 
bilities. 
*Based upon results of risk assessment 
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Security Plans 
Securing Commitment to the Plan 




Education can help understandability! 
Management must demonstrate commitment to the plan! 
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Section 7 
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Services Provided by Cryptosystems 
Secrecy 
Secrecy requires that an intruder should not be able to determine 
the plaintext corresponding to given ciphertext, and should not be 
able to reconstruct the key by examining ciphertext for known 
plain text. 
Authenticity 
Authenticity requires that the sender can validate the source of a 
message; i.e., that it was transmitted by a properly identified 
sender and is not a replay of a previously transmitted message. 
Integrity 
0 Integrity requires the ability to assurance that a message was not 
modified accidentally or deliberately in transit, by replacement, 
insertion or deletion. 
Nonrepudia tion 
Protection against a sender of a message later denying transmis- 
sion. 
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Introductory Concepts 
Definitions 
0 Encryption - encode. 
Decryption - decode. 
Cryptology - study of encryptm ant decryption. 
Cryptography - using encryption to conceal text. 
Cryptanalysis - the breaking of secret writing. 
Plaintext - the original message P 
- Sometimes called cleartext. 
p = [PI, P2,...9 Pnl 
0 Ciphertext - the encrypted message C 
Encryption Algorithms 
C = E(P) (E is the encryption algorithm) 
P = D(C) (D is the decryption algorithm) 
- The term encipher is sometimes used for encryption. 
- The term decipher is sometimes used for decryption. 
Clear& we must have: 
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Substitution Ciphers 
The Caesar Cipher 
Each character of the plaintext is replaced with 
to the right, modulo 26. Le., A is replaced with 
with E, ..., Z is replaced with C. 
the character three 
D, B is replaced 
x modulo y (or simply x mod y) is the remainder obtained when x 
is divided by y. Le., 28 mod 26 2 .  
Modulo is used to handle “wrap around” situations. 
The table below shows how plaintext is encrypted into ciphertext. 
R O F E S S I O N A L  C O U R T E S Y  
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I )  
Variation of Caesar Cipher 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
c ~ P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O  
With any cipher that is a variation of the Caesar Cipher, the mes- 
sage receiver only needs to know what the character A maps to in 
order to be able to decrypt the whole message. I.e., once you know 
what character A maps to, you can figure out what all the other 
characters map to. 
Thus: 
- The key of the Caesar Cipher is D. 
- The key of the Caesar Cipher variation is P. 
~~ ~~~ 
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Substitution Ciphers 
A General Substitution Cipher 
A more general substitution cipher is produced by using a map- 
ping of characters that is not so simplistic as the previous two 
examples. Consider the mapping below: 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z  
c ~ X D G J M P S V Y B E H K N Q T W Z C F I L O R U A  
* I  
In order for the message receiver to decrypt a message using this 
cipher, they need to know what every character in the alphabet 
maps to. 
Cryptanalysis Attack of These Codes: 
Since there are only 26 different keys for Caesar Cipher variation 
codes, one could try all keys in an attempt to decrypt a message. 
This type of an attack (trying all keys) is called a brute-force 
attack. 
There are 26! (26 factorial = 26 x 25 x 24 x ... x 1) keys for the 
general substitution cipher example. 26! s 4 x 10 26 
This number of keys is too great to attempt a brute force attack. 
0 In spite of this, this type of cipher is easy to crack. 
Letter frequency analysis is commonly used to break substitution 
ciphers 
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Frequency Distribution Analyses 
E T R N I O A S D L H C F  
12.75 9.25 8.50 7.75 7.75 7.50 7.25 6.00 4.25 3.75 3.50 3.50 
Frequency Distribution of Characters in English: 
The following tables list the relative frequency of characters in the 
English language. 
3.00 
U M P Y G W V B K X Q J Z  
3.00 2.75 2.75 2.25 2.00 1.50 1.50 1.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 
@ 
Consider the following ciphertext: 
P Z S U O M H D E V X F W  




0 The distribution of characters in this message is: 
Q T A B G Y  I - J  C K L N R  
2.50 2.50 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.67 0.83 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 It seems likely that cipher letters P an 2 are the equivalents of 
plaintext letters E and T, but it is not certain which is which. 
The letters S, U, 0, M and H are all of high frequency and proba- 
bly correspond to plaintext letters from the set { R, N, I, 0, A, S}. 
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Frequency Distribution Analyses 
Additional Strategies: 
The frequency of two-letter combinations (known as digraphs) can 
also provide clues. 
For example, the digraph ZW appears three times. 
The most common digraph is “TH’. 
Also ZWP appears in the ciphertext and we conjectured that P 
might stand for E in plaintext. 
Furthermore, ZWSZ appears in the first line. 
It is possible that S stands for A. 
Given these assumptions we have the following structure: 
U Z Q S O V U O H X M O P V G P O Z P E V S G Z W S  
t a  e e t e  a t h a  
M D Z S H Z O W S F P A P P D T S V P Q U Z W Y M X  
t a  t h a  e e e  a e  t . h  
U Z U H S X  EE 
F U P Z H M D J U D T M O H M Q  
e t  
At this point, trial and error should yield the plaintext. 
More On Substitution Ciphers 
Monoalphabetic Substitution Ciphers: 
0 All ciphers discussed so far are examples of monoalphabetic 
ciphers. 
0 Throughout the whole message, each character of plaintext is 
always replaced by the same character of ciphertext. 
- For example, when using the Caesar Cipher, the plaintext let- 
ter I is always replaced with the ciphertext letter L. 
0 Any cipher that has this property is called a monoalphabetic 
cipher. 
If the message is long enough, the distribution of letters in the 
ciphertext will be similar to the distribution of letters in English. 
- If the letter E occurs 13% of the time in the plaintext, then the 
letter that E encrypts to will occur 13% of the time in the 
ciphertext. 
Thus, monoaIphabetic ciphers lend themselves to character fre- 
quency analyses and are relatively easy to break. 
Advantages of substitution ciphers: 
Can be performed by direct lookup. 
Time to encrypt a message of n characters is proportional to n. 
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Polyalphabetic Ciphers 
Polyalphabetic Cipher Issues: 
Polyalphabetic Ciphers are an improvement over the simple 
monoalphabetic technique. 
Polyalphabetic Ciphers use two or more monoalphabetic ciphers 
when encrypting a message. 
A Simple Polyalphabetic Cipher 
Consider an example which uses a variation of the Caesar Cipher 
with key D on even letters and key M on odd letters. 
In this example the letter E in the plaintext sometimes encrypts to 
the letter H (when E is in an even position in the plaintext) and 
sometimes encrypts to letter Q (when E is in an odd position in the 
plaintext). 
The resulting ciphertext will not then exhibit the same frequency 
distribution of characters as the plaintext. 
If E occurs 13% of the time in the plaintext, there may be no char- 
acter in the ciphertext that occurs 13% of the time, because some- 
times E is mapped to H and sometimes it is mapped to Q. 
This example cipher is still relatively easy to break. 
After failing to break a message using a straight forward frequency 
analysis, the cryptanalyst might assume that the cipher is a polyal- 
phabetic cipher and might start looking at frequency distributions 
of every other letter or every third letter or every fourth letter and 
so on. 
In the case of this example, if the message is long enough or if 
enough messages have been intercepted, a frequency analysis of 
every other letter would break the code. 
Advantages of polyalphabetic ciphers: 
Flattens letter frequencies. 
Double letter pairs not so obvious. 
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Vigenere Cipher 
key m o n t e r e y m o n t e r e y m o n t e r e y m o n  
plaintext w e  a r e d i s c o v e r e d s a v e y o u 
ciphertext I S N K I U M Q  0 C I X V V H Q M  J R R S L 
Vigenbre Cipher Details: 
0 The Vigenke Cipher is one of the best known polyalphabetic 
Consider the following example: 
ciphers. 
r s e 1 f 
V Q Q 2 S 
In this example the key used is the word “monterey”. 
- Note how the word “monterey” is written repeatedly for the 
whole length of the message in the top row of the table. 
The key specifies which variation of the Caesar Cipher is used for 
each letter of the message. 
For example, the first letter of the message will be encrypted 
with a Caesar Cipher variation of key M. 
The second letter will be encrypted with a Caesar Cipher 
variation of key 0. 
- 
- 
- An so on. 
Attacking this type of cipher. 
After failing to break a message using a straight forward frequency 
analysis, the cryptanalyst might assume that the cipher is a polyal- 
phabetic cipher and might start looking at frequency distributions 
of every other letter or every third letter or every fourth letter and 
so on. 
In this example, if the message is long enough or if enough mes- 
sages have been intercepted, a frequency analysis of every eighth 
letter would break the code. 
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One Time Pad Scheme 
How To Make An Unbreakable Cipher 
If in the previous example, the key word was random and as long 
as the message, how would a cryptanalyst attack this cipher? 
The cryptanalyst would need to intercept many messages to 
develop a statistical relationship between the ciphertext and the 
plaintext. 
- I.e., the first letter of each message would always be 
encrypted using the same variation of the Caesar cipher, as 
would the second letters and so on. 
If enough messages are intercepted, the code could be broken. 
If each random key is only used once (no two messages use the 
same random key), how would a cryptanalyst attack this cipher? 
No successful attack is possible because the ciphertext has no sta- 
tistical relationship to the plaintext. 
This type of cipher is called a One Time Pad and it is unbreakable. 
Note however, that this scheme requires the secure distribution of 
many long (as long as the messages) keys. 
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Binary Substitution Ciphers 
The Vernam cipher: 
0 The Vernam cipher is a version of the One Time Pad cipher that is 
implemented using binary keys, plaintext and ciphertext. 
Consider the example below: 
The ciphertext is obtain by XORing key bits with plaintext bits. 
I.e., Ci = Pi (3 Ki 
If the key is not as long as the entire message and is therefore 
repeated, a statistical relationship will exist between the plaintext 
and the ciphertext and the cipher may be broken. 
If the key is as long as the message, but the key is used for several 
messages, there will again be a statistical relationship between the 
plaintext and the ciphertext so that the cipher may be broken. 
If the key is as long as the message and only one message is 
encrypted with any one key, the code is functionally equivalent to 
a One Time Pad and is unbreakable. 
~~ 
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Transposition Techniques 
t e i e a c m t e a r s a d  
h t m h s o e h w l u s i  
Trans po s it i o n C i p he rs : 
All examples so far involved the substitution of a ciphertext sym- 
bol for a plaintext symbol. 
A very different kind of mapping is achieved by performing a per- 
mutation of the plaintext letters. 
Pure transposition ciphers are easily recognized because they have 
the same letter frequencies as the original plaintext. 
Example 1: 
Writing the message backwards - not very hard to 
analyze. 
The plaintext “thetimehascomethewalrussaid” 
The ciphertext “diassurlawehtemocsahemiteht” 
Example 2: 
Transposing adjacent letters - not very hard to analyze. 
The plaintext “thetimehascomethewalrussaid” 
The ciphertext “httemihesaocemhtwelaurssiad” 
Example 3: 
Write the message down in columns and reading off the 
rows becomes the ciphertext. 
The plaintext “thetimehascomethewalrussaid” 
The ciphertext “teieacmtearsadhtmhsoehwlusi” 
Cryptanalysis is fairly straightforward and involves laying out the 
ciphertext in matrices of various shapes and sizes. 
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More Transposition Techniques 
Example 4: 
Again the plaintext is written down by column and it is read off by 
The key column specifies the order in which the rows are read 
Off. 
rows, but this time the rows are read off in a permuted order. 
- 
The plaintext “thetime hascome thewalrussaid” 
The ciphertext “heoeudistlatmchriehmwstaeas” 
The cipher is still fairly easy to break, by playing around with dif- 
ferent permutations of rows and columns. 
Digraph (common two-letter combinations) and trigraph (common 
three-letter combinations) frequency tables can be useful. 
Multiple Stage Ciphers: 
Transposition ciphers can be made significantly more secure by 
performing more than one stage of transposition. 
The result is a more complex permutation that is not easily recon- 
structed. 
Ciphers consisting of multiple stages of transpositions and multi- 
ple stages of substitutions can be very secure. 
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Encryption Issues 
Data Compression: 
Compressing the message before encrypting it can enhance a 
cipher’s ability to resist being broken. 
Many of the crypanalytic techniques discussed so far involved 
making guesses and then looking for English words. 
If the message is compressed before encryption, it does not look 
like English when it is correctly decrypted (it must be uncom- 
pressed to recover the English text). 
Types of attacks on ciphers: 
Often today it is assumed that the adversary knows what encryp- 
tion algorithm is being used. 
When this is true, the adversary is only attempting to determine 
the key used during the encryption process. 
Cryptographers try to determine the strength of ciphers given that 
a cryptanalyst may possess different types of information. 
Possible scenarios include: 
Ciphertext only 
Known plaintext 
- The cryptanalyst knows the algorithm and the ciphertext. 
- The cryptanalyst knows the encryption algorithm and a plain- 
text-ciphertext pair (the plaintext that corresponds to a cipher- 
text). 
Somehow the cryptanalyst has obtained the plaintext corre- 
sponding to a ciphertext. 
The cryptanalyst knows the encryption algorithm and a plain- 
text-ciphertext pair, such that the plaintext was chosen by the 
Somehow the cryptanalyst has tricked someone into sending 
a message that might reveal information or structure about the 
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More Encryption Issues 
Computational Security: 
0 An encryption scheme is said to by computationally secure if 
- the cost of breaking the cipher exceeds the value of the 
encrypted information and 
the time required to break the cipher exceeds the useful life- 
time of the information. 
- 
Abstract measures of a cipher’s effectiveness: 
Confusion: 
- Confusion obscures the relationship between the plaintext 
and the ciphertext. 
The easiest way to do this is through substitution. 
Diffusion dissipates the redundancy of the plaintext by 
spreading it out over the ciphertext. 
The simplest way to cause diffusion is through transposition. 







- Bit-sensitivity looks at the impact on the ciphertext (how 
many bits change) as a result of changing either one bit of the 
plaintext or of the key. We want every bit of the ciphertext to 
depend on every bit of the plaintext and on every bit of the 
key. 
. 
Codes based on hard problems: 
0 Just because a cipher is based on a “hard problem” it does not 
mean that the cryptanalyst needs to solve that problem to break the 
code. 
Recall that the General Substitution Cipher has 26! keys, which is 
far too many to try exhaustively. 
But this cipher is easily broken using a frequency distribution 
analysis of the ciphertext. 
Brute force attacks are usually impractical. 
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The Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
History of DES 
1972 -NBS issued a call for proposals: 
Must provide high level of security. 
Must be completely specified and easy to understand. 
The security of the algorithm must reside in the key; the security 
should not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm. 
Must be available to all users. 
Must be adaptable for use in diverse applications. 
Must be economical to implement in electronic devices. 
Must be efficient. 
Must be able to be validated. 
Must be exportable. 
1974 - ISM responded with “Lucifer” (renamed - DEA). 
Note that Lucifer algorithm used a 128-bit key and DES uses a 56- 
bit key. 
IBM consulted NSA on design issues. 
- NSA suggested changes to some of the S-boxes. 
1976 - DES officially adopted. 
Overview of DES 
Combination of: 
- Substitution technique (for confusion). 
- Transposition technique (for diffusion). 
These two techniques are repeated for 16 cycles one on top of the 
other. 
Plaintext is encrypted in blocks of 64 bits. 
Keys are 64 bits long (only 56 are really needed). 
0 Uses only standard arithmetic and logical operations on up to 64 
bit numbers. 
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More on DES 
DES Has Four Modes of Operation 
ECB -Electronic Code Book 
CBC - Cipher Block Chaining 
OFB - Output Feedback 
CFB - Cipher Feedback 
More will be said about the differences between these modes of 
operation later. 
The following description of the DES algorithm 
will assume the ECB mode of operation. 
When used for encryption: 
0 Data is input in a block, which consists of 64 bits. 
A 64 bit key is input. 
- Only 56 bits of the key are used. 
- Every 8th bit is discarded. 
- The extra bits can be used as parity-check bits to ensure the 
key is error free. 
A 64 bit block of ciphertext is output. 
When used for decryption: 
A 64 bit block of ciphertext is input 
The same key used during encryption is input. 
A 64 bit block of plaintext is output. 
Basic algorithm structure 
The figure on the following page reveals the basic algorithm struc- 
ture. 
The algorithm has 16 iterations. 
The Key goes through 16 transformations. 
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Overall DES Scheme 
64-bit pllaintext 56-bii key 
A Initial Permutation A Permuted choice 
Iteration 1 Permuted choice 
I c K2 c 
1 1 
(Iteration 2 X P e r m u t e d  choice Left circular sh i f t3  







c . I 






Internal DES Details 
DES Structure 




An encrypting algorithm on the left. 
A key transforming algorithm on the right. 
The following two pages discuss the inner structure of the key 
transforming algorithm. 
- This processing produces the various key values (K1 through 
K16) that are used by the encrypting algorithm. 
Following the discussion of the key transforming algorithm is a 
discussion of the plaintext encrypting portion of the algorithm. 
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DES Key Transforming Algorithm 
PERMUTED CHOICE 1 
I 
LEFT SHIFT < LEFT SHIFT < 
LEFTSHIFTS < LEFTSKIFTS < 
LEFT SHIFTS 0 LEFT SHIFTS c) 
I K16 
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DES Key Transforming Algorithm 
The Key Scheduler 
0 Contains a set of bit-shifts and permutations totally independent of 
0 The key schedule is usually computed before encrypting takes 
the encrypting algorithm. 
place. 
Step I 
I .  The key is subjected to an initial Permuted Choice P-Box. 
2. The result is divided into two 28-bit halves labeled Co and Do. 
Step 2 
I .  Both C and D are given a left circular shift according to the 
shift table. 
Step 3. 
I .  C and D are concatenated to produce CD1. 
Step 4 
I .  CD1 is then subjected to a Permuted Choice in which the key 
2. Bits 9,18,22,25,35,38 and 54 are removed to produce a 48- 
3. K1 is used in cycle 1 of the cryption algorithm. 
is permuted. 
bit key K1. 
Steps 2 through 4 
I. Repeated a total of 16 times. 
Note: 
The only difference in each cycle is the number of bits shifted in 
the circular shift. 
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DES Encrypting Algorithm 





( INVEREINITIALPERM 1 
K,  
K16 
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DES Encrypting Algorithm 
A Single Cycle of the DES 
Step 1. 
1. Input 64 bits of plaintext. 
Step 2. 
I .  Rearrange by a P-Box known as the Initial Permutation (IP). 
Step 3. 
I .  Split block into two 32 bit segments called the Left (L) and 
Right (R) halves. 
2. Save a copy of the Right half and label b. 
Step 4. 
I .  Subject R to a special permutation box called a Permutation 
Expansion (PE) which takes 32 input bits and produces 48 - 
output bits. 
Step 5. 
I .  Take the expanded R and XOR it against a 48-bit segment of 
the key. 
(Note: This is the only place in each cycle which involves the 
key) 
Step 6. 
I .  Output from XOR is called Pre-S block. 
2. 48-bit Pre-S block is broken into eight 6-bit segments. 
3. Each segment processed by a different S-Box in parallel. 
4. Each S-Box produces four bits. 
5. A total of 32 bits output called Post-S. 
Step 7. 
I .  Post-S is fed to a final P-box. 
2. Takes a 32-bit input and returns a 32-bit output. 
3. The output is called the result. 
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DES Encrypting Algorithm 
Note: 
Steps 4 through 7 are often grouped into one function in DES dia- 
grams f(Rn-1&) 
Step 8. 
I .  The Left (L) is now XORed against the output of F(R,Kn) to 
produce the “New R’ 
2. RO now becomes the “New L” 
Steps 3 to 7 
1. repeated 16 times for each 64-bit block to be encrypted 
Finally, the PREOUTPUT is subjected to a reverse of the initial 
permutation (IP) 
This is required for the algorithm’s invertibility. 
Decryption uses the exact same algorithm except that the order in 
which the keys are used is reversed. 
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Substitution Boxes (S- Boxes) 
Substitution Box (S-Box) 
0 Introduces confusion and non-linearity to DES 
0 Interpret bits as numbers 
0 One number replaced by another from a table 
- 
- duplications among the elements 
table has values ranging from 0 (0000) to 15 (1 11 1) 
0 Takes 6-bit input and returns 4-bit output 
1. First and last bits choose row into S-box substitution table. 
2. The middle four bits chooses the column 
3. The table returns a four bit number 
0 They are the heart and soul of the algorithm's secrecy 
S-BOX 
INPUT 
First and Last bits binary 11 = decimal 3 
Middle four bits binary 0101 = decimal 5 
OUTPUT binary 1001 = decimal 9 
binary 101011 = decimal 43 
~ 
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ECB Mode 
Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) 
Each 64-bit plaintext block is encrypted independently of all other 
plaintext blocks. 
The term codebook is used because, for a given key, there is a 
unique ciphertext for every 64-bit block of plaintext. 
Abstractly, one could imagine a gigantic codebook with an entry 
for every 64-bit plaintext block and the corresponding 64-bit 
ciphertext block. 
If a message is highly structured, it may contain blocks of plain- 
text that are identical. And since this mode encrypts them to iden- 
tical ciphertext blocks, some structure of the message maybe 
revealed. 
Hence, this mode is not considered too secure for long messages. 
An advantage of this mode is that due to the independence of the 
block encryptions, an error that occurs during transmission in one 
block will only affect the decryption of that block. 
- I.e., errors do not propagate. 
CBC Mode 
IV 
Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) 
0 An enhanced version of the ECB that chains together blocks of 
ciphertext. 
The CBC mode encrypts each block using the plaintext, the key 
and the output of the previous block (except the first in the cycle 
which uses an Initializing Vector (IV)). 
The CBC mode has an advantage over the ECB mode in that 
repeating blocks are hidden. 
- See the diagram below. 
0 The CBC is frequently employed in generating Message Authenti- 
cation Codes (MACs), frequently referred to as Message Digests, 
which are a type of cryptographic checksum used to ensure mes- 
sage integrity. 
- The MAC consists of the last block of ciphertext and is gener- 
ally sent along with a plaintext version of the message. - The rest of the ciphertext message is discarded when all that 





e e o  1 
Because of the chaining affect on blocks, an error in transmission 
will cause decryption errors in subsequent blocks. 
~~ 
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CFB Mode 
Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) 
Iv 
56 bits I 8 bits 
Encrypt 0 
Select Discard 
8 bits 56 bits 
v 
This mode uses the block nature of DES in a way that produces a 
stream cipher. 
Stream ciphers act on small chunks of data, usually 8-bit chunks. 
It eliminates the need to pad messages into 64-bit blocks. 
It can operate in real-time. That is, each character can be 
encrypted and transmitted immediately. 
The scheme requires an Initial Vector (IV) to start the process. 
In the diagram below, Pi is an 8-bit piece of plaintext and Ci is the 
corresponding 8-bit piece of ciphertext, 
Notice that the plaintext nevers gets directly processed by the DES 
Encryption algorithm. Instead, it is XORed with the output of the 
DES Encryption algorithm. 
4--- 
Shift register 




8 bits 56 bits 
cN-l= 
Shift register 
... 0 Encrypt 
Select Discard 
8 bits 56 bits 
1 
f1  Pl p2 fc2 PN i" 
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OFB Mode and Decryption 
Output Feedback Mode (OFB) 
0 This mode is similar in operation to the CFB mode. 
0 The difference is that in CFB mode the previous %bit chunk of 
ciphertext is shifted into the shift register and used as input to DES 
and in OFB mode the selected 8-bits of DES output are shifted 
into the shift register. 
One advantage of OFB mode is that errors in transmission do not 
propagate. 
DES Decryption 
The process of decryption with DES is essentially the 
same as the encryption process. 
The same algorithm and key are used for encryption and 
decryption, except that during decryption the internal keys 
(Kd are used in reverse order. 
DES is a form of shared key /symmetric key cryptography. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - lntroduction to Computer Security Section 7 Page A 1-227 
DES Issues 
Criticisms of the DES 
Number of iterations - is 16 enough? 
Key length 
- 256 possible keys to try. 
- Massively parallel system could try all keys in 1 day 
(although it would be a very expensive proposition). 
- According to an article in the October I ,  1996 San Jose Mer- 
cury News, a government agency can break a DES encrypted 
message in 12 seconds. 
Triple encryption may be the answer. See below. - 
NSA involvement - Do they hold a 'trapdoor'? 
Weaknesses of the DES 
Weak keys (e.g. all zeros or all ones). 
Semi-weak keys (2 separate keys can decrypt the same message). 
0 The same DES algorithm is used! 
Key length 
Triple DES 
0 Provides an effective key length of 112 bit key (i.e. independent 56 
bit keys); thereby making a brute force attack infeasible. 
Most common variant is EDE mode (encrypt-decrypt-encrypt for 
encryption and decrypt-encrypt-decrypt for decryption). 
- Encrypt plaintext with DES using key #l. 
- Decrypt resulting cipher text with key #2. 
- Encrypt resulting Ciphertext with key #l. 
About half as fast as standard DES 
The keys are used in reverse order. 
Bit Sensitivity 
If only one bit of either the input plaintext or key is changed, each 
bit of the ciphertext is affected. 
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~ 
Symmetric Versus Asymmetric Algorithms 
Two Categories of Encrypting Algorithms 
Encryption algorithms can be divided into two categories: 
- 
- 
Symmetric key algorithms or ciphers 
Asymmetric key algorithms or ciphers 
Symmetric Key Ciphers: 
In symmetric key ciphers, both the encryption algorithm and the 
decryption algorithm use the same key. 
All ciphers discussed so far, including DES, are symmetric key 
algorithms. 
Other names for symmetric ciphers: 
- Private key. 
- Secretkey. 
- Single key. 
- Sharedkey. 
- Conventional encryption. 
Symmetric key schemes require both the sender and receiver to 
possess the same key. 
The amount of information a cryptanalyst can gain about a key is 
directly proportional to the number and length of messages 
encrypted with the key. 
For security reasons, keys should be changed periodically, which 
means that keys need to be securely distributed fairly often. 
- I.e., the key must be securely distributed. 
Asymmetric Key Ciphers: 
In asymmetric key ciphers the key used for encryption is Werent 
from the key that is used for decryption. 
Other names for asymmetric ciphers: 
Asymmetric key ciphers do not require the secure distribution of 
keys. 
- They, however, have other key distribution problems. 
- These problems are discussed on future slides. 
- Public key. 
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International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 
Overview 
Operates on 64-bit plaintext block. 
Uses 128 bit key. 
0 Same algorithm is used for encryption and decryption (like DES). 
0 Considered by some to be superior to DES 
0 It is a symmetric algorithm. 
General Description 
64 bit input block is divided into four 16 bit blocks: X1, X2, X3, 
and X4 which become the input blocks to the first round of the 
algorithm. 
In each of the eight total rounds, the four sub-blocks are XORed, 
added, and multiplied with one another and with six 16 bit sub- 
blocks of key material. 
Between each round the second and third sub-blocks are swapped. 
Speed of IDEA 
Software implementation speeds are comparable with those for 
DES. 
Hardware implementations are just slightly faster. 
I€ you are interested in learning more about IDEA and other crypto- 
graphic techniques then you might want to read the following book: 
Applied Cryptography 
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Skipjack Algorithm 
Overview 
Developed by NSA. 
- started design in 1985 and finished evaluation in 1990 
Developed for use by Clipper and Capstone. 
Actual algorithm is classified SECRET. 
- To prevent the construction of devices that will interoperate 
with Skipjack devices, but which don’t support the “Law 
Enforcement Field” mechanisms. 
General Description 
It is a symmetric algorithm. 
It has an 80 bit key and encrypts 64-bit blocks of plaintext. 
It can be used in either ECB, CFB, OFB, or CBC modes. 
There are 32 rounds of processing per single encrypt or decrypt - 
operation. 
The strength of Skipjack does not merely depend upon the secrecy 
of the algorithm (like any good cipher). 
Speed of Skipjack 
The algorithm was designed to achieve high data throughput for 
use in real-time communications system. 
Skipjack Issues: 
It is intended to only be implemented in a tamper-proof chip. 
It is also intended that the implementation will provide a Law 
Enforcement Field (LEAF) that will enable law enforcement agen- 
cies to decrypt encrypted messages. 
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Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Public key cryptographic systems use two keys, one private and 
one public key, to make the necessary transformations. 
Summary of Public Key Protocols 
Each user generates two keys - a public key and a private key. 
Each user keeps the private key in a secure manner. 
Each user gives the public key to everyone else. 
Example for sending a secret. 
Alice wants to send a message to Bob, such that if the message is 
intercepted it cannot be read. 
Alice has Bob’s public key. (Only Bob has Bob’s private key!) 
Alice encrypts the message with Bob’s public key. 
Alice sends the encrypted message to Bob. 
Bob uses his private key to decrypt the message. 
If the message is intercepted in transit, it can only be decrypted by 
someone who has Bob’s private key and no one but Bob has Bob’s 
private key. 
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RSA Encryption 
Rivest-S hamir- Adel man (RSA) Encrypt ion 
Two key system (public and private) based on the difficulty of fac- 
toring very large numbers. 
- Encryption C 1 mod n 
- Decryption P E Cd mod n 
Key, and Keyd are carefully chosen such that: 
P E (p")d mod n E (pd>" mod n (i.e. E(D(M)) = D(E(M)) = M) 
Choosing Keys for RSA Method 
Underlying problem is based on factoring very large numbers! 
Encryption C 1 mod n 
Decryption P = cd mod n 
where 
Encryption key = (e, n) 
Decryption key = (d, n) 
The first task is to select n 
- 
- 
n is normally very large (approx 200 digits) 
n is a product of two large primes p and q (typically 100 dig- 
its each) 
Next a large integer e is chosen such that 
e is relatively prime to (p-1) * (q-1) 
Le., e and @-1) * (9-1) have no factors in common. 




0 Next select d such that: 
Then if we have selected our numbers correctly, 
e * d = 1 mod (p-1) * (q-1) 
A MINOR MIRACLE OCCURS 
(P)d 3 P mod n 
Note: Minor miracle provided courtesy of Euler and Fermat. 
~ ~~ 
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RSA Encryption 
Public Key 
n => product of two primes, p and 4 
e => relatively prime to @-1) * (4-1) 
@ and 4 remain secret) 
Private key 
d s e-' (mod@-1) * (q-1)) 
Encrypting 
c = &(mod n) 
Decrypting 
rn E &(mod n) 
Let p = 1 1 and q = 13 {both primes} 
n = p  * 4 = 143 and Then 
(p-1) * (4 -1) = 10 * 12 = 120 
Next choose e such that it is relatively prime to 
@-1) * (4 -1). We will choose 1 l! 
Recall that: d s e-' (mod@- 1) * (4- 1)) 
d * e =  1 mod@ - 1) * (4- 1) 
In other words: 11 * 11-' mod 120 1 mod 120 
121 mod 120 E 1 mod 120 
In this case both e and d are the same (1 1) 
Let the plain message P be the letter 'H' 
(7 in our 0-25 schema) 
E('H') = E(7) = > 7'l mod 143 
D(106) 
106 
= 10611 mod 143 3 7 => 'HI 
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Introduction to Hash Functions 
Hash Functions and Message Digests. 
A hash function H accepts a variable-size message M as input and 
outputs a fixed-size representation H(M) of M, sometimes called a 
message digest. In general H(M) will be much smaller than M; 
e.g., H(M) might be 64 or 128 bits, whereas M might be a mega- 
byte or more. 
A hash function can serve to detect modification of a message. 
That is, it can serve as a cryptographic checksum (also known as 
an MDC = manipulation detection code or MAC = message 
authentication code). 
It is theoretically possible that two distinct messages could be 
compressed into the same message digest (a collision). The secu- 
rity of hash functions thus requires collision avoidance. Collisions 
cannot be avoided entirely, since in general the number of possible 
messages will exceed the number of possible outputs of the hash 
function. However, the probability of collisions must be low. 
Properties of Hash Functions 
e To serve the authentication process properly a hash function F 
must have the following properties: 
a. F can be applied to an argument of any size. 
b. F produces a fixed-size output. 
c. F(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x. 
d. For any given y it is computationally infeasible to find x with 
F(x) = y. 
Property (d) guarantees that an alternative message hashing to 
the same value as a given message cannot be found. This pre- 
vents forgery and also permits F to function as a crypto- 
graphic checksum for integrity. 
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Example Hash Function 
Ultra simple example: 
Divide the message up into 8-bit chucks. 
Pad the beginning with zeros if necessary. 
Interpret each 8-bit block as a number. 
The values will be between 0 and 255. 
The message M is Ml,M2,M3, ..., MN 
The hash of message M (hash(M)) = (M12 + M? + M32 + * - - + 
MN2) mod 255 
M = 11001010,00101010,01011100 
hash(M) 
hash(M) = ( 40804 + 1764 + 8464 ) mod 255 
hash(M) (51032) mod 255 
hash(M) = 32 
How hard is it to find another message that also hashes to 32? 
( (202)2 + (42)2 + (92)2 ) mod 255 
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Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
The Digital Signature Algorithm. 
The scheme relies on the difficulty of computing discrete loga- 
rithms. 
It was proposed in 1991 as the basis for the NIST Digital Signa- 
ture Standard (DSS). 
It is intended to provide the capability for the creation and verifi- 
cation of digital signatures and not for use as a general encryption 
algorithm nor for key distribution. 
DSA is notably slower than RSA (10 to 40 times slower for signa- 
ture verification). 
It is the subject of controversy since it may infringe upon other 
patents. 
It has been criticized because of  its short key length. 
In 1992 Simmons discovered a subliminal channel in DSS (which 
allows people to embed a secret message in their signatures that 
can only be read by the receiver of the message). 
Public Key 
p => 512-bit to 1024-bit prime (can be shared 
q => 160-bit prime factor ofp-1 (can be shared 
g => < p (can be shared among a group of users) 
y => f(mod p )  (a 60-bit number) 
among a group of users) 
among a group of users) 
Private key 
Signing 
x = < q (a 160-bit number) 
k => choose at random, less than q 
r (signature) E g:(modp) mod q 
s (signature) = (k' (H(m) + xr)) mod q 
Verifying 
w=s-  I modq 
ul= (H(m) * w) mod q 
u2 = (r * w) mod q 
v = (( gux * y"2)) modp) mod q 
Accept as valid ifv  = r 
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MD4/5 and MD2 
MD4/MD5 and MD2 
MD4 is a one-way hash function designed by Ron Rivist. MD 
stands for Message Digest, and the algorithm produces a 128-bit 
hash, or message digest, of the input message. 
Rivest’s goals for the design of MD4 algorithm were: 
- Security - It should be computationally infeasible to find two 
messages that hash to the same value. No attack should be 
more efficient than brute force. 
Direct Security - Not to be based on any fundamental 
assumption like the difficulty of factoring. 
Speed - Should be suitable for high speed 32 bit software 
implementations. 
Simplicity - Should be as simple as possible without large 
data structures. 
Architecture - favor microprocessor architectures (specifi- 





After a successful attack was made on the &st three rounds of the 
algorithm was achieved in 1990, Rivest strengthened the algorithm 
which is now known as MD5 (MD5, to date is considered secure). 
MD2 is another one-way hash function also created by Rivest and 
is used as the basis for Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM). 
General Description of MD5 
After some initial processing, MD5 processes the input text in 
512-bit blocks, divided into sixteen 32-bit sub-blocks. The output 
of the algorithm is a set of four 32-bit blocks, which concatenate 
to form a single 128-bit hash value. 
The main loop, which continues for as many 512-bit blocks as 
there are in the message, consists of four rounds of sixteen opera- 
tions each. Each operation performs a nonlinear function on three 
of four 32 bit variables. The result is then added to the fourth vari- 
able. 
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Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
NIST, with assistance from NSA, designed the Secure Hash Algo- 
rithm (SHA) for use with the DSA. The standard is known as the 
Secure Hash Standard (SHS). 
When a message of any length is input, The SHA produces a 160- 
bit message digest. 
SHA is very similar in operation to MD4. It differs in that it adds 
an additional expansion operation, an extra round and the whole 
transformation was designed to accommodate the DSS block size 
for efficiency. 
Most cryptographers feel that the SHA is more secure than MD5 
because of its fundamental design as well as its resistance to brute 
force attack on the 160-bit message digest versus the 128-bit 
digest produced by MD5. 
If you are interested in learning more about hash functions and other 
cryptographic techniques then you might want to read Chapter 14 of the 
following book: 
Applied Cryptography 




NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 7 Page A 1-239 
This page is intentionally blank. 





NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 8 Page A 1-24 1 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 8 Page A 1-242 
Protocols 
The Purpose of Protocols 
In daily life, there are informal protocols for almost everything 
that we do; ordering over the telephone, playing poker, exchanging 
cash for products or services, banking, voting in an election, to 
mention just a few. We don't give much thought to these protocols 
since they have evolved over time and everyone knows how to use 
them and how they work. 
0 Increasingly, people are communicating and doing business over 
computer networks rather than face-to-face as they have in the 
past. Many face-to-face protocols rely on people's presence to 
ensure fairness and security; however, in our new cyber world we 
do not have that luxury. It is therefore necessary to develop formal 
protocols for computing that can ensure that business is conducted 
fairly, honestly and securely. 
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Protocols 
Protocol 
An orderly sequence of steps taken by two or more parties to 
accomplish some task. 
Characteristics 
I. Established in advance 






- Directly involved in transaction. 
- 
A Trustworthy, disinterested third party. 









- A third party who judges whether a transaction was con- 
ducted fairly. 
- A notarypublic 
Disadvantages 
- Detects failure to cooperate after the fact. 
Self Enforcing Protocols 
Advantages 
- Guarantees fairness 
- No Outsider needed 
Using DES To Support Secrecy 
Alice wishes to send a secret message M to Bob. 
Both Alice and Bob possess KAB 
I. Alice encrypts M with the DES key KAB, producing M’ 
2. Alice transmits M’ to Bob 
3. Bob decrypts M’ with the DES key KAB, producing M 
n 
Since both only Alice and Bob share the key KAB, nobody else can 
read Alice’s secret message M I  unless they have managed to 
obtain a copy of the private key KAB. 
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Using DES To Support Authenticity 
Alice wishes to send a message M to Bob such that Bob is 
assured that the message could only have originated from 
Alice. 
I. Alice encrypts M with the DES key KAB, producing M’ 
2. Alice transmits M’ to Bob 
3. Bob decrypts M’ with the DES key KAB, producing M 
n 
-Bob 
Since both only Alice and Bob share the key KAB, Bob knows that 
Alice is the only person who could have sent M. Nobody else 
could have sent it, unless they have managed to obtain a copy of 
the private key KAB. 
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Using DES To Support Integrity 
Alice wishes to send a message M to Bob such that Bob is 
assured that the message was not modified during its 
transit from Alice to Bob. 
I. Alice encrypts M with the DES key KAB, producing M’ 
2. Alice encrypts M with the DES key KAB, using CBC mode 
and produces a 64 bit MAC 
3. Alice transmits both M’ and the 64 bit MAC to Bob 
4. Bob decrypts M’ with the DES key KAB, producing M 
5. Bob encrypts M with the DES key KAB, using CBC mode 
and produces a 64 bit MAC’ 
6. Bob compares MAC and MAC’ to see if they are the same. 
n 
Since both MAC and MAC’ are the same Bob knows that the mes- 
sage M has not been altered. 
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Disadvantages of Conventional Key Systems 
With a conventional key system a separate key is needed for every 
pair of users. 
n * (n-1)/2 keys are required for n users. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 users requires three keys 
~ A B ,  ~ A C  and ~ B C  
4 users requires six keys 
~ A B ,  ~ A C ,  ~ B C ,   AD, ~ B D  and  kc^ 
In general, we are choosing from n items k at a time or: 




K C D  
KEY MANAGEMENT IS A NIGHTMARE!! 
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Disadvantages of Conventional Key Systems 
Distribution of Shared Keys: 
Keys must be distributed in a secure manner. 
- Bonded courier. 
- Registered mail. 
As previously mentioned, the amount of information a cryptana- 
lyst can gain about a key is proportional to the number and length 
of messages encrypted with the key. 
Thus, for security reasons, keys should be changed periodically, 
which means that keys need to be securely distributed fairly often. 
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Using RSA To Support Secrecy 
Alice wishes to send a secret message M to Bob. 
I .  Alice encrypts M with Bob’s public key KBOB-pUB, producing 
M’ 
2. Alice transmits M’ to Bob 
3. Bob decrypts M’ with his private key KBOB-p,,, producing M 
n 
Problem!! 
Nobody else can read M since Bob is the only one who possesses 
KBoB-pRI; however, Bob has no assurance that M came from Alice 
since anyone could have used his public key KBOB-puB 
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Using RSA To Support Authenticity 
Alice wishes to send a message M to Bob such that Bob is 
assured that the message could only have originated from 
Alice. 
I .  Alice encrypts M with Alice’s private key KALICE-pRl, produc- 
ing M’ 
2. Alice transmits M’ to Bob 
3. Bob decrypts M’ with Alice’s public key KALICE-pUB, produc- 
ing M n 
Ivan / n 
Problem! 
This protocol ensures authenticity, but secrecy is non-existent 
since anyone can obtain Alice’s public key KAUCE-pUB Thus M is 
accessible to an eavesdropper like Ivan. 
Problem ! 
Bob is still not absolutely certain that M’ was not altered in transit, 
~~ ~ 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 8 Page A 7-251 
Using RSA To Support Secrecy, Authenticity and 
Integrity 
Alice wishes to send a secret message M to Bob such that 
Bob is assured that the message could only have 
originated from Alice and that the message was not 
modified during its transit from Alice to Bob. 
I .  Alice uses a mutually available hash function H to produce a 
hash H(M)ALICE of the original message M. 
2. Alice signs H(M)ALICE by encrypting it with her private key 
KALICE-PRI producing HWI’ALICE 
3. Alice encrypts M with Bob’s public key KBOB-pUB, producing 
M’. 
4. Alice transmits both M’ and H(M)’ALICE to Bob 
5. Bob decrypts M’ with his private key KBOB-pRI, producing M 
6. Bob uses the same hash function H to produce a hash 
H(M)B,B of the message M he just decrypted in step 5. 
7. Bob decrypts H(M)’ALICE using KALICE-PUB. 
8. Bob compares H(M)AUCE and H(M)Bo, to see if they are the 
same. 
n 
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Public-Key Systems Issues 
Distribution of Keys: 
To some degree, public key systems solve the key distribution prob- 
lem that private key systems suffer from. 
The number of keys that a large community requires can be greatly 
reduced if the members of the community use a public key scheme 
instead of a private key scheme. 
If a community of n members uses a public key scheme they will 
only require n private keys and n public keys. 
- 
There is no need for maintaining secrecy when distributing public 
keys. 
This is a total of 2n keys. 
Note that there is no need for secrecy, but there is a big 
need for authenticity. 
Consider the following scenario: 
Alice computes a private key / public key pair and sends the public 
key to Bob in a message such that Bob thinks that the public key is 
from Carol. 
I.e., Bob thinks that this key is Carol’s public key. 
Now if Bob wants to send a secret to Carol, he would encrypt the 
secret with Carol’s public key and send it off to Carol. 
Alice intercepts the message an decrypts the message with the pri- 
vate key and reads the secret. 
This example illustrates the need for authenticity when receiving 
public keys. 
- 
- This problem leads to public key management and certificate 
authority schemes. 
More on this topic later. 
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Efficiency Considerations 
Public Key Versus Private Key Algorithms: 
Private key algorithms (such as DES and IDEA) are much faster 
than public key algorithms (such as RSA). 
Question: 
How do we take advantage of public key cryptography for key dis- 
tribution and private key cryptography for bulk encryption? 
Answer: 
Use a hybrid scheme (such as PGP). 
Hybrid Schemes: 
In a hybrid scheme, a public key algorithm is used to encrypt (and 
decrypt) a shared key (such as a DES key). 
The message is encrypted with the shared key. 
The encrypted message and the encrypted shared key are transmit- 
ted. 
The receiver, decrypts the shared key (using a public key algo- 
rithm) and then uses the shared key to decrypt the message. 
Analysis of the hybrid scheme: 
Only keys (which are relatively short) are encrypted using the slow 
public key algorithm. 
The message (which may be very long) is encrypted with the fast 
shared key algorithm. 
The shared key may only be used for one message. 
Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures. 
A digital signature is the electronic analogue of a handwritten sig- 
nature. A common feature is that they must provide the following: 
A receiver must be able to validate the sender's signature. 
A signature must not be forgeable. 
- 
- 
0 There are two major variants of implementation: 
- True signatures. 
- Arbitrated signatures. 
In a true signature system, signed messages are forwarded directly 
from signer to recipient. In an arbitrated system, a witness (human 
or automated) validates a signature and transmits the message on 
behalf of the sender. The use of an arbitrator may be helpful in 
event of key compromise as noted below. 
Digital signatures provide authentication, nonrepudiation and 
integrity checks. In some settings authentication is a major consid- 
eration; In some cases it is desirable even when secrecy is not a 
consideration. 
When using a public key scheme, encrypting a message (or the 
hash of a message) with a private key is effectively "signing" the 
message, since only one person in the world has the private key. 
~ 
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Key Management in Shared Key Systems 
Conventional system key management. 
In a conventional (one-key) system, two users who wish to com- 
municate securely must first securely establish a common key. 
One possibility is to employ a third party such as a courier. In 
practice, it may be necessary to establish a new key from time to 
time for security reasons. This may make use of a courier or simi- 
lar scheme costly and inefficient. 
An alternative is for the two users to obtain a common key from a 
central issuing authority with whom each can communicate 
securely. Security is then a major consideration: a central authority 
having access to keys is vulnerable to penetration. Due to the con- 
centration of trust, a single security breach would compromise the 
entire system. In particular, a central authority could engage in 
passive eavesdropping for a long period of time before the practice 
was discovered, even then it might be difficult to prove. 
In large networks it might become a bottleneck, since each pair of 
users needing a key must access a central node at least once. Addi- 
tionally, failure of the central authority could disrupt the key distri- 
bution system. A hierarchical (tree-structured) system, with users 
at the leaves and key distribution centers at intermediate nodes 
may be one way to alleviate this problem. However, this creates a 
new security problem, since a multiplicity of entry points for 
intruders is created. Furthermore, it might be inefficient unless 
pairs of users communicating frequently were associated to a com- 
mon subtree; otherwise the root of the tree would, once again, 
become a bottleneck. 
Some of these disadvantages can also be mitigated by a public- 
key approach to key distribution. 
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Key Management in Public Key Systems 
Public-Key System Key Management. 
Prior to using a public-key cryptosystem for exchanging conven- 
tional secret keys, users Alice and Bob must exchange their public 
keys. It is a simpler problem than exchanging secret keys, since 
public keys do not require secrecy in storage or transit. Public keys 
can be managed by an on-line or off-line directory service; they 
can also be exchanged directly by users. However, authenticity is 
an issue. If Alice thinks that KlvM-puB is really KBOB-pUB then 
Alice might encrypt using K,vAN+uB and inadvertently allow Ivan 
to decrypt using KlVAN-pRI. A second problem is integrity: any error 
in transmission of a public key will render it useless. Hence some 
form of error detection is desirable. Regardless of the scheme cho- 
sen for public key distribution, at some point a central authority is 
likely to be involved. However, exchange of public keys between 
users need not involve the central authority, since the primary con- 
cern is with authenticity. Therefore, the implications of comprol 
mise of the central authority are not as severe as it would be in a 
conventional key system. 
Validity is an additional consideration: a user's public key may be 
invalidated because of compromise of the corresponding private 
key, or for some other reason such as expiration. This creates a 
stale-data problem in the event that public keys are stored or 
accessed through a directory. 
Definition 
A nonce is a random number that is often used in protocols to pre- 
vent the "replay" problem. 
Example use: 
Alice generates a new nonce and sends a message containing the 
nonce. If she then receives a return message containing the same 
nonce value, she knows that the return message is not a replay of a 
previous message that had been sent to her. 
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Key Distribution Example 
An authentication protocol in real time used for 
the exchange a DES key. 
I 1 
4. Bob chooses some random string R, I 
6. Alice decrypts with KALlc.p,, to obtain R,cE, RB, 
7. Alice verifies her random string RALlCE 
9. Bob decrypts with &OB+RI to obtain R B m  
10 Bob verifies his random string RmB 
n 
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Key Management Via Certificates 
Use of Certificates in Public Key Systems. 
A technique to obtain a solution to both authenticity and integrity 
in distribution of public keys is the use of certificates. A certifi- 
cate-based system assumes a central issuing authority CA as in the 
secret-key case. Again it must be assumed that each user can com- 
municate securely with the CA. This is relatively simple since it 
merely requires that each user possess GA-puB, the public trans- 
formation of the CA. Then Alice may register KALlcE+uB with the 
CA. Since KALICE-pUB is public, this might be done via the postal 
service, an insecure electronic channel, a combination of these, 
etc. 
Normally Alice will follow some form of authentication procedure 
in registering with the CA. Alternatively, registration can be han- 
dled by a tree-structured system: the CA issues certificates to local 
representatives (e.g., of employing organizations), who then act as 
intermediaries in the process of registering users at lower levels of 
the hierarchy. 
In any case, in return Alice receives a certificate signed by the CA 
and containing KALICE-pUB That is, the CA constructs a message M 
containing KALICE-pUB, identification information for A, a validity 
period, etc. Then the CA computes CERTAUCE = &A-pRI(M) 
which becomes Alice's certificate. CERTAUC, is then a public doc- 
ument which contains both KAUCE-pUB and authentication, since 
the certificate is signed by the CA. Certificates can be distributed 
by the CA, by users, or used in a hierarchical system. The inclu- 
sion of the validity period is a generalization of timestamping. The 
importance of timestamping is in guarding against the use of com- 
promised keys. 
However, the problem of stale data is not wholly solved by times- 
tamping: a certificate may be invalidated before its expiration date, 
because of compromise or administrative reasons. Hence if certifi- 
cates are cached by users (as opposed to being redistributed by the 
CA each time they are used), the CA must periodically issue lists 
of invalidated certificates. 
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Key Management Via Certificates 
A phone-book approach to certificates. 
Some of the features of the previous schemes could be combined 
in a phone-book approach, using an electronic equivalent such as a 
floppy disk containing certificates. This would optimize ease of 
use since a user could communicate securely with another by 
accessing the latter’s certificate very rapidly. However, again the 
central authority would have to issue “hot lists”. Periodic distribu- 
tion of the compilations of certificates would be a separate man- 
agement process. Additionally, the security of such a scheme is 
clearly in question since phone-book entries might contain errors, 
or entries could be altered. 
Certificate 
Name: Alice 
Address: alice@ host. domain 
Date Issued: 950901 
Date Expires: 960831 
Public Key: clpg55kwplvwqlfdrg 
tuoksfidolbkfgcsdarp 
Oqxsjhrxfj sdf2yunOql 
dxklrtortwdgrr6ee 8 14 
Signed: Mr. Trustworthy Trent 
Key Management Via Certificates 
Decentralized Management. 
Users may be responsible for managing their own certificates. In 
this event the protocol is much simpler. When A wishes to initiate 
communication (e.g., exchange of a secret key) with B, he sends a 
message to B containing A's certificate, A's identification, and 
other information such as a date, random number etc. as described 
in the protocol in the previous section. This message also requests 
B's certificate. Upon completion of the certificate exchange, 
employing some protocol such as the handshake above, A and B 
will possess each other's authenticated certificates. A can validate 
the certificate CB by decrypting the certificate with &A-PUB. Then 
KB-pUB may be retrieved. The certificate must contain information 
properly identifying B to A, so that an intruder cannot masquerade 
as B. The certificate must also have a validity period. In turn B 
may proceed similarly. 
The central authority must periodically issue lists of certificates 
which have become invalid before their expiration dates due to key 
compromise or administrative reasons. It is likely that in a large 
system this would be done, e.g., on a monthly basis. Hence a user 
receiving a certificate from another user would not have complete 
assurance of its validity, even though it is signed by the CA. Thus 
this system trades higher efficiency for some security loss, com- 
pared to the previous scheme. 
For greater assurance of validity, a user could access a centrally- 
managed list of invalid certificates; presumably these would be 
very current. This would require on-line access to a central facility, 
which would create the same type of bottleneck we have noted 
previously. However, the accesses would be very quick, since pre- 
sumably only a certificate sequence number would be transmitted. 
Another on-line possibility would be for the central authority to 
enforce coherence by a global search of cached certificates each 
time a certificate is invalidated. Again there is a trade-off of valid- 
ity assurance and efficiency. 
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Certificate Example 
Sample PGP certificate 
and signed message hash 
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 
Version: 2.6.i 
mQCNAi+btRkAAAEEAKxQ9HwqfsQc9apOlQmFTo2wqbCL6Q1 xlvN6CjxkBbtviaLq 
Eg mVPn b/FGD5wwxDM jCC JDw BFf LLRwASQAyyy5Rju kkZxl Gn8qHzmoy IOVTFOI J I 
TFDWyVjMSSvUKACDqXv/xVFunsPIPc7d6f4MwxDl kw2BBpoV7k64dVcua4BAAUR 
tCRTc2ggZGlzdHJpYnVOaW9ulGtleSA8eWxvQGNzLmhl dC5maTGJAJUCBRAvm7Vv 




- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 
Version: 2.6.i 
i QCVAg UB MAP h QqkZxf G W HOo 1 AQHg ng PIdbc RU FqJ F549VvVOWg DtAxuIUoO6 h nei 
26/0pczgH6j8+6fZh8TV81 yVAh95K6EhHsKo85j5hXmKSG3xLn6fw26ql DPGHpQ 
Sa4xQ4oL20qcvgOeaEi3gZxxTD5etzdl8e BNbe8vS Ikk9 1 yrsAiZL7h8St7UHGsA 
N5WqXSM18pg= 
=tXr9 
-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
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Key Distribution Example 
Exchange of DES key using a one-way authentication 
protocol with certificates: 
I 1. Alice chooses some random string R k i C E  I 
~~ 
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CLIPPER 
The CLIPPER Chip 
The CLIPPER chip is one implementation of the SKIPJACK algo- 
rithm. The Clipper chip designed for the AT&T commercial secure 
voice products has the following characteristics. 
- Functions specified by NSA; logic designed by 
MYKOTRONX; chip fabricated by VLSI, Inc. 
- Resistant to reverse engineering against the most sophisticated 
techniques which may be used by a well funded adversary. 
- 15-20 MB/S encryptiorddecryption rate once synchronization is 
established. 
- The chip programming equipment writes (once) the following 
information into a special memory on the chip. 
- serial number (unique) unit key (unique) family key specialized 
control software 
I .  Upon generation (or entry) of a session key in the chip, the 
chip performs the following actions. 
2. Encrypts the 80-bit session key under the unit key produc- 
ing an 80-bit intermediate result. 
3. Concatenates the 80-bit result with the 25-bit serial number 
and a 23-bit authentication pattern (a total of 128 bits). 
4. Enciphers this 128 bits with the family key to produce a 
128-bit cipher block chain called the Law Enforcement 
Field (LEF). 
5. Transmits the LEF at least once to the intended receiving 
Clipper chip. 
6. If law enforcement agencies want to decrypt the session, 
they intercept the LEF and messages of this session. They 
use the LEF to obtain the session key from the Escrow 
authorities. 
7. The two chips use this field together with a random initial- 
ization vector (IV) to establish cryptographic synchroniza- 
tion. 
8. Once synchronized, the CLIPPER chip uses the session key 
to encrypt/decrypt data in both directions. 
The chips can be programmed to not enter secure mode if the LEF 
has been tampered with (e.g. modified, superencrypted, replaced). 
CLIPPER chip prices currently cost $16 unprogrammed and $26 
programmed. 
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CLIPPER 
... 
The Great Debate - Key Escrowing 
The CLIPPER chip was intended to, protect private communica- 
tions while at the same time permitting government agents to 
obtain the keys upon presentation of legal authorization. The the 
two halves of the unique unit key are to be held by two separate 
escrow agents and would allow the government to access the 
encrypted private communications. The use of CLIPPER, so far, is 
voluntary; however, government agencies are being strongly 
encouraged to adopt its use. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
the Department of the treasury were designated on February 4, 
1994 as the two escrow agents that will hold the keys in escrow. 
The topic of key escrowing has been the subject of a great deal of 
heated debate over the past two years. On one side are those that 
feel that individual privacies are at risk and those that argue that 
law enforcement officials must be given the technological ability 
to do their jobs. The most notable proponent for key escrowing is 
Dorothy Denning who believes that CLIPPER is necessary to stop 
crime. The Electronic Freedom Foundation (and notably John 
Perry Barlow) adamantly opposes the key escrowing concept 
because the temptation for government to usurp the rights of pri- 
vate individual's rights is too tempting. 
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Anonymous Key Distribution 
Anonymous Key Distribution 
Consider the problem of key distribution. If we assume that people 
do not have the ability to generate their own keys then they must 
use the services of a Key Distribution Center (KDC). The problem 
is that the keys must be distributed in such a fashion that no one 
may determine who gets what keys. 
I .  Alice generates a public/private key pair (for this protocol, 
she keeps both keys secret). 
2. The KDC generates a continuous stream of keys. 
3. The KDC encrypts the keys, one-by-one, with its own private 
key. 
4. The KDC transmits the encrypted keys, one-by-one, onto the 
network. 
5. Alice chooses a key at random. 
6. Alice encrypts the chosen key with her public key. 
7. Alice waits for a while and sends the double encrypted key 
back to the KDC. 
8. The KDC decrypts the double encrypted key with its private 
key, leaving a key encrypted with Alice’s public key. 
9. The KDC sends the encrypted key back to Alice. 
10. Alice decrypts the key with her private key. 





Nonrepudiation is contingent upon users keeping their private keys 
secret. If Alice’s private key KAUCE-pRI should be compromised, 
then Alice might be able to repudiate messages sent even before 
the compromise. 
The use of a central authority is suggested for this purpose. In this 
scheme, the receiver of a message sends a copy to the central 
authority. The latter can attest to the instantaneous validity of the 
sender’s signature (i.e., that it has not been reported that the 
sender’s private key has been compromised at the time of sending). 
In a public-key system augmented by a hash function H, Alice 
might send a message M to Bob as follows (ignore secrecy consid- 
erations): Alice sends M and a signed hash H(M)’A~CE to Bob. 
Bob uses Alice’s public key KALICE-pUB to retrieve H(M), then 
computes H(M),B and compares the two values for authentica-. 
tion. For nonrepudiation, Bob retains M, KALICE-pUB and 
H(M)’AL,CE. If Alice attempts to repudiate M, a judge can use the 
three items to resolve the dispute by completing the same steps 
Bob did and attesting to the validity of Alice’s private key at the 
time of transmission of M. 
The preceding schemes satisfy another desirable property: in the 
adjudication process, they do not compromise security by expos- 
ing private keys to a judge. 
0 Another solution involves timestamps. This again may involve a 
network of automated arbitrators, but is very simple in nature. 
Receivers obtain timestamps along with the received message. If a 
receiver needs to be sure of the validity of a signature, he may 
check the validity of the sender’s private key by checking with a 
central authority. As long as the received message is timestamped 
before the validity check, the receiver is assured of nonrepudia- 
tion. If users are permitted to change their keys, a central authority 
should retain past keys for use in disputes which may arise later. 
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Secret Sharing Algorithms 
Secret Sharing Algorithms 
Let’s assume that you’re setting up a launch program for a nuclear 
missile. You want to make sure that no single individual can ini- 
tiate a launch. You have five officers whom you feel can be trusted 
with the individual secret codes to initiate a launch; however, you 
additionally desire that only three officers need be present to 
launch a missile. 
This problem can be solved by a secret sharing scheme, called a 
threshold scheme. In its simplest form any message (a launch code 
in this case) can be divided into n pieces, called shadows, such that 
any m of them can be used to reconstruct the entire message. 
Lets say you desired to create a (33) threshold scheme to satisfy 
our launch code scheme, then we could use the following tech- 
nique developed by Shamir. 
I. Generate a quadratic polynomial a ~ ?  + bx + M (modp) in 
which p is a random number. The coefficients, a and b, are 
chosen at random and are kept secret and discarded after the 
shadows are handed out. M is our secret launch code. The 
prime p is made public. 
2. The shadows ki are obtained by evaluating the polynomial at 
five points ki = F(+). 
3. Since the quadratic polynomial has three unknown coeffi- 
cients, a, b, m, any three shadows can be used to create three 
equations since the other two equations are redundant. 
Secret Sharing Algorithms 
Secret Sharing Algorithms 
Let: 
M =  11 
a = 7 b = 8 (our chosen randoms) 
(our secret launch code) 
Which generates the quadratic: 
F(x) = 7x2 + 8x +11 (mod 13) 
We create the following shadows: 
k, = F(l) = 7 + 8 + 11 = 0 (mod 13) 
k2 = F(2) = 28+ 16 + 11 = 3 (mod 13) 
k3 = F(3) = 63 + 24 + 11 = 7 (mod 13) 
k4 = F(4) = 112 + 32 + 11 = 12 (mod 13) 
k, = F(5) = 175 + 40 + 11 = 5 (mod 13) 
To reconstruct M from three of the shadows, let’s say, k2, k3 and 
ks we solve the following set of linear equations to find M: 
3 = a  * 22 + b  * 2 + M  (mod 13) 
7 = a  * 32 +b * 3 + M  (mod 13) 
5 = a  * S2 + b  * 5 + M  (mod 13) 
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Blind signatures 
Blind signatures 
Usually we desire people to be aware of the contents of a docu- 
ment before signing it; however, there are times when we wish to 
have people sign a document without their seeing the contents. 
This has an obvious application in the real world, specifically to 
the notarization process. Less obvious perhaps is that we can use 
blind signatures in voting protocols. 
Let’s assume that Bob is a notary public. Alice wants him to sign a 
document but does not want him to have any idea what he is sign- 
ing. Bob doesn’t care because he is just certifying that he notarized 
the document at a given time. The following simple protocol can 
be used. 
I .  Alice takes the document and multiplies it by a random value, 
called a blinding factor. 
2. Alice sends the blinded document to Bob. 
3. Bob signs the document and returns it to Alice. 
4. Alice divides out the blinding factor, leaving the original doc- 
ument signed by Bob. 




Although on the surface it may seem like a very simple protocol to 
develop, secure voting can involve rather detailed and complicated 
protocols. We will look at only at a few of the more simplistic pro- 
tocols which involve a Central Tabulating Facility. 
Ideally, the protocol we desire has the following properties: 
I .  Only authorized voters can vote. 
2. No one can vote more than once. 
3. No one can determine for whom anyone voted. 
4. No one can change anyone else’s vote without being discov- 
ered. 
5. All voters can make sure that theit vote has been taken into 
account in the final tabulation. 
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Simplistic Secure Voting Protocols 
Simplistic Secure Voting Protocols 
Let’s look at a very simplistic protocol that does not work: 
I .  All voters encrypt their vote with the public key of the CTF. 
2. All voters send their vote to the CTF. 
3. The CTF decrypts the votes, tabulates them and makes the 
result public. 
This protocol does not work because it violates every one of the 
characteristics we desire in a voting protocol. 
Let’s try an improvement over the f is t  protocol that satisfies some 
of our properties but still falls short of the mark: 
I .  All voters sign their vote with their private key. 
2. All voters encrypt their signed vote with the CTF’s public 
key. 
3. All voters send their vote to the CTF. 
4. The CTF decrypts the vote, checks the signatures, tabulates 
the results, and makes the results public. 
This protocol is only a slight improvement since it only satisfies 
properties (1) and (2) of our ideal protocol. 
Voting with Blind Signatures 
Voting with Blind Signatures 
The problem that we now face is how to dissociate the vote from 








All voters generate a pair of votes (“yes’ and “ n ~ ” )  to which a 
very large randomly generated serial number is attached. 
All voters blind their pairs of votes and send them to the CTF. 
The CTF checks its database to make sure voters have not 
submitted blinded votes for signature previously. Then it 
signs the votes and sends them back to the voters and stores 
the names of the voters in its database. 
The voters unblind the messages, leaving a a “yes” and “no7’ 
vote, each of which has been signed by the CTF. 
The voters choose one of the votes and encrypts it with the 
CTF’s public key. 
The voters send in their votes. 
The CTF decrypts the votes, checks the signature, checks its 
database for a duplicate serial number, saves the serial num- 
ber, and tabulates the votes. It publishes the results of the 
election, along with every serial number and its associated 
vote. 
The protocol above works even better if all votes are collected 
in an electronic ballot box prior to giving it to the CTF, since 
this would make it impossible for the CTF to keep track of 
who sent in what vote. 
The problem with this protocol is that it does involve a CTF 
which must be trusted. In order to eliminate the CTF we must 
resort to rather complex and cumbersome protocols which 
appear to be extremely impractical for large scale elections. 
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Digital Cash 
Digital Cash 
Once again an everyday protocol which we frequently take for 
granted, and which also appears to have a relatively simple solu- 
tion in cyber-space, requires a complex and cumbersome solution. 
There is no single solution which fits our concept of an ideal digi- 
tal cash world. The following characteristics have been identified 







Independence - The security of the digital cash is not depen- 
dent on any physical location. The cash can be transferred 
through computer networks. 
Security - The digital cash cannot be copied or reused. 
Untraceability - No one can trace the relationship between 
users and their purchases. 
Off-Line Payment - The point of purchase does not need to be 
linked to a host to process the user’s payment. 
Transferability - The digital cash can be transferred to other 
users. 
Divisibility - A piece of digital cash in a given amount can be 
subdivided into smaller pieces of cash in smaller amounts. 
There are a number of digital cash systems which have been pro- 
posed and several implementations currently exist; however, no 
practical solution has been implemented which satisfies all of the 
constraints above. 
Okamoto and Ohta have developed a schema which satisfies all 
the constraints. The total data transfer for a payment is about 20 
kilobytes, and the protocol can be completed in several seconds. 
S/Key - One-Time Password System 
S/Key - One-Time Password System 
Developed and implemented at Bellcore. 
One-time password system, to counter eavesdropping on network 
connections to obtain user/account information and passwords. 
The user's secret password never crosses the network during login. 
User's secret password is never stored anywhere, including on the 
host being protected. 
Based on publicly available hash function algorithm (MD4/MD5). 
Takes 8 bytes of input to MD4 then by folding the output byte 
pairs in the 16-byte MD4 to produce an 8-byte output (yielding a 
64-bit password). 
How one-time passwords are generated: 
I. The very first one-way password is created by running the 
secret password s through the hash functionfsome specified 
number of times, N. 
2. The next one-way password is generated by running the 
secret password through the hash function N-1 times; 
3. In general, each subsequent one-time password pi is gener- 
ated by: 
pi = j y s )  
An eavesdropper will not be able to generate the next one- 
time password in the sequence because doing so would 
require inverting the hash function. 
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S/Key - One-Time Password System 
How one-time passwords are generated: 
I. The host is initially given PO. 
2. When a client attempts to be authenticated, the seed and the 
current value of i are passed to the client. 
3. The client returns the next one-time password by taking a the 
seed value, which is concatenated to the password, and run- 
ning the modified secret password through the hash function 
i-1 times. 
4. The host temporarily saves the clients result, then applies the 
hash function to it. 
5. If the result compares to its previously stored value then the 
temporary copy replaces the previously stored value, and the 
client is given access. 
After the user has used N-I passwords then it is necessary to reini- 
tialize the system through the use of keyinit, which is a special ver- 
sion of the UNIX passwd command. 
SKey is available for anonymousftp from: thumper.bellcore.com 
in the publnmh subdirectory 
Section 9 
Network Security 
NPS GlSR CS3600 - lnfroducfion to Computer Security Section 9 Page A 1-277 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 9 Page A 1-278 
Introduction to Networks 
Network 
A collection of interconnected functional units providing data com- 
munications services among components attached to it. These com- 
ponents are comprised of both hardware and software 
/ 
/ \ / 
User 
User 
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Threats to Network Security 
Their distributed nature and the possibility of increased interconnec- 
tivity render networks more vulnerable than monolithic systems. 
Traffic Flow Analysis 
Inference of information through the examination of message 




Dominoes Pizza Traffic 
Denial of Service 
The prevention of authorized access to physical resources through 
theft or disruption. Delaying for time-critical access is a form of 
denial of service 
flooding of network with traffic 
blocking of transmissions based on addresses 
message replay 
Spoofing (lmpersona tion) 
Use of services under a false identity. May obtain unauthorized 
access to information or may maliciously modify information 
replay of passwords 
modification of source addresses 
compromise of passwords 
message replay 
Eavesdropping 
Illicit capture of information while it is enroute between communicat- 
ing parties 
Radio link interceptions 
Wiretapping 
Emanations from communications equipment 
Grabbing unprotected ethernet packets in a LAN 
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Threats to Network Security 
Covert Channels 
The use of system mechanisms in an unexpected manner which 




I ' /  \ \ 
Unexpected Mechanism 
Covert Channel 
Encodings using message length 
Encodings using message addresses 
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Network Security Services 
There is overlap between these areas. Note that I S 0  lists the follow- 
ing: Non-repudiation, access control, authentication, data confidenti- 
ality, and data integrity 
Access control 
Enforcement of security policy when requests for access are made 
In forma tion Confidentiality 
Protection of information from unauthorized disclosure 
Information Integrity 
Protection of information from unauthorized modification 
Authentication and Non Repudiation 
Insure the proper authentication of active system entities. Prevents 
impersonation or masquerading 
Prevent the repudiation of prior events 
- Proof of origin 
- Proof of receipt 
Availability 
Insure that the network services are both available and of appropriate 
quality 
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Confidentiality 
Objective: 
0 Restrict access to data in transit or in storage to TCB components 
Method: 
transform data to render contents unreadable -- encryption 
store data in system-only domain -- secured computing systems or 
trusted processor states 




Prohibit flow of information down in levels of confidentiality 
Permit entities at higher confidentiality levels to observe 
information at lower confidentiality levels 
Considerations for location of confidentiality controls 
0 Which protocol layer? 
0 Multiple protocol layers? 
0 End system provides? 
Intermediate system provides? 
Problems 
Key Management 
Key distribution centers for private keys 
Certificate servers for public keys 
Separation of Encrypted from Unencrypted 
Where is the TCB? 
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Integrity 
Objective: 
Prevent unauthorized modification of data. Includes 
integrity of information in transmission packets 
insuring transmission of complete message to intended desti- 
nation 
- 
- ordering of transmission packets 
- 
Method: 
use message authentication codes (MAC), also known as integrity 
locks 
Use of label-based controls, e.g. derived from Biba Integrity 
Model 
Prohibit flow of information up in levels of integrity 
Permit entities at lower integrity levels to observe information 
of higher integrity 
- 
- 
Considerations for location of integrity controls 
Which protocol layer? 
Multiple protocol layers? 
End system provides? 
Intermediate system provides? 
Problems 
Management 
Protection of integrity enforcement mechanisms 
Determination of specific integrity attributes, e.g. labels or MACs 
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Authentication and Non-repudiation Services 
Objective: 
Establish message origin (author) 
Obtain proof that message was sent. 
Method: 
use signatures, time-stamps 
Considerations for location of authentication and non- 
repudiation services 
Which protocol layer? 
Multiple protocol layers? 
End system provides? 
0 Intermediate system provides? 
Problems 
Protocol designs 
The protocols can be complicated. 
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Availability Services 
Although desirable, cannot be specified in the same 
precise, global, and persistent manner as confidentiality 
and integrity policies 
Subjective 
- What is progress? 
- What is termination? 
- What is success? 
- what is sufficient? 
- Cannot look at individual components, entire system must be 
examined 
Authorized users may compete for system resources 
To reduce scope of problem, external users may need to be 
excluded 
- totally 
- provided with circumscribed services 
How are availability attributes defined? 
How are availability attributes allocated and revoked? 
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of requestor of service. 
Sometime “certifi- 
cates are produced for 
future requests 
No, 
but can help enforce 
TCB access control 
decisions 
Yes, 
Semantics of data 
altered so that they are 
unintelligible 
Yes, 
Encrypted data may 
have internal check 
sum 
Cleartext may have 
cryptographically 
computed checksum 
Trusted Network Base 
Yes. 
Mandatory integrity 
fields, but information 






but data must remain 
under continuous con- 
trol of the TNB, other- 
wise supplemental 
mechanisms, such as 
encryption, are needed 
No in the case of com- 
munications 
Enforcement of Biba 
integrity model within 
system. 




should use error detec- 
tion techniques to sup- 
port physical 
protection 
Restrict use of end 
system only to autho- 
rized users 
Separate users who 
should have access to 
information from 
those who should not 
Malicious modifica- 
tion can be avoided by 
combined physical and 
personnel controls 
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Cryptography for Secure Networking 
Objective: 
transform information so that it is unreadable without use of a key to 
transform ciphertext back to plaintext 
Permits secure communication over an insecure channel 
Two kinds of Cryptography 
Private Key -- Symmetric Key 
examples include Skipjack, DES 
Same Key and algorithm are used to encrypt and decrypt message 
Supports multiple receivers 
Key must be agreed upon by sender and receiver 
- trusted protocol for key distribution 
- synchronization of rekeying 
- deliver keys by trusted courier 
encipherment is in fixed block sizes 
high bandwidths supported 
- hardware implementations 
- stream mode -- lo8 bps 
- change keys with each protocol data unit -- lo6 to lo7 bps 
Public Key -- Asymmetric Key 
Examples include RSA 
Sender and receiver have different keys for encryption and decryption 
Dp,j , (Ep,b(P>) = P 
The encryption key is public and may be stored in a “directory” 
The decryption key must be protected 
Bandwidth lower -lo6 bps 
Benefits of Cryptography 
Cryptography contributes to communications security (COMSEC) 
Confidentiality 
Once a sensitive message has been encrypted using a strong 
encryption algorithm, it can only be decrypted using the key 
Encrypted data is consider to be unclassified 
Integrity 
Digital checksums 
Message authentication codes 
Integrity Lock, also known as “Spray Paint” 
Message Digests 
- likelihood of two messages producing the same message 
digest is low 
- no keys are required 
- MD5 is a popular choice 
Authentication 
Use key to validate identity 
0 Private Key Authentication 
- Three-way protocol usual 
- Trusted key server required 
- Kerberos is an example 
Public Key Authentication -- digital signatures 
- 
- 
NIST digital signature standard @ S S )  - no privacy 
Basic mechanism: sender signs message through encryption 
with private key and receiver authenticates by decrypting 
with public key 
- Replay is prevented by using time stamps 
- Digests can improve efficiency 
- Problem: public keys must be distributed 
Access Control -- NO! 
Cryptography does not provide access control. If a TCB selects pair- 
wise keys based on security labels, then cryptography can support 
TCB access control decisions. 
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Challenges to Network Cryptography 
Key Management 
Classification of key is the least upper bound of the classifications of 
data encrypted with the key 
Who should receive individual keys? 
each message 
each security level 
individual users 




need to have good random number generators 
need to avoid weak keys 
- all 1s 
- all0’s 
- etc. 
Need Key Distribution and Revocation Plan 
may differ for symmetric and public keys 
need key revocation lists 
may choose to use mixed schemes 
public key cryptography to distribute symmetric (shared) keys 
symmetric key cryptography to encrypt messages 
Secure Data Network System (SDNS) supports key distribution 
relying on public key methods 
Blacker and Kerberos are systems where a particular network node 
is allocated key distribution responsibility 
IS0 Reference Model 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
Describes computer network communications. 
0 Model describes peer-to-peer correspondence, relationship 
between corresponding layers of sender and receiver. 
0 Each layer represents a different activity performed in the actual 
transmission of a message. 
Each layer serves a separate function 




User Program Initiates message; optional encryption I--- ~- ~ 
Layer 6 
Presentation 
System Utilities Breaks message into blocks, text compres- 
sion; optional encryption 
Layer 5 
Session 
Operating System Establishes user-to-user session, header 
added to show sender, receiver and 













Flow control, priority service, information 
added concerning the logical connection 
Routing, message blocking into packets, 
routing information added to blocks 
Transmission error recovery, message sep- 
aration into frames; optional encryption, 
header and trailer added for correct 
sequencing and error detection 
Physical signal transmission, by individ- 
ual bits 
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OSI Security Service Matrix 
Services 
peer entity authentication 
~ ~ 
data origin authentication 
access control 
~~ ~ ~ 
connection confidentiality 
connec tionless confidentiality 
selective field confidentiality 
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Cryptography Placement Issues 
Data in Red is in the clear. 
Data in the Black is encrypted. 
Encryption takes place as data passes from the Red region to the 
Black region. 
Decryption takes place as data passes from the Black region to the 
Red region. 
Link Encryption -- Encryption is a link layer 
All Intermediate systems must be trusted 
Protects against compromise during transmission 
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Cryptography Placement Issues 
End-to-End Encryption 
Encryption is at application layer 
Application information is protected 
Potential for many attacks at lower protocol levels 
End System A End System B 
Cryptography Placement -- SlLS 
’ Standard for Interoperable LAN Security 
IEEE 802.10 LAN Security Working Group 
vendors, government, and users 
Security Services at layer 2 of OSI framework 
End System A 
RED 
3 1  
Intermediate 
System 
End System B 
m 
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Benefits and Disadvantages of SILS 
SILS Permits Routing 
Recall Layer 3 provides routing services 
Advantages 
0 routing may be optimized 
0 Many protocols exist at Layer 3, e.g. Novell, TCP/IP, etc. 
With encryption at Layer 2, all are supported - 
Disadvantages 
with encryption below the routing layer, then clear text must be 
available in intermediate systems 
the addresses provided by the source will not necessarily be used 
because the router may choose “better” addresses 
all routing paths used must be able to encrypt/decrypt so that desti- 
nation can decrypt and reconstruct the complete message 
Performance at high bandwidth may require multiplexing of mul- 
tiple cipher streams 
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Mixed Systems 
Here some systems use encryption while others do not 
End System A End System B 
I 
7 1  
I 
6 l  
I 
5 1  
I 
4 1  
3 1  
I 
I 
2 1  
I 





0 maintain DAC of End Systems 
separate messages according to security level 
keep encrypted and unencrypted information separate 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 9 Page A 1-297 
Mixed Systems - continued 
Red systems may be LANS 
inexpensive 
local protection 
use secure facilities 
do not need encryption, so performance is better 
must be trusted 
separate information by security level 
enforce DAC policy, which may include a policy regarding how 
messages will be routed when they are transmitted from the LAN 
Intermediate systems must be trusted 
must separate Red and Black 
must protect keys and cryptographic methods 
may need to select cryptography based upon message security 
levels 
routing policy may need to be enforced 
Black systems require no mandatory trust 
all messaged are treated as having same level 
DAC routing policy may need to be enforced 
may choose to protect communications lines against 
traffic analysis 
denial of service 
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~~ 
Where are Encryption Mechanisms Located? 
Within the host system 
If you want to use encryption at the application level 




need trusted system 
- separate Remlack 
- manage keys and cryptography 
- information is read from Red and written to Black 
As a front end device 
helps to localize encryption 
could be device on VO port 
could be card on system bus (part of hardware, but not “in” the 
host system) 





The Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) assumes that it is possible 
to evaluate a network under the TCSEC. 
implies that the network can be treated as if it were a monolithic 
computer sys tem 
Strategy is to partition the TCB both logically and physically 
among components of the network. 
This results in a Network TCB (NTCB). 
Evaluation procedure 
must have decomposition of overall network security policy into 
policies for individual components 
evaluate individual components 
use the network security architecture to support the assertion that 
the network is a sound composition of its components 
given a sound composition assert that since each supports its allo- 
cated policy correctly that overall network security policy is sup- 
ported We will inspect the rationale for doing this. 
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Network Security Policies 
Need to examine policy and how it will be allocated to Network com- 
ponents. 
Security Policy 
Security policy is broadly expressed in terms of people and informa- 
tion 
0 need a single uniform network security policy 
if there are multiple organizations involved, then the security pol- 
icy needs to be defined during the early stages of the network 
development process 
Mandatory Access Control Policy 
based on a comparison of labels associated with information with 
clearances of users. 
may need to merge systems of classes and clearances 
commercial organizations may have trivial MAC policies 
0 label-based, i.e., labels on data units and communications entities 
Discretionary Access Control Policy 
these are much more diverse 
- modes of access 
- composition of groups 
- kinds of named objects for access control 
- mechanisms to limit or propagate permission to access infor- 
mation 
expect intensive generalization of policy among organizations 
overall policy -- depends upon the underlying capabilities ascribed 
to the network 
based upon the identity of the entity requesting service 
- Host 
- Users 
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Network Supporting Policies 
Supporting Policy Issues: 
additional capabilities relating to accountability of individuals for 
security-relevant activities 
provide environment for enforcement and monitoring of MAC and 
DAC policies 
two major sub-categories 
Identification and Authentication 
supports MAC and DAC 
authenticates ID and clearance 
basis for determining group membership for DAC 
Audit 
security relevant events are uniquely associated with a user 
hold users accountable for actions 
for network, must formulate mutually acceptable set of overall sup- 
porting policies 
likely to be harder than DAC 
Network Security Policy Issues 
Formal Security Policy Model 
0 starting point for a chain of arguments leading to higher assurance 
0 form of model may be influenced by technical characteristics of 
system to be built 
- want intuitive resemblance to subjects, objects and access 
characteristics of intended implementation 
For each component in the network a Reference Monitor is needed. 
0 each Reference Monitor should have a Formal Security Policy 
Model (at Class B2 and above) 
0 do not need a Formal Security Policy Model for the entire network 
system 
instead must argue that each model represents the overall 
security policy 
- 
Security Policy Summary 
Must have a priori policy statements. 
For Class B2 and above, must have Formal Security Policy Models. 
Formal Security Policy Models are not required for supporting policy 
components. 
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Network TCB -- Introduction 
0 bjectives 
I .  a subject is confined to a single network component for its lifetime 
2. a subject may directly access only objects within its component 
3. every component contains a component Reference Monitor which 
4. communications channels which link components do not compro- 
If a network succeeds in achieving the points described above, then 
its collection of Reference Monitors constitute a comprehensive net- 
work 
mediates all access which are made locally. 
mise information 
Reference Monitor 
all network accesses are mediated 
there are no non-local accesses 
the network Reference Monitor cannot be tampered with 
no component reference monitor can be tampered with. 
We need to design the network so that the above axioms can be vali- 
dated. 
i 
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Method to Achieve Objectives 
Confine Subjects 
Subjects must be confined to a single component. 
notion of a <process, domain> pair for a subject 
limit objects to the same component 
must assure that no domain encompasses objects from 
another component 
- 
0 remote processes result in the creation of a new subject in the 
remote component. 
Objects in Local Component 
Subjects can directly access objects only within the component with 
which the subject is associated. 
What about information being transmitted between components? 
information “in motion” is not treated as an object 
0 if it is not an object then it cannot be access until it “comes to 
rest” 
Components Contain Component Reference Monitor 
0 in some components a degenerate component reference monitor 
may suffice 
- this means that if the component is single level the reference 
monitor is degenerate 
no accesses need be checked because 
1.al1 objects have the same label 
2.all subjects have the same class 
- 
recall that each component reference monitor needs to enforce 
only the policy pertinent to the particular component’s local 
accesses 
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Special Concerns for Distributed TCBs 
Fragmented TCB Domain 
Trusted Paths Between Components 
Trusted Protocols 
Fau It tolerance 
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Fraamented TCB Domain 
Monolithic system 
all aspects of security state are local 
all aspects of security state are immediately available 
state transitions are well defined 
Distributed system 
many devices 
0 maintaining integrity of TCB more difficult 
A single device may not comprise totality of all system integrity 
constraints 
- Delays possible 
- No guarantees of stability 
Concurrent transitions at various locations may no. permi 
ordering of state transitions 
>tal 
Security state may be replicated, consistency must be maintained 
Labels must be consistent 
Methods for comparing labels must be consistent 
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Trusted Paths Between Components 
Must provide assurance that TCB data is passed in a trusted path 
Trusted Path must provide 
message received from trusted path originated from a trusted 
source 
message received from trusted path was not modified 
labels of messages sent on the trusted path have not been altered 
message ordering is preserved on pair-wise trusted paths 
- prevents replays 
- this may be optional 
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Trusted Protocols 
Protocol interpreters at different OSI levels may need to be trusted 
Implementation of Trusted Path 
0 Insert into protocol interpreters at Transport level or below 
- 
- expensive to verify 
delivery assurances may be part of protocol 
0 Or, use cryptographic authentication with end-to-end transport 
level protocol 
- need not guarantee delivery 
- not too expensive to verify 
Implement System-level atomic State Transitions 
May need application level protocols for making global state tran- 
sitions. 
Very difficult to verify 
System-level Concurrency Control 
Use to achieve atomic state transitions 
~~ 
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Fa u It to I e ran ce 
Everything may not function all of the time 
Must have fail-secure properties 
even though something is not working, the system is still secure 
just show that failure states are secure 
do not worry about the "usual" safety issues 
- progress 
- termination 
- delivery of service 
Denial of Service 
People do worry about this 
System should be designed to provide partial policy enforcement 
in the face of failures 
example: DAC could still work even though only one security 
level might be serviced within a LAN on a distributed system 
- 
Traditional fault-tolerant techniques can be applied to TCB rele- 
vant data 
BLACKER 
Multilevel secure, with compartments 
Class A1 (but pre-TNI) 
Complete development but future use problematic 
sys-high to sys-low sys-high to sys-low FI lz”l 












I router I 
LAN 
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Blacker Overview 
Secure System Applique to Defense Data Network (DDN) 
Major Components 
Blacker Front End 
Smart encryption box between host and Packet Switch 
Blacker Initialization Parameters Carrier 
hand-held device for initializing BFEs 
Access Control Center (ACC) 
maintains authorization tables 
0 controls permissions for hosts to exchange messages 
security officer activity 
maintains audit trails 
0 triggers auditing alarms 
Key Distribution Center (KDC) 
distributes encryption keys to BFEs under direction of ACC 
B I ac ke r “ Domain ” 
1OOOBFE’s 




- (Note that for reliability ACCs and KDCs were replicated) 
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Red/Black Separation achieved through COMPUSEC 
Security Kernel used to separate Red and Black 
Traditional has crypto device “sandwiched” between Red and 
Black 
- Double the hardware cost 
- 
Kernel 
Must synchronize Red/Black -- difficult 
- Separates Red/Black 
- Manages Crypto as MLS device 
Secure Network Interface 
SNI, AKA Blacker Front End (BFE) 
Transparent: 
Network interface presented to host 
Host interface presented to network 
Separates 
Host- to- hos t shared keys 
Security Levels 
Enforce a connectivity property 
A host may send or receive messages over a crypto connection only if 




Automatic Crypt0 Key Support 
obtains keys on demand 
rekeys connections 
Obtains permissions from SCC/ACC and through them enforces 
access control 
When SCC/ACC and KCC/KDC are unavailable, emergency mode 
for secure communications 
Connection Data base 
new connections added only if received by trusted path from SCC via 
KCC 
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. . . .. - 
Access Control Center 
Security Control Center, a.k.a Access Control Center (ACC) 
Mediates 
request for connection between source and destination 
request for mediation comes from SNI/BFE 
Message security level must be within ranges of source and desti- 
nation 
Source and destination must be on each others DAC lists 
If successful will request that KCC/KDC generate keys for the 
connection 
Security Administration 
Access Control Database 
Security Administration Interface 
Generates data to initialize SNIs 
Maintains configuration database of host/SNI sites 
Within a Domain 
Replicated SCCs 
two phase commit used for consistency 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 9 Page A 1-3 14 
~ 
Key Distribution Center 
KCC, a.k.a. Key Distribution Center 
All keys are encrypted 
Must communicate with BFEs at hosts’ security level 
- therefore MLS 
- 
- 
Use crypto seals for all imports/exports associated with KDC 
Cryptoseals makes KDC similar to a security Guard 
Centralized Key Management 
Distribution of Keys controlled by Access Control Center 
Separate administration of COMSEC and Access Control concerns 
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Overview of TCP/IP lnternals 
The Protocols 
TCP/IP is a suite of protocols including TCP and IP, UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol), ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol), 
and several others. 
TCP/IP protocol suite does not conform exactly to the Open Sys- 
tems Interconnection's seven layer model, but rather is pictured as 
shown: 
> 
NETWORK LAYER P 
I IP Pa& I PHYSICAL LAVER 
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Overview of TCP/IP lnternals 
The IP layer receives packets delivered by lower-level layers and 
passes the packets "up" to the higher-layer TCP or UDP layers. 
and also transmits packets that have been received from the TCP 
or UDP layers to the lower-level layer. 
IP packets are unreliable datagram because IP does nothing to 
ensure that IP packets are delivered in sequential order or are not 
damaged by errors. 
The IP packets contain the source address of the host from which 
the packet was sent, and the destination address of the host that is 
to receive the packet. 
TCP and UDP services generally assume that the source address 
in a packet is valid when accepting a packet. 
IP address forms the basis of authentication for many services; the 
services trust that the packet has been sent from a valid host and 
that host is indeed who it says it is. 
IP contains an option known as IP Source Routing, which can be 
used to specify a direct route to a destination and return path back 
to the origination. A source routed IP packet, to some TCP and 
UDP services, appears to come from the last system in the route as 
opposed to coming from the true origination. 
IP source address is problematic and can lead to break-ins and 
intruder activity; furthermore it can be used to trick systems into 
permitting connections from systems that otherwise would not be 
permitted to connect. 
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Overview of TCPIIP lnternals 
TCP 
If the IP packets contain encapsulated TCP packets, the IP soft- 
ware will pass them "up" to the TCP software layer. TCP sequen- 
tially orders the packets and performs error correction, and 
implements virtual circuits, or connections between hosts. The 
TCP packets contain sequence numbers and acknowledgments of 
received packets so that packets received out of order can be reor- 
dered and damaged packets can be retransmitted. 
Connection oriented services, such as TELNET, FTP, rlogin, X 
Windows, and SMTP, require a high degree of reliability and 
therefore use TCP. DNS uses TCP in some cases (for transmitting 
and receiving domain name service databases), but uses UDP for 
transmitting information about individual hosts. 
UDP 
UDP interacts with application programs at the same relative layer 
as TCP. However, there is no error correction or retransmission of 
misordered or lost packets. UDP is therefore not used for connec- 
tion-oriented services that need a virtual circuit. It is used for ser- 
vices that are query-response oriented, such as NFS. 
0 It is easier to spoof UDP packets than TCP packets, since there is 
no initial connection setup (handshake) involved. 
ICMP 
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) is at the same relative 
layer as IP; its purpose is to transmit information needed to control 
IP traffic. ICMP redirect messages inform hosts about more accu- 
rate routes to other systems, whereas ICMP unreachable messages 
indicate problems with a route. Additionally, ICMP can cause 
TCP connections to terminate "gracefully" if the route becomes 
unavailable (ping is a commonly-used ICMP-based service). 
ICMP redirect messages can be used to trick routers and hosts act- 
ing as routers into using "false" routes; these false routes would 
aid in directing traffic to an attacker's system instead of a legiti- 
mate trusted system. This could in turn lead to an attacker gaining 
access to systems that normally would not permit connections to 
the attacker's system or network. 
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Overview of TCP/IP lnternals 
TCP and UDP Port Structure 
TCP and UDP services generally have a client-server relationship. 
(example - TELNET) 
A TCP or UDP connection is uniquely identified by 
- source IP address - the address of the system that sent the 
packet 
destination IP address - the address of the system that 
receives the packet 
- source port - the connection's port at the source system 
- destination port - the connection's port at the destination sys- 
tem. 
[There is a somewhat-uniform rule that only privileged server 
processes, i.e., those processes that operate with U N E  supe- 
ruser privileges, can use port numbers less than 1024 
(referred to as privileged ports).] 
- 
- 
Example - how ports are used for sending and receiving 
messages 
The TELNET server listens for incoming messages on port 23, and 
sends outgoing messages to port 23. A TELNET client, on the same 
or different system, would first request an unused port number from 
the operating system, and then use this port when sending and receiv- 
ing messages. It would place this port number, say 3097, in packets 
destined for the TELNET server so that the server, when responding 
to the client, could place the client's port number in its TCP packets. 
The client's host, upon receiving a message, would examine the port 
and know which TELNET client should receive the message. 
123.4.58-3097 t o  123.45.30-23 
4123.45.30-23 to 123.4.58-3097 - 
123.4.5.0 - C h t   123.4.5.30 - Savor 
Internet security problems 
Contributing Factors : 
Internet was not designed to be very secure. 
Phenomenal success of the Internet. 
Introduction of different types of users. 
Vulnerable TCP/IP services - a number of the TCP/IP services are 
not secure and can be compromised by knowledgeable intruders. 
Services used in the local area networking environment for 
improving network management are especially vulnerable. 
Ease of spying and spoofing - the majority of Internet tr&c is 
unencrypted; e-mail, passwords, and file transfers can be moni- 
tored and captured using readily-available software, intruders can 
then reuse passwords to break into systems. 
The role and importance of system management is often short- 
changed in job descriptions, resulting in many administrators 
being, at best, part-time and poorly prepared 
Lack of policy - many sites are configured unintentionally for 
wide-open Internet access without regard for the potential for 
abuse from the Internet; many sites permit more TCP/IP services 
than they require for their operations and do not attempt to limit 
access to information about their computers that could prove valu- 
able to intruders. 
Complexity of configuration - host security access controls are 
often complex to configure and monitor; controls that are acciden- 
tally misconfigured often result in unauthorized access. 
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Internet security problems 
Use of weak, static passwords. 
Passwords can be “cracked” a number of different ways, however 
the two most common methods are by cracking the encrypted 
form of the password and by monitoring communications chan- 
nels for password packets. 
The UNIX operating system usually stores an encrypted form of 
passwords in a fle that can be read by normal users. The password 
file can be obtained by simply copying it or via a number of other 
intruder methods. Once the file is obtained, an intruder can run 
readily-available password cracking programs against the pass- 
words to obtain passwords that can be used to gain access into the 
system. 
Host Authentication 
Some TCP or UDP services are able to authenticate only to the 
granularity of host addresses and not to specific users. 
- For example, an NFS (UDP) server cannot grant access to a 
specific user on a host, it must grant access to the entire host. 
The administrator of a server may trust a specific user on a 
host and wish to grant access to that user, but the administra- 
tor has no control over other users on that host and is thus 
forced to grant access to all users (or grant no access at all). 
Ease of Spyi nglMonitoring 
When a user connects to hisher account on a remote host using 
TELNET or FTP, the user’s password travels across in plaintext 
making the passwords susceptible to direct packet monitoring or 
network sniffers. 
Electronic mail - Most users do not encrypt e-mail, yet many 
assume that e-mail is secure and thus safe for transmitting sensi- 
tive information. 
The X Window System permits multiple windows to be opened at 
a workstation, along with display of graphics and multi-media 
applications (for example, the WWW browser Mosaic). Intruders 
can sometimes open windows on other systems and read key- 
strokes that could contain passwords or sensitive information. 
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Internet security problems 
Ease of Spoofing 
Recall that the IP address of a host is presumed to be valid and is 
therefore trusted by TCP and UDP services. Using IP source rout- 
ing, an attacker's host can masquerade as a trusted host or client. 
An example: 
1. the attacker would change her host's IP address to match that of 
the trusted client, 
2. the attacker would then construct a source route to the server that 
specifies the direct path the IP packets should take to the server 
and should take from the server back to the attacker's host, using 
the trusted client as the last hop in the route to the server, 
3. the attacker sends a client request to the server using the source 
route, 
4. the server accepts the client request as if it came directly from 
the trusted client and returns a reply to the trusted client, 
5. the trusted client, using the source route, forwards the packet on 
to the attacker's host. 
An even simpler method for spoofing a client is to wait until the 
client system is turned off and then impersonate the client's sys- 
tem. Personal computers often use NFS to obtain access to server 
directories and files (NFS uses IP addresses only to authenticate 
clients). An attacker could, after hours, configure a personal com- 
puter with the same name and IP address as another's, and then ini- 
tiate connections to the UNIX host as if it were the "real" client. 
(likely would be an insider attack). 
Electronic mail on the Internet is particularly easy to spoof and, 
without enhancements such as digital signatures, generally cannot 
be trusted. The exchange takes place when Internet hosts exchange 
mail uses a simple protocol consisting of ASCII-character com- 
mands. An intruder easily could enter these commands by hand by 
using TELNET to connect directly to a system's Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol ( S M T P )  port. The receiving host trusts that the 
sending host is who it says it is, thus the origin of the mail can be 
spoofed easily by entering a sender address that is different from 
the true address. As a result, any user, without privileges, can fal- 
sify or spoof e-mail. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Compufer Security Section 10 Page A 1-325 
Firewalls 
Why a Firewall? 
The purpose of an Internet firewall is to provide a single point of 
defense with controlled and audited access to services, both from 
within and without an organizations private network. 
I. Protection from vulnerable services. 
2. Controlled access to site systems. 
3. Concentrated Security. 
4. Enhanced privacy. 
5. Logging and statistics on network use or misuse. 
6. Policy enforcement. 
Issues and Problems with Firewalls 
Restricted access to desirable services, such as TELNET, FTP, X 
Windows, NFS. 
If unrestricted modem access is still permitted into a site protected 
by a firewall, attackers could effectively jump around the firewall. 
Firewalls generally do not provide protection from insider threats. 
MBONE - Multicast IP transmissions (MBONE) for video and 
voice are encapsulated in other packets; firewalls generally for- 
ward the packets without examining the packet contents. 
Viruses - Firewalls do not protect against users downloading virus- 
infected personal computer programs from Internet archives or 
transferring such programs in attachments to e-mail. 
Throughput - Firewalls represent a potential bottleneck, since all 
connections must pass through the firewall and, in some cases, be 
examined by the firewall. 
All eggs in single basket - A firewall system concentrates security 
in one spot as opposed to distributing it among systems. A com- 
promise of the firewall could be disastrous to other less-protected 
systems on the subnet. 
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Internet security problems 
Design Decisions 
0 There are two fundamental philosophies that determine the overall 
configuration of a firewall (The distinction in these two philoso- 
phies cannot be overemphasized): 
“That which is not expressly permitted is prohibited.” 
- The firewall must be designed to block everything, and ser- 
vices must be enabled on a case-by-case basis. 
This approach is the easiest from an administrator’s point of 
view since it provides a more “fail-safe” stance and does not 
demand that the administrator possess exception skills in the 
maintaining security of the system. 
- 
“That which is not expressly prohibited is permitted.” 
The system administrator is placed in reactive mode to the 
actions of the user. Although this offers the user the greatest 
flexibility, it often pits the user against the administrator. 
This approach requires that the administrator anticipate what 
users will do and requires considerable skill in auditing and 
maintaining the overall security of the network. 
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Firewall Basics 
Packet Filtering 
A packet filtering router usually can filter IP packets based on 
some or all of the following fields: 
- source IP address, 
- destination IP address, 
- TCP/UDP source port, and 
- TCP/UDP destination port. 
A site might wish to block connections from certain addresses, or 
block connections from all addresses external to the site (with cer- 
tain exceptions, such as with SMTP for receiving e-mail). 
If a firewall can block TCP or UDP connections to or from specific 
ports, then one can implement policies that call for certain types of 
connections to be made to specific hosts, but not other hosts. 
Packet Flltering Router 
1ncerne-t 
Representation of Packet Filtering on TELNET and SMTP. 
I 
I 
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Firewall Basics 
An example of packet filtering rules: 
Type Source Addr Dest Addr Source Part Dest Port Action 
tcp * 123.4.5.6 > 1023 23 permit 
tcp * 123.4.5.7 > 1023 25 permit 
tcp * 123.4.5.8 > 1023 25 permit 
tcp 129.6.48.254 123.4.5.9 > 1023 119 permit 
UdP * 1 2 3 . 4 ~ ~  > 1023 123 permit 





Port 23 is the port associated with the TELNET. 
Port 25 is the port associated with the SMTP. 
Port 119 is the port associated with the NNTP. 
Port 123 is the port associated with the NTP. 
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Firewall Basics 
App I icat ion Gateways 
To counter some of the weaknesses associated with packet filtering 
routers, firewalls need to use software applications to forward and 
filter connections for services such as TELNET and FTP. Such an 
application is referred to as a proxy service, while the host running 
the proxy service is referred to as an application gateway. 
An example of an application gateway: 
As an example, consider a site that blocks all incoming TELNET 
and FTP connections using a packet filtering router. The router 
allows TELNET and FTP packets to go to one host only, the TEL- 
N E T m P  application gateway. A user who wishes to connect 
inbound to a site system would have to connect first to the applica- 
tion gateway, and then to the destination host, as follows: 
I .  a user first telnets to the application gateway and enters the name 
2. the gateway checks the user's source IP address and accepts or 
3. the user may need to authenticate herself (possibly using a one- 
4. the proxy service creates a TELNET connection between the 
5. the proxy service then passes bytes between the two connec- 
6. the application gateway logs the connection. 
of an internal host, 
rejects it according to any access criteria in place, 
time password device), 
gateway and the internal host, 
tions, and 
Unauth&lcst;cd E L N E T .  
Pirewall *tern 
w4Mvanced Authrmtlcatlon SW 
Virtual Connection Implemented by an Application Gateway and Proxy Services. 
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Firewall Basics 
Benefits of Application Gateways 
Proxy services allow only those services through for which there 
is a proxy. 
The names of internal systems need not necessarily be made 
known via DNS to outside systems. 
Application traffic can be pre-authenticated before it reaches inter- 
nal hosts and can be logged more effectively. 
Cost-effective because third-party software or hardware for 
authentication or logging need be located only at the application 
gateway. 
Rules at the packet filtering router will be less complex since the 
router need only allow application traffic destined for the applica- 
tion gateway and reject the rest. 
An e-mail application gateway serves to centralize e-mail collec- 
tion and distribution to internal hosts and users. To outside users, 
all internal users would have e-mail addresses of the form: 
user@ emailhost 
The gateway would accept mail from outside users and then for- 
ward mail along to other internal systems as necessary. Users 
sending e-mail from internal systems could send it directly from 
their hosts, or in the case where internal system names are not 
known outside the protected subnet, the mail would be sent to the 
application gateway, which could then forward the mail to the des- 
tination host. 
Application gateways are used generally for TELNET, FTP and e- 
mail, as well as for X Windows and some other services. The 
application gateway can filter the FI'P protocol and deny all puts 
to the anonymous FTP server; thus ensuring that nothing can be 
uploaded to the server. 
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Packet Filtering Firewall 
The most common and easiest to employ for small, uncomplicated 
sites. 
The site systems usually have direct access to the Internet while all 
or most access to site systems from the Internet is blocked. 
Usually, inherently-dangerous services such as NIS, NFS, and X 
Windows are blocked. 
5 i i  systsrn5 
Packet Filtering Firewall. 
Disadvantages 
Little or no logging capability. 
Packet filtering rules are often difficult to test thoroughly. 
If complex filtering rules are required, the filtering rules may 
become unmanageable. 
Each host will require its own copy of advanced authentication 
measures. 
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Dual-homed Gateway Firewall 
A host system with two network interfaces with the host's IP for- 
warding capability disabled (i.e., the host can no longer route 
packets between the two connected networks). 
Services and access to site services is provided by proxy servers 
on the gateway. 
Simple firewall, yet very secure. 
The router can prevent direct Internet access to the firewall and 
force access to go through the firewall. If direct access is permitted 
to the server (which is the less secure alternative), then the server's 
name and IP address can be advertised by DNS. Locating the 
information server between the gateway and the router also adds to 
the security of the site, as any intruder penetration of the informa- 
tion server would still be prevented from reaching site systems by 
the dual-homed gateway. 
Inwrnct 
AlIAppRGatl~TraRk 
# HT"/&phcr/FmApplbUon r& 
Dual-homed Gateway Firewall with Router. 
Design policy - deny all services unless they are specifically per- 
mitted, since no services pass except those for which proxies exist. 
Achieves a higher degree of privacy since the names and IP 
addresses of site systems are hidden from Internet systems, 
because the firewall does not pass DNS information. 
The firewall can house software to require users to use authentica- 
tion tokens or other advanced authentication measures. 
The firewall can also log access and log attempts or probes to the 
system that might indicate intruder activity. 
The security of the host system used for the firewall must be very 
secure, as the use of any vulnerable services or techniques on the 
host could lead to break-ins. 
NPS CiSR CS3600 - introduction to Computer Security Section 10 Page A 1 -333 
Screened Host Firewall 
More flexible firewall than the dual-homed gateway firewall, but is 
less secure. 
Combines a packet-filtering router with an application gateway 
located on the protected subnet side of the router. 
The router filters inherently dangerous protocols 
Router rejects (or accepts) application traffic according to the fol- 
lowing rules: 
application traffic from Internet sites to the application gate- 
way gets routed, 
- all other traffic from Internet sites gets rejected, and 
- the router rejects any application traffic originating from the 




All Appllcatlon TMMC 
Other Trusted Traffic 
Application Gateway 
Screened Host Firewall. 
Needs only one network interface and does not require a separate 
subnet between the application gateway and the router. 
Permits the router to pass certain trusted services “around” the 
application gateway and directly to site systems. 
There are now two systems, the router and the application gate- 
way, that need to be configured carefully. 
Opens up the possibility that the policy can be violated. 
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Screened Subnet Firewall 
Can be used to locate each component of the firewall on a separate 
system, thereby achieving greater throughput and flexibility. 
Two routers are used to create an inner, screened subnet 
Internet 




Screened Subnet Firewall with Additional Systems. 
No site system is directly reachable from the Insne t  and vice 
versa. 
Routers are used to direct traffic to specific systems, thereby elim- 
inating the need for the application gateway to be dual-homed. 
Appropriate for sites with large amounts of traffic or sites that 
need very high-speed traffic. 
The two routers provide redundancy since an attacker would have 
to subvert both routers. 
~ 
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Integrating Modem Pools with Firewalls 
App1icat;iot-i Catcway 
Modem Pool Placement with Screened Host Firewall. 
Internet 
Internet Site Eiy5tcrns 
Appllcatlon Gatway * +. 
Dial-in 
Modem Pool Placement with Screened Subnet and Dual-Homed Firewalls. 




System Eva1 ua tions 
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Evaluation Issues 
Important Evaluation Criteria 
These criteria do not specify or address how to implement the 
required security features. 
NCSC Criteria 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
a.k.a. Orange Book 
a.k.a. Criteria 
Ties assurance with features. 
More on following slides. 
Federal Criteria for Information Technology 
Secu r i ty 
Intended to be joint NCSC/NIST standard. 
Attempts to establish protection profiles in order to achieve greater 
flexibility over TCSEC. 
Rejected 
- scientifically unsound 
- politics 
Common Criteria 
Currently in Draft form. 
Uses protection profiles. 
Attempt to harmonize criteria of EC, US, and Canada. 
Highly flexibility is an objective. 
Threat perspective. 
Considered by some to be dangerous because of arbitrary mix of 
features and assurance. 
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TCSEC Issues 
The TCSEC defines four basic divisions; A, B, C 
and D. 
Class A designates the highest level of assurance of policy 
enforcement. 
Within a division, numbers are used to designate a finer distinction 
of levels, (i.e., B1, B2, B3). 
A greater number indicates higher assurance. 
Classes C through Class B1 might be add on measures to existing 
operating system 
At Class B2 and above security must be included in system design. 
Class A1 systems subjected to formal methods. 
TCSEC class requirements are cumulative. 
- Division D is failure 
The TCSEC analysis of systems is divided into 





Each requirements area is divided into a number 
of finer requirements. 
Lower assurance systems (e.g., C2) must satisfy a specific set of 
these requirements. 
Higher assurance systems (e.g., B2) must satisfy a larger specific 
set of these requirements. 
The Highest assurance systems (Al) must satisfy all of these 
requirements. 
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TCSEC Requirements Chart 




Exportation of Labeled Information 
Labeling Human Readable Output 
Mandatory Access Control 
Subject Sensitivity Labels 
I DeviceLabels 




Trusted Facility Management 
~ 
b e d  Diskbution 
I Security Features User’s Guide I 
Trusted Facility Manual 
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TCSEC Requirements 
Security Policy 
Discretionary Access Control 
Object reuse 
When a storage object (page frame, disk sector, magnetic tape, 
etc.) is initially assigned, allocated or reallocated to a subject, the 
TCB will ensure that the object contains no residual data. 
Labels 
This is a requirement for labels (sensitivity or integrity) associated 
with each system resource (e.g., subject, object). 
- Label Integrity - Exported labels shall accurately reflect inter- 
nal labels. 
- Exportation of Labeled Information - VO devices will be 
labeled either single-level or multilevel. 
Labeling of Human Readable Output - The TCB will mark human 
readable output. 
Mandatory Access Control 
Subject Sensitive Labels 
The TCB will notify each terminal user of each change in the 
security level associated with the user. 
Device Labels 
Minimum and maximum security levels will be assigned to all 
attached devices. 
Accountability 
Identification and Authentication 
Audit 
Trusted Path 




The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution that is pro- 
tected from tampering. It shall be internally structured in well- 
defined largely independent modules. It shall make effective use of 
available hardware to separate those elements that are protection- 
critical from those that are not. 
System Integrity 
There shall be features that can be used to periodically validate the 
correct operation of the hardware and fmnware elements of the 
TCB . 
Security Testing 
The security mechanisms shall be tested. 
Design Specification and Verification 
Formal or informal models shall be used to verify system correct- 
ness. 
Covert Channel Analysis . 
The developer shall conduct a through search for covert channels 
and make a determination of the maximum bandwidth of each 
identified channel. 
Trusted Facility Management 
The TCB shall support separate operator and administrator func- 
tions. 
Configuration Management 
A configuration management system shall be used. 
Trusted Recovery 
Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided that can recover 
a system without a comprise of protection. 
Trusted Distribution 
Trusted distribution facilities shall be used. 





New or enhanced requirement 
No additional requirement 
Security Features User’s Guide 
A summary of protection mechanisms. 
@ 
* 
Trusted Facility Manual 
An administrator manual about running a secure facility. 
Test Documentation 
Documentation of the test plan and test results. 
Design Documentation 
A description of the design. 
The following symbols are used in the chart on the next 
Page. 
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TCSEC Requirements Chart 
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Class D and C1 
Class D Systems: Minimal Security 
There are no evaluated systems in this class. 
Class C1 Systems: Discretionary Security 
Protection 
C1 systems provide rather limited security features. 
e C1 systems are an environment of "cooperating users processing 
data at the same level of security." 
Two main features: 
- I and A, e.g., passwords 
- Does not require a distinction between read, write and exe- 
cute. 
- Allows wildcards. E.g., M* = all users whose names begin 
with M. 
- DAC 
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Class C2 
Class C2 Systems: Controlled Access Protection 
Accountability through password controls and audit. 
More detailed discretionary controls. 
Object reuse requirement. 
DON CAP Program (C2 by 92) 
Controlled Access Protection (CAP) Guidebook 
(NAVSO P-5239-15) 
Functional interpretation of “Class C2” requirements. 
Describes minimum set of automated controls for a system. 
All DON systems must be assessed for CAP compliance. 
All DON systems are considered to process “sensitive unclassi- 
fied” data as a minimum and therefore must adhere to “Class C2” 
requirements due to data aggregation and connectivity. 
Waivers may be granted but must be reviewed annually. 
CAP Assessments 
Basic 
Used to determine if a set of CAP features exist in a product (doc- 
umentation review) 
Detailed 
Used to determine whether CAP features function as described or 
claimed 
Recognized-A uthority 
Compliance assessments by: 
- NCSC (National Computer Security Center) 
- NESSEC (Naval Electronic Sys. Security Eng. Center) 
- N R L  (Naval Research Laboratory) 
- AFCSC (Air Force Cryptologic Support Center) 
c 2  Advantages - Abuse of authority, Direct probing. 
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Class B1 
Class B1 Systems: Labeled Security Protection 
An informal or formal model of the Security Policy is required. 
All "major" objects are required labeled and these labels are used 
to enforce a MAC policy. 
B 1 is often call "C2 with labels", since B1 systems do not require 
much more assurance than C2 systems. 
The labels must be implemented in a way such that a system has 
the potential to support different Human Readable Labels. 
- The internal labels are probably just numbers and a Human 
Readable Label Manager maps the numbers to the Human 
Readable Labels. 
- DoD might use Top Secret, Secret, etc. 
- Non-DoD might use Sensitive, Non-sensitive, etc. 
Requires a Security Officer. 
Requires Security Officer documentation. 
- Administration of labels 
- Securely manage user clearances. 
Requires Human Readable Labels on output. 
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Class B1 Summary 
Advantages 
Prevention and Detection 
Abuse of Authority 
Direct Probing 
Some Protection Against Probing with Malicious Soft ware 
Risks 
Direct Penetration 
Subversion of Mechanism 
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Class B2 
High Assurance versus Low Assurance 
Systems rated at class B 1 and below are commonly referred to as 
"low assurance" systems. 
Systems rated at B2 and above are commonly referred to as "high 
assurance" systems. 
Class B2 Systems: Structured Protection 
Not much additional user-visible security features. 
Instead, B2 has extended features and additional assurance that the 
features were designed to work properly. 
The system is relatively resistant to penetration. 
Requirements: 
Formal Security Policy Model. 
MAC for all subjects and objects. 
Greater isolation for Security Kernel. 
Methodical configuration management. 
- Protects against illicit modifications. 
Greater use of modularity and use of hardware features. 
Trusted path. 
Covert channel analysis. 
Identification and isolation of non-security relevant code. 
Penetration testing will augment interface testing. 
NPS ClSR CS3600 - Introduction to Computer Security Section 1 1 Page A 1-350 
Class 82 Summary 
Advantages 
Prevention and Detection 
Abuse of Authority 
Direct Probing 
Some Protection Against Probing with Malicious Software 
Some Protection Against Direct Penetration 
Risks 
Direct Penetration 
Subversion of Mechanism 
~~ ~ 
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Class B3 
Class B3 Systems: Security Domains 
There are no new user-visible features. 
Must satisfy Reference Monitor implementation requirements. 
- Simple 
- Tamper-proof 
- Impossible to bypass 
Exclude code from Security Kernel that is not security relevant. 
Highly resistant to penetration. 
Trusted Facility Management. 
- Assignment of specific individual as security officer. 
Requires Trusted Recovery. 
Class 83 Summary 
Advantages 
Prevention and Detection 
Abuse of Authority 
Protection against Direct Probing 
I Some Protection Against Probing with Malicious Soft ware 
Significant Protection Against Direct Penetration 
Some Protection Against Subversion of Mechanism 
Risks 
Subversion of Mechanism 
I 
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Class A1 
Class A1 Systems: Verified Protection 
Pretty much functionally equivalent to B3 systems. 
Trusted Distribution is the only new feature. 
Additional assurance provided by: 
Formal analysis and mathematical proof that the system design 
matches the system’s security policy and its design specifications. 
Trusted Distribution 
- This decreases the possibility of subversion during distribu- 
tion, i.e., replacement of TCB parts. 










Formal Top Level Specification can be analyzed by computer tools 
to find all covert storage channels. 
Class A1 Summary 
Advantages 
Prevention and Detection 
Abuse of Authority 
Protection against Direct Probing 
Protection Against Probing with Malicious Soft ware 
Increased Assurance Against Direct Penetration 
Increased Assurance Against Subversion of Mechanism 
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TCSEC Security Requirements 
Class C2 
Security Req u i rem e n t s Overview 
Controlled Access 
Protection 
Class D Minimal Protection 
Class B1 




Class B2 I Structured Protec- 
tion 
Reserved for systems that have been evaluated but fail to 
meet the requirements for a higher evaluation class. 
Nominally satisfies the discretionary security require- 
ments by providing separation of users and data. It incor- 
porates some form of credible controls capable of 
enforcing access limitations on an individual basis, i.e., 
suitable for allowing users to be able to protect project or 
private information and to keep other users from acciden- 
tally reading or destroying their data. The class C1 envi- 
ronment is expected to be one of cooperating users 
processing data at the same level(s) of sensitivity. 
Enforce a more finely grained discretionary access con- 
trol than C1 systems, making users individually account- 
able for their actions through login procedures, auditing 
of security-relevant events, and resource isolation. 
All features of class C2 are required. In addition, an 
informal statement of the security policy model, data 
labeling, and mandatory access control over named sub- 
jects and objects must be present. The capability must 
exist for accurately labeling exported information. Any 
flaws identified during testing must be removed. 
Based on a clearly defined and documented formal secu- 
rity policy model that requires the discretionary and man- 
datory access control enforcement found in B 1 systems to 
be extended to all subjects and objects in the ADP sys- 
tem. In addition, covert channels are addressed. The TCB 
must be carefully structured into protection-critical and 
non-protection-critical elements. The TCB interface is 
well defined and the TCB design and implementation 
enable it to be subjected to more thorough testing and 
more complete review. Authentication mechanisms are 
strengthened, trusted facility management is provided in 
the form of support for system administrator and operator 
functions, and stringent configuration management con- 
trols are imposed. The system is relatively resistant to 
penetration. 
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Must satisfy the reference monitor requirements that 
mediate all accesses of subjects to objects, be tamper- 
proof, and be small enough to be subjected to analysis 
and tests. To this end, the TCB is structured to exclude 
code not essential to security policy enforcement, with 
significant system engineering during TCB design and 
implementation directed toward minimizing its complex- 
ity. A security administrator is supported, audit mecha- 
nisms are expanded to signal security-relevant events, and 
system recovery procedures are required. The system is 
highly resistant to penetration. 
Functionally equivalent to B3 in that no additional archi- 
tectural features or policy requirements are added. The 
distinguishing feature of this class is the analysis derived 
from formal design specification and verification tech- 
niques and the resulting high degree of assurance that the 
TCB is correctly implemented. 
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TPEP Program 
NCSC Trusted Product Evaluation Program 
(TPEP) 
Resulted from DoD Directive 5215.1 in 1982. 
The NSA is responsible for evaluating commercial products 
through an independent evaluation based on TCSEC requirements 
by a qualified team of experts. 
TPEP phases: 
- Proposal phase 
- Vendor assistance phase 
- Design analysis phase 
- Evaluation phase 
- Rating Maintenance Phase (RAMP) 
TPEP Guidelines and Interpretations 
a.k.a. The Rainbow Series 
Guidelines 
- A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in 
Trusted Systems 
- A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in Trusted 
Systems 
- A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in 
Trusted Systems 
- A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems 




- Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) 
- Trusted Database Interpretation (TDI) 
Evaluated Products List (EPL) 
List of products that have completed evaluations and those that are 
in evaluation. 
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TPEP RAMP Program 
Rating Maintenance Phase (RAMP) 
Reason for RAMP. 
- Frequency of new releases. 
- Limited evaluation resources. 
Goals 
- Keep EPL populated with trusted products. 
Approach 
- Use qualified vendor personnel (VSAs). 
- Same level of detail as original evaluation. 
Applicability of RAMP 
- All products evaluated against TCSEC, TNI, TDI. 
ScopeofRAMP 
- At B2 and above NSA Future Change Review Board decides 
if proposed changes are appropriate for RAMP. 
- At B 1 and below the Technical Review Board decides if pro- 
posed changes are appropriate for RAMP. 
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Balanced Assurance 
Technically Sound 
Security Architectures Use TCB Subsets 
Require Greatest Assurance for Most Critical Policies 
Enforcement Mechanism for Most Critical Policies is Most 
Privileged 
Commercially At tractive 
Can Build System Using Incrementally Evaluated Components 
Permits High Assurance Where Critical 
Does not Impose High Assurance Requirements 
Unnecessarily 





Database Management System 5 5 
(Elements, rows, etc.) 5 
Lower Assurance 
High Assurance 
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Architecture Before Networking 
Unclassi 
Separate systems 
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Single-Level Connection Architecture 
Unclassified 
Systems Connected at a Single Security Level 
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Networked Balanced Assurance Architecture 
Systems Connected Through A High Assurance Guard 
With one minor caveat, one could argue convincingly that the resultant network above could satisfy 
the Orange Book A1 requirements, since the mandatory enforcement is being done by an A1 rated 
component. The minor caveat is that A1 DAC requires the ability to deny access down to the gran- 
ularity of a single user (i.e., Alice is denied read access to file X, even though file X is readable by 
everyone else in the world). The C2 systems shown above are not required to have this functional- 
ity. 
The phrase "C2+" is often used to describe systems that satisfy C2 functionality and assurance 
requirements and, in addition, implement a DAC policy that has the ability to deny access down to 
the granularity of a single user. Thus, if C2+ systems are used in the configuration shown above, a 
convincing argument could be made that the entire network should warrant an A1 rating. 
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Basic Terms and Definitions 
System Operating Modes 
Dedicated Security Mode 
All users possess the proper clearance and have need-to-know for 
accessing all data processed and stored by the AIS. 
All information is handled at the highest level processed by the 
system. 
System High Security Mode 
All users possess the proper security level but do not necessarily 
have a need-to-know. 
All information is processed at the highest level processed by the 
system. 
Note that the book Computer Security Basics (page72) 
does not give the full definition. 
Multilevel Security Mode 
One or more users do not possess the proper clearance for access- 
ing the most sensitive classified data processed and stored by the 
AIS . 
Data labels maintained by the system can be trusted. 
Controlled Security Mode 
A reduced form of multilevel security mode, when a more limited 
degree of trust is placed in the AIS and the classification and clear- 
ance levels are restricted. 
Compartmented Security Mode 
The mode of operation which allows the system to process two or 
more types of compartmented information or any one type of com- 
partmented information with other than compartmented informa- 
tion. 
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C1 C2 C2 C2 B2 B3 A1 
C1 C2 C2 C2 C2 B2 B3 
II Maximum Data Sensitivity 




C1 B1 B2 B3 * * * 
N C1 C2 B2 B2 A1 * 
C C1 C2 C2 B1 B3 A1 * 
* 
C 
;:SBI) I I I C2 I C2 1 C2 I B1 1 B2 1 
C2 C2 C2 C2t B1$ 
MC c 2  c 2  c 2  c 2  C2t C2t 
Systems for Classes C1 or C2 are assumed system high 
C2-f -- If users not authorized for all categories, then Class B 1 or 
higher 
B 12: -- If 2 categories, Need Class B2 
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System Composition Dangers 
Need to Combine Systems or Components 
composition can be challenging 
- connection of separately secure systems may be insecure 
- need more research on theory of composition 
Cannot Assume Adequate Assurance Although Individual 
Components are Sufficient for Isolated systems 
Cascade Problem Example 










Systems with Secret-to-Secret Connection are Inadequate 
Information can “cascade” from TS to S to C 
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Criteria Dangers 
Mix and Match Approach 
Arbitrary Protection P;ofiles to Counter Specific “Threats” 
Separation of Functional Requirements from Assurance Require- 
ments 
Post Evaluation TCB Extensions 
Relying on Vendor “Pedigrees” 
Most Popular University Operating System is Notably Insecure 
Example: Building Nice WYSIWYG Interfaces Does not Imply 
Security Competence 
Vendors May Cut Comers for Greater Profit 
Changes in Personnel or Business Strategy Unknown to Evalua- 
tion Authority 
Customer Will Not Know Assurance Lacking Until Too Late 
Assurance Summary 
Codify What is Demonstrated- Worked Examples 
Unify with COMSEC Practice 
Utilize synergy 
Identify uses for Cryptographic Techniques -- integrity of labels 
Identify Trusted Processing -- keys 
TCB Subsetting Techniques -- TNI gave a start 
Trusted Subject Methods 
Covert Storage Channel Analysis 
Sufficient Design Constraints 
Definitive Tie to Cryptography 
Explicitly Address Balanced Assurance 
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Orange Book 
Green Book 
Light Yellow Book 
Yellow Book 
Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
Contains basic requirements in four categories for trusted 
operating systems: security policy, accountability, assur- 
ance, and documentation. 
Department of Defense (DoD) Password Management 
Guideline 
Contains a set of good practices for the design, imple- 
mentation, and use of password systems 
used for authentication. Many trusted systems comply 
explicitly with this guideline. 
Computer Security Requirements - Guidance for Apply- 
ing the Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TSEC) in Specific Environ-- 
ments 
Contains information on different modes of security 
(closed security environment, open security environment, 
dedicated security mode, controlled security mode, and 
multi-level security mode) and the “risk index” associ- 
ated with each environment. 
Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer 
Security Requirements - Guidance for Applying the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TSEC) in Specific Environments 
Companion to the Light Yellow Book. Contains back- 
ground information on determining the class of trusted 
system required for different risk indexes. 
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Dark Blue Book 
Tan Book 
Department of Defense (DoD) Magnetic Remanence 
Security Guideline (FOUO) 
Contains recommendations for using products that purge 
magnetic media via various types of data sanitization and 
magnetic remanence techniques. 
A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems 
Contains an interpretation of the auditing requirements 
included in the Orange Book. Auditing 
keeps track of sensitive activities in a system and pro- 
vides a way of determining who performed these activi- 
ties. 
Trusted Product Evaluations: A Guide for Vendors 
Contains procedures to follow when submitting a trusted 
system (or a network product, a database product, or a 
subsystem) to the NCSC for evaluation. 
~ ~~ 
A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control 
(DAC) in Trusted Systems 
Contains an interpretation of the discretionary access 
control requirement included in the Orange Book. DAC 
protects files and other objects in a system at the discre- 
tion of the owner. 
Glossary of Computer Security Terms 
Contains definitions for common terms used in govern- 
ment computer security publications. 





Venice Blue Book 
Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) of the Trusted Com- 
puter System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) 
Contains an interpretation of the Orange Book require- 
ments for networks, and a summary of specific network 
services: communications integrity, denial of service, and 
compromise protection. 
A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in 
Trusted Systems 
Contains an interpretation of the configuration manage- 
ment requirements included in the Orange Book. These 
requirements manage changes to the Trusted Computing 
Base and to the system documentation. 
A Guide to Understanding Design Documentation in 
Trusted Systems 
Contains an interpretation of the design documentation 
requirements included in the Orange Book, including the 
suggested scope and level of effort for this documenta- 
tion. 
~~ 
A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in 
Trusted Systems 
Contains an interpretation of the trusted distribution 
requirements included in the Orange Book. These 
requirements ensure that all elements of the TCB distrib- 
uted to a customer arrive exactly as intended by the ven- 
dor. They include recommendations for packaging, 
security locks, courier service, etc. 
Contains an interpretation of the Orange Book require- 
ments for computer security add-on products and sub- 
systems. Subsystems typically provide features in one or 
more or the following categories: discretionary access 
control, object reuse, identification and authentication, 
and audit. 
~~~~ 
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Light Blue Book 
Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline 
Companion to the Red Book. Contains information help- 
ful when integrating, operating, and maintaining trusted 
computer networks, including the minimum security 
required in different network environments. 
Rating Maintenance Phase (RAMP) Program Document 
Contains procedures for keeping an Orange Book rating 
up to date via the RAMP program. Participation in 
RAMP is required for C1, C2 and B1 systems. 
~ 
Guidelines for Formal Verification Systems 
Contains procedures to follow when submitting a formal 
design and verification tool to the NCSC for evaluation. 
A Guide to Understanding Trusted Facility Management 
Contains an interpretation of the trusted facility manage- 
ment requirements included in the Orange Book. These 
requirements mandate certain types of system and secu- 
rity administration - for example, the separation of opera- 
tor, security administrator, and account administrator 
functions. 
Trusted Product Evaluation Questionnaire 
Contains an extensive list of questions aimed at vendors 
of trusted systems. Examples are “What are the subjects 
in your system?” and “How can an operator distinguish 
the TCB-generated banner pages from user output?” The 
goal of the list is to help vendors understand what techni- 
cal information is required for the system to be evaluated 
successfully. 
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Gray Book 
Lavender 2 
Trusted UNlX Working Group (TRUSIX) Rationale for 
Selecting Access Control List Features for the UNIX Sys- 
tem 
Contains a description of access control lists (ACLs), 
their use in enforcing the discretionary access control 
(DAC) feature included in the Orange Book, and the rea- 
sons for selecting this mechanism as a standard for 
trusted U N E  systems 
Trusted Database Management System Interpretation 
Contains an interpretation of the Orange Book require- 
ments for database management systems. 
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